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© Nick Chozos Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to gain an understanding of the problems that may impede 
detection and recovery of NHS laboratory screening errors. This is done by developing an 
accident analysis technique that isolates and further analyzes error handling activities, 
and applying it in four case studies; four recent incidents where laboratory errors in NHS 
screening  programmes  resulted  in  multiple  misdiagnoses  over  months  or  even  years. 
These errors resulted in false yet plausible test results, thus being masked and almost 
impossible to detect in isolated cases. 
 
This technique is based on a theoretical framework that draws upon cognitive science and 
systems engineering, in order to explore the impact of the plausibility of false test results 
on  the  entire  process  of  error  recovery.  The  four  analyses  are  then  integrated  and 
compared, in order to produce a set of conclusions and recommendations. 
 
The main output of this work is the “Screening Error Recovery Model”; a model which 
captures  and  illustrates  the  different  kinds  of  activities  that  took  place  during  the 
organizational  incident  responses  of  these  four  incidents.  The  model  can  be  used  to 
analyze and design error recovery procedures in complex, inter-organizational settings, 
such as the NHS, and its Primary/Secondary care structure.  
 Thesis statement  
This thesis aims to contribute to the safety and overall quality of screening programmes 
in the NHS, by enhancing our understanding of the problems that may impede detection 
and recovery of screening errors. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 
 
Laboratory and radiology departments are playing an increasingly critical role in modern 
healthcare. In the past 25 years, advances in medical knowledge and technology have 
created the opportunity  for better and faster patient diagnosis; for instance, with new 
high-speed  analyzers  laboratory  testing  can  be  largely  automated,  while  with  an 
information-technology  based  infrastructure,  specialist  doctors  can  now  perform  the 
interpretation of X-rays from a distance, without the patient having to go to the hospital 
[Brennan, 2005].  
 
The benefits of these innovations can be seen in the Breast Cancer Screening Programme 
of  the  UK’s  National  Health  Service  (NHS).  Since  its  introduction  in  1987,  the 
programme resulted to a 25% drop in mortality rates attributed to breast cancer by 2000 
[NHS Advisory Committee for Breast Cancer Screening, 2006]. Similar success has been 
achieved by other NHS screening programs, altogether contributing significantly to the 
timely diagnosis of various forms of cancer, Sexually Transmitted Infections (STI), and 
other critical conditions.  
 
Despite the significant advances in laboratory medicine, hospitals and laboratories still 
remain  concerned  about  the  accuracy,  validity  and  reliability  of  clinical  test  results Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
 11 
[Plebani and Carraro, 1997; Hickner et al., 2006; Schiff, 2006]. As several challenges and 
problems  remain  in  the  already  complex  setting  of  diagnostic  networks  (e.g.,  the 
definition of an acceptable error range, delays in following-up critical test results), the 
drastic changes that information technology has brought about have created the potential 
for new kinds of error, which—although rare—can be significantly more disastrous in 
extent.  
 
Table  1.1  summarizes  three  serious  screening  incidents  which  had  multiple  adverse 
outcomes over long periods of time. The table below is based on the subsequent inquiry 
reports that were produced [Ferres et al., 2001; Commission for health improvement, 
2002; Baker, 2006]; immediate cause refers to the cause that initiated the incident, while 
incident-prolonging causes are issues that resulted in not detecting the immediate cause 
and/or poorly handing the incident. Similar screening incidents have occurred in the UK 
[The Guardian, 2006], USA [Wears, 2003] and Canada [Bernstein, 2003].  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
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Incident  Investigation findings  Patients affected 
1.  Down’s syndrome 
screening errors, 
Sheffield Northern 
General Hospital, 
Immunology Dept. 
 
January-May 2001 
Immediate cause: A software bug was affecting 
an algorithm used to calculate the likelihood of 
pregnant women giving birth to children with 
Down’s 
Incident-prolonging factors: User interface 
deficiencies, audits not carried out as planned, 
incident log books not used as specified, poor 
communication between staff groups 
-  158 high-risk 
pregnancies missed 
 
-  2 women had late 
abortion 
-  2 women gave birth to 
children with Down’s 
2.  Breast cancer 
screening errors, 
Hammersmith 
London, Breast 
Cancer screening 
service 
 
1993-October 2000 
Immediate cause: Confusing notation for denoting 
positive and negative results 
Incident-prolonging factors: No robust protocol 
for ensuring women received the correct result, 
strained relationships between staff groups, 
poor handling of complaints 
-  Over 12,000 incorrect  
tests 
 
-  17 patients more 
critical  
-  1 death 
3.  Breast cancer 
screening errors, 
Manchester, Breast 
Cancer screening 
service 
April 2003–January 
2006 
Immediate cause: ‘Human’ error of a single 
radiologist, who misinterpreted multiple 
mammograms  
 Incident-prolonging factors: No double-checking 
of radiology reports which is common practice, 
lack of safeguards  
-  176 mammograms 
misinterpreted 
 
-  28 cancers missed, 
out of which 17 were 
very critical 
Table 1.1: NHS screening incidents 
Although the immediate causes that led to these unfortunate events vary (i.e., hardware 
and software bugs, problematic notation for denoting positives, human error), all of these 
incidents  were  prolonged  for  several  months  by  relatively  common  organizational 
problems  (e.g.,  communication  breakdowns,  lack  of  safeguards,  poor  handling  of 
complaints); however, the most important aspect of these failures is that when the errors 
manifested, false test results were plausibly acceptable, masking errors and allowing for 
them to be used in the diagnostic process. Detection was consequently only possible over 
time, when experienced staff became increasingly alarmed over a lack of positive results 
reported from the laboratory. 
 Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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The study presented in  this thesis is therefore an attempt to identify and analyze the 
factors  that  inhibit  laboratory  error  detection  and  recovery.  While  there  has  been 
considerable work in the study of laboratory error, little attention has been paid to the 
impact of such errors to healthcare systems overall and how errors are detected and dealt 
with  [Plebani  and  Carraro,  2004].  In  addition,  this  work  may  be  distinguished  from 
previous error handling studies by incorporating the concept of problem detection in the 
overall error recovery process. Problem detection refers to the concerns over a potential 
error, as opposed to error detection, which is the identification of an error) [Klein et al., 
2005].  
 
In order to achieve these purposes, an accident analysis tool has been developed which 
focuses on the error handling activities that took place during an incident. This tool is the 
primary contribution of this thesis, which has been specifically tailored to help analyze 
these healthcare events. The development of such a tool was found necessary as existing 
accident analysis approaches do not take a structured perspective on the sequence of 
events that form an error recovery process. The accident analysis approach suggested has 
been used to analyze four incidents; resulting findings were then integrated and compared 
in  order  to  draw  high  level  conclusions  about  the  factors  that  limit  the  ability  of 
healthcare systems to detect, control and recover from laboratory error.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the aims and objectives of the study, and present 
an overview of the thesis. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
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1.1  Aims and objectives 
The work presented in this thesis focuses on the events that take place once there are 
initial concerns that ‘something is wrong’, but does not examine the causal factors, i.e., 
what led to the errors in the first place. The high-level goal of this study is to understand 
how errors could be better detected, contained and controlled, in order to help healthcare 
professionals limit the consequences on human life to the smallest extent. 
 
The aims of this thesis are the following:  
•  Primary Aim: To gain a detailed understanding of the factors that affect 
detection and recovery of screening errors 
Investigations  into  the  incidents  discussed  in  Table  1.1  produced  detailed 
conclusions and recommendations regarding the improvement of organizational 
response to errors. The primary aim of this thesis is to utilize these findings by 
comparing  and  integrating  them,  and  further  analyzing  them  with  a  scientific 
method  that  can  be  useful  for  policy-makers,  system  and  medical  device 
designers. The results of this analysis will be presented in Chapter 6, which will 
conclude with a detailed model that presents all the activities that may take place 
during laboratory error handling.  
 
•  Secondary Aim:  To  generate  recommendations  for  the  improvement  of 
laboratory error handling 
The basis for these recommendations will be the model that has been developed in 
order to meet the Primary Aim. Recommendations will focus on improving each 
stage of laboratory error recovery. An important aspect of these recommendations Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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is that they are based on the relationship between the different stages of error 
recovery  (these  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  3,  but  they  are  error 
detection,  error  indication,  further  investigation,  error  explanation,  and  error 
correction), e.g. different recommendations regarding incident reporting that has 
been stimulated from different kinds of detection. 
 
In order to meet these aims, it was necessary to achieve the following research objective: 
•  Research Objective: To develop and validate an accident analysis tool 
that can be used to identify and analyze error handling activities 
This accident analysis technique is an adaptation of ‘Sequentially Timed Events 
Plotting’ (STEP) [Henrick and Benner, 1983] that has been integrated with error 
recovery theory in order to take a focus on error handling. The development of 
Error  Recovery-STEP  (ER-STEP)  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  4: 
Research Methodology. 
 
The  following  section  presents  an  overview  of  the  methodology  used  to  meet  these 
objectives, and provides an introduction to the findings of this thesis. 
1.2  Overview of research methodology and results 
Figure 1.1 summarizes the three parts of the methodology and their relationship to the 
aims and the research objective of this thesis. Step 1 is the development of ER-STEP, 
Step 3 is the application of ER-STEP for the analysis of four case studies (which were 
discussed in the introduction of this Chapter) and Step 3 is the integration of the 
individual findings in order to draw high level conclusions. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
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Figure 1.1: Overview of research methodology, aims and objectives. 
The  analysis  of  the  four  incidents  resulted  in  an  informed  model  that  describes  the 
various kinds of activities within a healthcare system that make up the organizational 
response towards the control and correction of a laboratory error.  
 
The model is presented in Figure 1.2 below; it illustrates the relationship between error 
recovery activities, and can be used to design error recovery processes based on different 
kinds of detection, including incident reporting schemes and user interface design.  
 
Primary Aim:  
To gain a detailed understanding of the 
factors that affect detection and recovery of 
screening errors 
 
Secondary Aim:  
To generate meaningful 
recommendations for the 
improvement of laboratory 
error handling 
 
Research Objective:  
To develop and 
validate an accident 
analysis tool that can 
be used to identify and 
analyze error handling 
activities 
 
 
Methodology Step 1: 
Development of 
technique 
 
 
Methodology Step 
3: Further analysis 
of the 4 case 
studies findings 
 
 
Methodology 
Step 2: Analysis 
of four case 
studies 
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Figure 1.2: The Screening error recovery model. 
The  model  and  its  development  will  be  explained  fully  in  Chapter  6:  Overview  of 
findings. This is later used to guide the recommendations that are discussed in Chapter 7: 
Recommendations. 
 
The following section summarizes the contents of each chapter of this thesis. 
1.3  Thesis breakdown 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of laboratory work and laboratory error, which are the 
field and the focus of this thesis. First, the organizational structure of NHS diagnostic 
networks will be presented. This is important as there are several inter-organizational 
issues that need to be considered. This chapter will also discuss several studies that have 
attempted to identify and classify laboratory and radiology error types and frequencies. 
This chapter will conclude with a definition of the problem that this thesis aims to tackle. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
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Chapter 3 contains the literature review that this thesis draws upon. Theory on problem 
detection and error detection, error recovery strategies and models, and error management 
will be presented and discussed. This chapter will conclude with a new Error Recovery 
Framework, which has been developed for the purposes of this thesis. This framework 
builds upon the literature that has been reviewed but extends it by incorporating problem 
detection in the error recovery process. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the research methodology that has been used. This chapter discusses 
some existing approaches to accident analysis and elaborates on the need for an error-
handling focused analytical approach. This chapter will conclude with a presentation of 
the  accident  analysis  tool  that  has  been  developed  for  the  purposes  of  this  thesis 
(Research Objective). 
 
Chapter 5 presents the analysis of four case studies in detail. These are the three incidents 
summarized in Table 1.1, as well as one incident that took place in the USA. Each case 
study,  along  with  graphical  illustrations  of  the  applied  analytical  technique  will  be 
presented in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 6 presents an overview of the findings of the four analyses. This chapter will 
conclude with a model that describes the ‘Laboratory Error Handling Process’, which is 
an  overview  of  the  error  recovery  activities  that  may  take  place  within  a  diagnostic 
network. This is where the Primary Aim of this thesis has been met. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
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Chapter  7  discusses  some  preliminary  recommendations  for  the  improvement  of 
laboratory error detection and recovery (Secondary Aim). These recommendations will 
consider improvements, interventions and new ways for better dealing with laboratory 
error. 
 
Chapter 8 presents the validation of ER-STEP. The method undertaken for validation and 
the subsequent results are discussed here. 
 
Finally, Chapter 9 contains the overall conclusions that have arisen from this work, and 
discusses some possible directions for further research. This chapter is followed by a list 
of references and two appendices. 
 Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Chapter 2:  Field and focus 
 
 
 
The previous chapter introduced the aims and objectives that this thesis hopes to achieve. 
This chapter will present the field and focus of this study. An overview of laboratory 
medicine and screening programmes in the NHS will first be presented. This discussion 
will  proceed  with  a  description  of  the  inter-organizational  networks  that  take  part  in 
diagnostic services, focusing on the dependencies that are developed upon laboratory and 
radiology departments within NHS Trusts, as an error in one laboratory can propagate in 
various  organizations.  This  work,  therefore,  takes  place  in  the  field  of  diagnostic 
networks in the NHS, laboratory medicine, and the technological and procedural aspects 
that support such networks. 
 
The focus of this thesis is laboratory error, and in particular in screening services. There 
is much ongoing work aiming at the analysis of laboratory error [e.g. De Boer et al., 
2002; Sirota, 2005; Frable, 2006]; however, these studies tend to be confined within a 
specific laboratory, taking a rather quantitative approach towards the measurement of 
error types’ frequencies. It has also been suggested that most laboratory error studies do 
not consider the impact such errors have on patients, as laboratories do not maintain 
information about the results of their work in terms of patient outcomes [Bonini et al., 
2002].  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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This chapter will provide some background in laboratory medicine services and in the 
UK NHS in particular, focusing on screening services, before discussing laboratory error 
and recent work that identifies types and frequencies of error that can take place in a 
laboratory  setting.  This  information  will  then  be  related  to  the  incidents  presented  in 
Table 1.1 in order to place the problems that this thesis aims to tackle within the wider 
context of healthcare systems. 
2.1  Laboratory medicine 
Laboratory and radiology services are an integral part of diagnosis and monitoring of 
patients. On a daily basis, pathology, biochemistry, microbiology, immunology and other 
types  of  laboratories  produce  a  wide  range  of  test  reports  which  are  used  to  support 
clinicians’ decision upon patient treatment [Brennan, 2005]. Overall, there are three types 
of laboratory testing: 
 
1.  Screening test: a test in search of a disease in a person who does not appear to 
have it; e.g. PSA test (Prostate Specific Antigen) for prostate cancer.   
2.  Diagnostic test: a test for a specific, particular disease; e.g. lung cancer. 
3.  Monitoring test: a test which helps doctors keep track of how a patient is doing 
with a known disease; e.g. monitoring a diabetic patient.   
 
The testing process is made up of three stages: Pre-analytic, analytic and post-analytic. 
The pre-analytic phase is structured around the ordering and implementation of the test. 
The analytic phase conducts the specimen analysis. Post-analytic is the communication, Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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documentation and usage of the test results [Sirota, 2005]. Figure 2.1  illustrates an ‘error 
free’ testing process. 
 
Figure 2.1: An ‘error-free’ testing process [adapted from Hickner et al., 2005].  
The following section will discuss how diagnostic services are provided by the NHS. 
2.2  NHS diagnostic services  
The  NHS  can  be  seen  to  be  divided  in  two  sections:  Primary  and  Secondary  care.  
Primary care is the ‘frontline’ service, which is the first point of contact for patients. 
Primary care consists mainly of General Practice (GP) clinics and surgeries, as well as 
dentists, opticians and pharmacists. When a patient walks in the GP practice, a prognosis 
or initial consultation may conclude that laboratory testing is required, which will be 
carried out in a hospital (Secondary care). Specimens are taken at the GP premises and 
are then sent to the laboratory
1. As several hospitals, departments and GPs are attached to 
one laboratory, several specimens are analyzed in a routine, batch process, and the results 
are then sent back to each GP.  
 
Figure  2.2  illustrates  a  typical  network  of  primary  and  secondary  care  organizations 
which are all dependent on a single laboratory for the provision of diagnostic services.  
 
                                                 
1 More information can be found at www.nhs.uk/conditions/nhs/Pages/Definition.aspx?url=Pages/what-is-
it.aspx, last accessed 05-Oct-08  
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Figure 2.2: NHS diagnostic networks structure. 
The UK model of diagnostic services provision is somewhat different from the one in the 
USA, where there is an attempt to “bring lab-testing closer to the patient”. In the USA, 
testing facilities may also be offered at the first point of contact (for the UK in GPs or 
walk-in centres). When the patient goes to a clinic, there will first be a battery of common 
tests before the doctor even sees the patient, which will then be taken into account along 
with  patient  history,  whereas  in  the  UK  such  tests  have  to  be  requested  following  a 
consultation and sent back—a process which will may take days to perform [Brennan, 
2005]. In this way, the NHS model of laboratory services is significantly different from 
the USA model. 
 
Nonetheless—and as we shall see later on—the NHS diagnostic model has seen notable 
improvements, with important cost reduction, increases in productivity and offers more 
diagnostic  services.  Much  of  the  success  of  this  model  is  based  on the  utilisation  of 
modern technologies. The next section will briefly discuss some of the advances that 
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have driven much of the drastic structural and workflow changes seen in the NHS in the 
past twenty years. 
2.2.1  Laboratory information systems 
While  the  number  of  tests  ordered  has  increased  substantially  over  the  past  decade, 
laboratory systems also steadily growing to offer more critical diagnostic services [Smith 
and McNeely, 1999; Schiff, 2006]. In order to cope with these increasing demands, the 
testing process is utilizing a combination of complex technologies that can automate the 
analytic  stage.  This  combination  involves  hardware  and  software  that  is  used  for 
specimen analysis, and the subsequent calculations that need to be performed in order to 
derive the requested test results.  
 
In  addition,  information  technology  applications  have  also  been  introduced  for  the 
request, archiving and communication of test results and radiology reports. For instance, 
Picture Archiving and Communication Systems (PACS) are digital imaging solutions that 
can also distribute X-ray films over a computer network.  In the near future, all NHS 
Trusts  will  have  a  PACS  system  [Brennan,  2005].  NHS  Scotland  has  introduced  the 
Electronic Clinical Communications Implementation (ECCI), which aims at facilitating 
communications between primary and secondary care for the request and follow-up of 
laboratory tests, patient referrals, outpatient appointment etc. [Pagliari et al., 2004].  
 
These innovations have significantly reduced costs and created an infrastructure which 
allows for a more efficient and productive testing process. Laboratories can thus offer 
more  services  to  more  patients,  by  automating  a  great  part  of  analytic  testing  and Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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communication  with  GP practices,  departments  and  wards  as  well  as  other  hospitals. 
Such advances have formed the basis for the success of screening programmes in the 
NHS, which are discussed in the next section. 
2.2.2  NHS Screening programmes 
Screening programmes aim at diagnosing critical conditions such as cancer by routinely 
evaluating patients that are likely to have that specific condition. For instance, under the 
NHS  Breast  Cancer  Screening  Programme,  women  aged  50-64  are  invited  for 
mammography  screening  once  every  three  years  [Advisory  Committee  on  Breast 
Screening, 2006].  
 
Breast Cancer Screening was introduced in 1986. Since then, the NHS has grown to offer 
a variety of screening programmes
2. They can be summarized as follows: 
•  Cancer  screening:  Breast  cancer,  cervical  cancer  and  bowel  cancer.  There  is 
currently  no  national  screening  programme  for  prostate  cancer,  but  a  risk 
management programme is available.  
•  Vascular diseases: Heart disease, diabetes and stroke. 
•  Sexually  transmitted  infections:  Human  Immunodeficiency  Virus  (HIV), 
Chlamydia, Hepatitis B and C and others.  
•  Screening  for  pregnant  women  and/or  their  newborn  babies:  Down's 
syndrome, fetal anomalies, hearing, hepatitis B and HIV. 
 
                                                 
2 More information can be found at www.screening.nhs.uk, last accessed 05-Oct-08   Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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NHS screening programmes have achieved notable success; for instance, Breast Cancer 
screening has contributed to a 25% reduction in mortality attributed to the malignancy. In 
the same time, the number of women screened annually has been steadily increasing. By 
2005, there were approximately 1.3 million women screened, whereby 10,000 cancers are 
identified  per  year.  Timely  detection  has  then  resulted  to,  not  only  a  reduction  in 
mortality but also a reduction to the number of mastectomies [Advisory Committee on 
Breast Screening, 2006]. 
 
As mentioned previously, many screening programmes are driven by the capabilities of 
new technologies, but involve careful consideration of policy and the development of 
appropriate  management  structures.  New  screening  programmes  are  evaluated  by  the 
National Screening Committee (NSC) which uses research evidence and the skills of 
multi-disciplinary expert groups to develop policies for screening. The aim of the NSC is 
to ensure that “screening does more good than harm at a reasonable cost”
3 by assessing 
new programmes against a set of recognized international standards. 
 
There has been much criticism about the way with which new screening programmes are 
introduced. For instance, in 1996, an internal report compiled by the NSC characterized 
NHS  screening  programmes  a  “mess”.  Table  2.1  summarizes  some  of  the  problems 
identified by the NSC at the time [in Programme Director’s report, 2005]. 
                                                 
3 National Screening Committee official website, http://www.nsc.nhs.uk/uk_nsc/uk_nsc_main.htm#remit, 
last accessed 07-Oct-08 Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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-  Unknowing variations in policy, including no policy.  
-  Unknowing variations in practice.  
-  Absence of standards.  
-  Absence of performance measurement.  
-  Patchy training.  
-  Poor information for women.  
-  Lack of clear lines of accountability. 
Table 2.1: Problems identified in NHS Breast Cancer Screening Programme [Programme Director’s 
report, 2005].  
 
Continuing in this report, the NSC suggested that is essential to develop clear systems of 
management  which  are  able  to  deliver  the  four  functions  of  a  quality  assurance 
programme, namely:  
1.  Minimizing the risks of error. 
2.  Dealing with errors and adverse events quickly and compassionately. 
3.  Continual improvement in performance, either by investment of resources, 
new technology, or process redesign, and 
4.  Regular re-setting of quality standards.  
 
This  thesis  relates  primarily  to  function  2  but  also  to  function  3.  The  statement  of 
function 2 is an acknowledgement of the problems that the NHS has been facing with 
regards to screening error. The temporal aspect of error recovery is important because a 
misdiagnosed patient’s condition is most likely to deteriorate with time. This thesis can 
be  seen  to  contribute  to  function  3  by  promoting  the  development  of  more  efficient 
laboratory error recovery strategies. 
 
The following section will discuss quality assurance practices in the NHS. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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2.2.3  Diagnostic services quality management 
Laboratories and radiology departments have performance standards and systems in place 
for  quality  control  and  quality  assurance.  Reliability  cannot  be  achieved  in  a  clinical 
laboratory just through the promotion of accuracy in the analytical phase of the testing 
process; hence, monitoring all steps in laboratory testing in order to detect and correct 
defects  is  very  important  [Witte  et  al.,  1997].  Quality  assurance  is  therefore  applied 
throughout the testing process (see Figure 2.3).  
 
Figure 2.3: Quality assurance in screening services [adapted from Programme Director’s report, 
2005]. 
 
Some of the main aspects of laboratory quality assurance are summarized here:  
•  Laboratory standards: Each diagnostic specialization is governed by guidelines 
and standards that dictate how laboratories should conduct their services in order 
to  achieve  a  desirable  level  of  quality.  Policy  documents  cover  all  aspects  of 
laboratory work, from how testing should be carried out, to the acquisition of 
medical devices, and algorithms employed in the specific analysis [Johnson and 
Patnick, 2000]. 
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•  Performance indicators: Performance indicators are performance standards that 
are proposed and controlled on a national level by accrediting agencies. These are 
used to evaluate the performance on all healthcare organizations. Ratings can then 
be used for benchmarking purposes. Table 2.2 presents 8 performance measures 
that may be applicable to all clinical laboratories [Howanitz, 2005].  
Measure  Laboratory Discipline  Phase of Testing  Frequency of Data 
Collection 
Customer satisfaction  All   All 3  Yearly 
Turnaround time  Chemistry, Haematology  All 3  Monthly 
Patient Identification  All  Pre-analytic  Monthly 
Specimen 
acceptability 
Chemistry, Haematology  Pre-analytic  Monthly 
Proficiency testing  All  Analytic  6- 20 specimens per 
analyte yearly 
Critical Value 
reporting 
All  Post-analytic  Monthly 
Blood product 
wastage 
Transfusion medicine  Post-analytic  Monthly 
Blood Culture 
contamination 
Microbiology  Pre-analytic  Monthly 
Table 2.2: Critical laboratory performance measures [taken from Howanitz, 2005]. 
•  Auditing: Laboratory audit is concerned with the everyday aspects of the work of 
the department. Audits are usually organized internally (Internal Quality Control). 
However, the National External Quality Assessment Service (known as NEQAS) 
and  Clinical  Pathology  Accreditation  schemes  can  complement  the  in-house 
program of audit
4. The auditors check compliance, non-compliance or possible 
non-compliance against a checklist and write a report, while the quality system 
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itself  can  be  audited  (Figure  2.4  presents  a  fragment  of  an  example  audit 
checklist
5). Any faults identified by an audit should lead to immediate corrective 
action and appropriate changes in documentation, which should be discussed in 
management reviews. 
 
Figure 2.4: Example laboratory audit checklist. 
The primary purpose of quality assurance is to ensure that “the right result on the right 
specimen of the right patient is accurate, timely and properly interpreted” [Standards 
Unit,  Evaluation  and  Standards  Laboratory,  2008].  Quality  assurance  in  laboratory 
systems primarily aims at the avoidance of errors throughout the three phases of the test 
lifecycle. The next section will introduce laboratory error and discuss various laboratory 
error related studies that have taken place recently. 
                                                 
5 Full example laboratory audit checklist can be found at: 
http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/recover/recover_docs/wqt/qasr_app_g.pdf, last accessed 07-Oct-08 Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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2.3  Laboratory error  
Defining  laboratory  error  is  very  challenging,  as  there  is  much  debate  regarding 
acceptable  error  ranges  and  to  what  rate  unacceptable  test  results  are  tolerable 
[Blumenthal, 1997]. Not all patients’ samples with unacceptable results are equally likely 
to alter patients’ outcomes [Witte et al., 1997]. This confusion makes it very difficult to 
define laboratory error,  and therefore  regulate and mandate laboratory  quality control 
practices in laboratory services [Bonini et al., 2002]. Nevertheless, laboratory error can 
be broadly defined as “any defect during the entire testing process, from ordering to 
reporting results” [Plebani and Carraro, 1997].  
 
From this definition it is obvious that the risks associated with laboratory services are not 
limited within the premises of the lab and errors in the analytical stage of the testing 
process. In fact, many misdiagnoses have resulted from requesting the wrong result or 
mixing up patients, errors occurring during the ordering or use of test results by other 
clinical units or even institutions [Schiff, 2006].  
2.3.1  Error types and frequencies 
Table 2.3 summarizes the findings of three studies that have attempted to classify various 
errors according to the three stages of laboratory testing. These studies were carried out 
by monitoring different laboratories over periods of several months. Data was derived 
from a review of test records and audits. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Pre-analytical Phase  Analytical Phase  Post-analytical Phase  Study 
-  ordering of incorrect test  
-  specimen handling errors  
-  provision of false 
information to the 
laboratory  
-  specimen mix-up 
-  mislabelling of specimens 
-  lack of appropriate 
measurements 
-  knowledge problems  
-  problematic classification 
models 
-  delivery of report to the 
wrong location 
-  clinician misinterpretation  
Sirota, 
2005 
-  failure to order 
-  ordering delay 
-  ordered but not 
completed 
-  contraindicated 
-  specimen not sent or not 
picked up 
-  incorrect preparation 
-  inadequate equipment 
-  results incorrectly 
processed 
-  ambiguous report 
-  misread or missed critical 
report 
-  report not acted on 
-  report information not 
available when needed 
Hickner et 
al., 2006 
-  wrong patient name 
-  erroneous specification of 
hospital unit 
-  physician order missed 
-  order misinterpreted 
-  inappropriate container 
used 
-  isolated malfunctioning of 
instrument 
-  lack of specificity of the 
method 
-  unacceptable 
performance 
-  correction of erroneous 
finding overlooked 
-  keyboard entry error 
-  turnaround time exceeded 
-  physician not notified of 
problem 
Plebani 
and 
Carraro, 
1997 
Table 2.3: Errors in the testing process. 
As we can see, there is a variety of possible errors that can occur during the request, 
analysis and follow-up of test results. The following table  presents the findings of five 
studies  that  attempted  to  measure  the  frequencies  of  errors  in  the  three  stages  of 
laboratory testing. 
Pre-analytical 
Phase 
Analytical Phase  Post-analytical 
Phase 
Study 
31.6%  31.6%  30.8%  Lapworth and Teal, 1994 
53%  23%  24%  Goldsmchmidt and Lent, 1997 
55.6%  13.3%  30%  Nutting et al.., 1996 
68.2%  13.3%  18.5%  Plebani and Carraro, 1997 
75%  16%  9%  Stahl et al.., 1998 
Table 2.4: Laboratory error frequencies [taken from Bonini et al., 2002]. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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In conclusion  from Table 2.4, most errors occur at the pre-analytic and post-analytic 
stages. In fact, all of these studies agreed that the majority of errors occur during the pre-
analytical phase, but with significant percentages in the other two stages of testing. 
  
Table 2.5 presents some methodological information about these studies, as well as the 
findings these studies had in terms of impact of errors found on patient outcomes. 
Study  Data collection 
period 
Number of 
samples analyzed 
Impact on patient outcomes 
None    Mild    Moderate  Severe  
Lapworth and 
Teal, 1994 
1 year  997000  n/d  n/d  n/d  n/d 
Goldschmidt and 
Lent, 1997 
6 years  not determined 
(n/d) 
43%  23%   26%  8% 
Nutting et al., 
1996 
6 months  n/d  13%  13%  n/d  n/d 
Plebani and 
Carraro, 1997 
3 months  40490  74%  19.6%  6.4%  0% 
Stahl et al., 1998  3 years  676564  n/d  n/d  n/d  n/d 
Table 2.5: Patient outcomes in five laboratory error studies (adapted from Bonini et al., 2002). 
 
When considering the impact of laboratory errors found on patient outcome, these studies 
take account of four levels (none, mild, moderate, severe). These are classified according 
to immediate impact (i.e. delay of diagnosis) but do not examine the long terms effects of 
errors identified. This is problematic because it can be hard to determine the degree to 
which an error affected long term prognoses given that individual patient related factors 
have an impact on outcomes. 
 
In addition, the Goldschmidt and Lent study [1997] found that approximately 75% of 
laboratory errors are likely to result to tests which are still within their reference intervals. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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This  suggests  that  they  would  not  necessarily  have  any  adverse  impact  on  patient’s 
health, although they might be misleading. However, defining these boundary values is a 
great  challenge,  primarily  because  not  all  patients  are  going  to  respond  to  the  same 
treatment in the same way.  
 
These challenges limit our understanding of the impact of laboratory error on patient 
diagnosis  and  treatment  overall.  As  laboratories  maintain  little  or  no  information 
regarding the impact of their work on patients’ health, it is very difficult to understand of 
the  severity  of  laboratory  error;  a  single  error  may  have  much  greater  impact  on  a 
patient’s health, while several marginal errors may be superficial [Plebani and Carraro, 
1997].  
 
One more factor that makes laboratory error difficult to cope with—and, as this thesis 
argues the most important factor—is that it may  be very  difficult to detect, not only 
within the laboratory, but also when these test results are taken into consideration during 
patient  diagnosis  within  primary  care.  Erroneous  test  results  which  are  plausibly 
acceptable will mislead diagnosis, and therefore the decision upon a course of treatment. 
In  the  case  of  screening,  such  an  error  can  become  detrimental  either  by  missing  ill 
patients or by aggravating their health by e.g., excessive radiation treatment. The next 
section will therefore discuss the aspect of ‘plausibility’ of erroneous test results.  
2.3.2  Plausibility of false test results 
Errors taking place during the testing cycle may not always produce detectable abnormal 
results, nor raise questions for the physician that has requested them; they can thus be Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
 35 
taken into account during patient diagnosis and decision upon treatment [Bonini et al., 
2002]. When false test results appear to be worthy of belief, these are referred to as ‘false 
yet plausible’.  
In the case of screening, such errors can take the form of false positives/false negatives:  
•  A false positive is when there is no disease (or other condition) but the results 
come back as positive; for example, a positive test for HIV or cancer, when the 
person was disease free, would be a false positive.  Sometimes, when a disease is 
very rare, and/or when a test has a high rate of error, there may be more false 
positives than actual positives.   
•  A false negative is when there actually is a disease (or other condition) but the 
results come back as negative [De Boer et al., 2002].  
 
False-positives and false-negatives are a well known problem in laboratory medicine and 
to a certain level, they are inevitable in any screening programme [Johnson and Patnick, 
2000]. In the case of screening, there are two possible outcomes of the analysis: positive, 
or not positive; both of which are plausible, especially if there is no other information to 
constitute them as implausible. For instance, when patients are asymptomatic but ill, a 
false negative will seem like a plausible result. 
 
The incidents that were discussed in Table 1.1 are adverse events that involved several 
erroneous yet plausibly acceptable test results which were caused by technical faults or 
systematic  errors  taking  place  in  the  laboratory  during  highly  automated  routine 
analytical processes. Therefore the risks associated with plausibility increase when taking Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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into account the potential of hiding the automated production of multiple test results, and 
not just one single erroneous report.  
2.4  A pattern of failure in screening services 
The result of any screening service will be in the form of a ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. So 
despite the variety of screening services available, errors in the testing cycle are likely to 
result  to  false-positives  or  false-negatives,  which,  in  most  cases  seem  plausible  in 
isolation  for  any  screening  test.  Without  interaction  with  the  patient  or  a  substantial 
amount patient history, any deterministic derivation of a screening test will therefore be 
very likely to manifest in a way plausible for the diagnostician. 
 
In  the  incidents  summarized  in  Table  1.1,  such  plausibly  acceptable  yet  erroneous 
screening  tests  were  being  produced  for  periods  of  months,  or  even  years,  affecting 
hundreds  of  patients.  While  their  plausible  nature  is  an  inhibiting  factor  in  terms  of 
detection, there are some organizational and technological elements that contributed to 
the automation of multiple mistaken tests. In particular, the dependence of several points 
of care on one single laboratory increases the likelihood of propagation of a single fault to 
more patients; this becomes more critical when faults in software that participates in the 
analysis and communication result in the automated creation of multiple false test results. 
   
This  chapter  discussed  how  screening  is  done  in  the  UK,  within  the  organizational 
structure of diagnostic networks; where several GPs and even other hospitals depend on a 
single laboratory or radiology department for the screening of all of their patients (Figure 
2.2). Such a structure may be useful in terms of productivity and efficiency; however, if Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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there is a fault in the highly automated testing process (either software bugs or procedural 
problems), it is very likely that it will affect many—if not all—of the points of care that 
depend on that laboratory. 
 
The UK incidents of Table 1.1 all developed following this pattern. Moreover, they were 
prolonged  by  a  lack  of  (or  poor)  safeguards—the  quality  assurance  systems  in  place 
(primarily audits and management meetings) failed to mitigate or control these errors. As 
we shall see later on, these incidents were eventually detected and recovered because 
people involved took initiatives which were not necessarily prescribed to them.  
 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, the screening services quality assurance should be able to 
“…deal with errors and adverse events quickly…” [Programme Director’s report, 2005]. 
However, the fact that several such incidents have occurred since 2000
6 (Table 1.1) 
indicates that there are several problems that impede timely detection and efficient 
incident response. This thesis argues that there is a common pattern of failure that may 
occur in any screening service in the UK. This pattern of failure is summarized in Table 
2.6: . 
                                                 
6 The most recent event took place in 2006 [ www.guardian.co.uk/society/2006/jun/29/cancercare.health, 
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Fault in the analytic process   Software  bugs,  human  error  during  analysis,  procedural 
errors in the laboratory. 
Automation and propagation   Errors mentioned above are propagated across diagnostic 
networks. 
Plausibility of false test results  False test results are plausibly acceptable, and are thus 
used in patient diagnosis. 
Lack of (or poor) safeguards  Incident  reporting  scheme  not  used,  audits  not  carried 
out—even if they had been requested 
Poor incident response  Inability  to  detect.  Also,  during  the  crisis,  severe 
communication breakdowns prolong the incidents.  
Table 2.6: A pattern of failure in NHS screening services. 
The purpose of this thesis is therefore to understand in detail what underlying problems in 
the NHS—and screening services in particular—can result to the development of multiple 
misdiagnoses over prolonged periods of time. The focus then is on the inability to detect 
and recover from such errors when they occur, but not on the causal factors that led to the 
errors in the first place. This is because the causal factors vary greatly in the different 
types  of  laboratory  medicine,  phase  of  testing  and  types  of  error  that  can  occur 
(laboratory error types were discussed in Section 2.3.1). Despite the variety in causal 
factors,  plausibility  of  false  test  results  and  problems  in  the  incident  response  were 
somewhat similar. Therefore, the scope of this thesis is limited to the events that take 
place once false test results begin to be produced and detection is possible. 
 
The continuous effort to remove such faults in the analytic process (Table 2.6: ) does not 
necessarily ensure that errors will not occur again the future. With the potential for false 
yet  plausible  test  results  being  present,  it  is  essential  that  diagnostic  networks  are 
prepared  to  detect  and  recover  from  such  failures  as  quickly  as  possible.  This  is  the 
reason why this thesis focuses on error management within this setting.  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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The  next  section  will  summarize  this  chapter, before  we  proceed  to  the  next  chapter 
which will present and discuss the theory that this thesis draws upon: error detection and 
error recovery. 
2.5  Chapter summary  
This chapter presented the field and the focus of this thesis. This section will summarize 
the various concepts and practices that have been presented: 
•  Field of study: The field of this study is diagnostic services (laboratory medicine 
and  radiology)  in  the  NHS,  and  in  particular  screening  services.  This  chapter 
presented the testing cycle which is made up of three stages (pre-analytic, analytic 
and post-analytic). Then, screening programmes in the NHS, their organizational 
structure and the role of information technology were discussed. Finally, NHS 
laboratory quality assurance practices were briefly presented. 
•  Focus  of  study:  The  focus  of  this  research  is  laboratory  error,  and  most 
specifically the potential for plausibly acceptable false test results. This aspect of 
laboratory error is crucial because it makes it very difficult to detect errors once 
they have occurred, so false test results may be used in the process of diagnosis, 
and consequently have adverse affects on patients’ health.  
 
This chapter concluded with a pattern of failure that this thesis has observed in several 
NHS screening incidents: Multiple, false yet plausibly acceptable, screening tests which 
were not detected for long periods of time. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Chapter 3:  Theoretical context 
 
 
 
The previous chapter presented the context of this work, and focused on a pattern of 
failure that has materialized in several screening incidents, resulting in prolonged failures 
to detect and recover from laboratory errors. This chapter will present the theoretical 
background that this thesis draws upon. The literature review will introduce concepts 
regarding error detection and recovery that come from cognitive psychology and safety 
science, which will then be related to laboratory error and its manifestation in test results. 
This  review  will  conclude  with  an  ‘Error  Recovery  Framework’  that  will  be  used 
throughout this thesis, both for the analysis of the four case studies and the generation of 
recommendations for the improvement of laboratory error detection and recovery. 
3.1  Error recovery versus error prevention 
The  study  of  error  within  cognitive  science  and  applied  psychology  has  made  a 
significant contribution in understanding what types of error may occur, and what types 
of causes may result to different forms of error [e.g. mistakes, slips and lapses by Reason, 
1990]. Within safety research in industry, such  work has been very influential. More 
recently,  the  study  of  major  disasters  (e.g.,  Chernobyl  [Watt  Committee,  1988],  the 
Challenger  [Vaughan,  1996])  has  extended  our  understanding  of  error,  not  only  as  a 
human action, but also as a result of a wider, system failure. Error does not only refer to 
an act that will immediately result in a hazard (e.g., pressing the wrong button), but may Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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also  build  up  through  time  through  complex  organizational  and  socio-technical 
environments (e.g., maintenance error) [Reason, 2004].   
 
Safety  largely  depends  on  producing  systems  without  defects,  while  reducing  the 
potential for human errors to occur; this can be seen as ‘error prevention’, and can be 
seen a pro-active approach to safety. However, error prevention is not the only strategy 
towards achieving an acceptable level of system safety [Lewis and Norman, 1986; Frese, 
1991]. As it is extremely difficult to remove all potential for errors or technical faults 
[Greenwell et al., 2004], industrial systems have complex sensor-alarm systems to detect 
potential  problems  before  they  compromise  safety.  In  addition,  they  employ  incident 
response and crisis management procedures, in order to control failures as they occur and 
prevent or minimize their impact and consequences. Error recovery is therefore a second 
strategy (reactive approach) which, along with error prevention, can provide adequate 
system defences for the prevention and control of accidents [Kontogiannis, 1997].  
 
The two error resistance strategies, along with the concepts of forward and backward 
error  recovery  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  sections  are  summarized  in 
Figure 3.1.  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 3.1: Error resistance strategies [adapted from Jambon, 1997]. 
Error recovery (or error handling) has received less attention in research than the causes 
human error [Zapf and Reason, 1994; Kontogiannis, 1997]. In a similar manner, there is 
much more literature available in error prevention than error handling [Klein et al., 2005; 
Blavier et al., 2005]. Nonetheless, in the past 15 years, there has been some important 
work in the areas of error detection and recovery (however very limited in the area of 
patient safety). The purpose of this chapter is to therefore present some of this work, and 
place it in the context of laboratory screening error. 
3.2  Overview of error handling 
Improving the ability of a system to detect and recover from errors requires design and 
engineering effort, as well as organizational and structural considerations. Some system 
features that take part in the detection and recovery of errors and technical faults include 
the computer user interface [Rizzo et al., 1996], checking mechanisms [Clarke, 2005], 
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incident reporting, communication [Barenfanger et al., 2004], work design [Zapf et al., 
1994] and training [Chmiel and Wall, 1994]. 
 
Research and practice in error handing can be seen to fall under two main categories. 
These aspects of error handling are the following: 
•  Error detection: This area of research considers the mechanisms through which 
errors and technical faults are either identified, or merely steer suspicion, and is a 
focus of cognitive science (Section 3.3). 
•  Error recovery: Recovery follows directly after detection. A variety of models 
and frameworks describe the stages of activities that make up the process from 
detection to recovery, coming from systems engineering (Section 3.4). 
3.3  Error detection 
Error detection is the first step of an error recovery process [Reason, 1994; Kontogiannis, 
1997; Klein et al., 2005]. Error detection is a human, cognitive activity, which can be 
defined as “the realisation that an error has occurred without necessarily understanding 
the nature and cause of the error” [Zapf and Reason, 1994].  
 
Sellen [1994] proposed a theoretical taxonomy of detection modes which aims broadly to 
describe the ways through which people detect errors in a wide variety of everyday tasks. 
The framework describes a range of detection mechanisms falling into three categories: 
action-based, outcome-based or through limiting functions. The three modes of detection, 
along with an example of laboratory error detection are given below:  
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•  Action-based  detection:    Occurs  as  the  error  takes  place—this  can  be  best 
described as “caught-in-the-act”. Action-based detection occurs when there is a 
mismatch  between  an  action  plan  and  the  executed  actions,  or  if  there  is  a 
mismatch  between  conscious  intentions  and  executed  actions.  For  instance,  a 
laboratory technician detects his or her own error during a specimen analysis by 
realizing the analysis is not conducted as prescribed. Action-based detection can 
also occur when a person observes someone else while performing an erroneous 
action. 
•  Outcome-based detection: This is based on the evaluation of the outcome of the 
erroneous action. This kind of detection can occur if there is a mismatch between 
expected outcomes and actual outcomes, or if there is a match between expected 
error  forms  and  outcome.  In  a  laboratory  setting,  this  can  take  place  when  a 
physician examines a test report and the results do not make sense. 
•  Detection  through  external  limiting  functions:  Limiting  functions  refers  to 
physical  constraints  imposed  by  the  environment.  This  kind  of  detection  is 
somewhat  different  from  action-based  and  outcome-based  detection  as  no 
evaluation of the correctness of an action is required. In a laboratory context, an 
example of detection through limiting functions is the following: A ward nurse 
attempts to phone the pathology department in order to request a test, but he or 
she has actually phoned the haematology department. This is realized when the 
person who picks up the phone announces “you have reached the haematology 
department”.  
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In complex environments, error detection may not always occur instantly, but may in fact 
be  a  result  of  several  events;  even  though  error  detection  is  nothing  more  than  an 
acknowledgement of the presence of an error, without knowing what caused it, or even 
what the nature of the error is. Before being sure that something is actually wrong, people 
may first be  concerned, or suspicious that something might be wrong. This has been 
referred to in literature as error suspicion [Allwood, 1984], problem recognition [Cowan, 
1986], problem discovery [Woods et al., 1987] and problem detection [Smith, 1989]. The 
term  ‘problem  detection’  will  used  hereafter,  and  will  be  discussed  in  the  following 
section.  
3.3.1  Problem detection  
Problem detection is the process by which people first become concerned that events may 
be taking an unexpected and undesirable direction [Smith, 1989]. Problem detection can 
occur even in the absence of a fault or the occurrence of an error; however, it signifies the 
existence of a potential fault/error. This is important as in many cases, problem detection 
may  lead  to  an  early  resolution  of  a  problem  before  it  manifests  into  a  dangerous 
condition. Even in a steady state condition, problem detection signifies a preparedness 
and alertness in case something does go wrong. 
 
Problem detection is a sense-making activity. A person who is concerned may act in 
many different ways to determine if there is a problem, and what that is. For instance, if 
problem detection occurs, one might decide to monitor system behavior in case another 
cue of the potential problem emerges, or might decide to take action despite being sure Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
 46 
that something is wrong. In some cases, an operator may remain suspicious even when 
concerns are explained away by others [Klein et al., 2005]. 
 
The ‘discrepancy accumulation model’ [Cowan, 1986] is one the first influential models 
of problem detection, even through there had been some earlier propositions [e.g., Davies 
1973]. Cowan described problem detection as “the accumulation of discrepancies until a 
threshold was reached”. In a laboratory setting, the accumulation of discrepancies can for 
instance be seen as a growing concern over the frequency of positive or negative test 
results, without however being sure that an error has occurred. 
 
Klein et al. [2005] have suggested problem detection is affected by the following three 
factors: 
•  Expertise: Expertise can be an advantage in most cases. Skilled personnel are 
most  likely  to  generate  expectancies  and  be  decisive  to  take  action  when 
contradictions occur. A skilled operator is most likely to have an understanding of 
what conditions can result in the system generating misleading readings. On the 
other hand, expertise can result in confidently explaining away a problem. For 
instance, an experienced nurse may become concerned when he or she notices a 
discrepancy  in  the  frequency  of  positives/negatives,  while  an  experienced 
laboratory technician might not find this alarming.  
 
•  Stance:  Stance  refers  to  the  orientation  the  person  has  towards  the  situation 
[Chow et al., 2000]. Stance can be an absolute denial that anything could possibly Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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be  wrong,  to  a  hysterical  over-reacting  attitude  towards  minor  signs.  General 
alertness,  level  of  suspicion  and  emotional  status  are  some  of  the  factors  that 
make up a person’s stance. For example, a nurse that is hesitant to trust new 
technologies in his or her workplace will be ‘on the lookout’ for any problems a 
new system may incur. In healthcare systems, information is evaluated upon the 
basis of the “perceived credibility of the source" [Cicourel, 1990]. In other words, 
the judgment over the credibility of a test report will be made by taking into 
account the level of trust in the laboratory department that produced it. If there is 
no prior experience of problems originating from the source of information, it is 
unlikely that the plausibility of a test result will be questioned.  
 
•  Attention  Management:  This  refers  to  sensor/alarm  systems:  having  system 
facilities  to  detect,  capture  and  notify  operators  about  problems.  Attention 
management is however not independent of expertise and stance, as they may for 
instance result in disregarding an alarm or remaining concerned in the absence of 
an expected alarm [Wickens and McCarley, 2007].  
 
It is very likely that once a specific error has occurred, problem detection will occur 
before  error  detection—although  this  is  not  always  necessary.  In  most  environments, 
operators that have detected an error are expected to report this or take immediate action 
if it is within their responsibilities. However, the uncertainty that characterizes problem 
detection  can  prevent  an  operator  from  taking  action.  In  the  case  that  concerns  are 
reported  to  someone  else,  it  is  possible  they  will  be  disregarded  in  the  absence  of Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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convincing evidence. For this reason, following problem detection, operators may decide 
to continue monitoring system behavior for further cues, or may formulate and explore 
hypotheses as to what is wrong themselves [Klein et al., 2005].  
 
In everyday life problem detection occurs frequently, and, in many cases, instinctively. It 
could be argued that when, for instance, driving a car, a driver’s decision to slow down is 
dictated by problem detection as, not slowing down will result in a car crush. In a similar 
context, if while driving a car the driver hears a “strange” noise coming from the engine, 
it is possible that he or she will not take the car to the mechanic until that sound occurs 
again.  
 
The following section will present a number of models and frameworks that describe the 
process  of  error  recovery;  the  process  that  follows  error  detection  (but  not  problem 
detection) until recovery (or giving up). 
3.4  Error recovery 
Error recovery is generally made up of three stages: Error detection, error diagnosis, and 
error correction [Bagnara and Rizzo, 1989; Zapf and Reason, 1994; Jambon, 1997]. This 
generic process can be applied to any type of error within almost any context. However, 
depending on the environment, error explanation and error correction may be broken up 
further (for instance, the involvement of multiple people in an error handling process will 
require communication  (e.g. incident reporting) or planning might have to take place 
before proceeding to corrective actions).  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
 49 
3.4.1  Forward and backward error recovery 
A distinction can be made between forward and backward error recovery [Dix et al., 
1993].  This  distinction—used  extensively  in  interactive  systems  design—refers  to  the 
path that can be taken towards recovery [Jambon, 1997]: 
•  Backward Recovery:  Backward recovery refers to attempt to restore the system 
state following the occurrence of an error by following events as they occurred in 
reverse.  According  to  Yang  [1992],  there  are  three  kinds  of  backward  error 
recovery: undo, cancel and stop.  
•  Forward  recovery:  During  forward  recovery  the  operator  has  to  perform 
unexpected tasks to recover the fault, perhaps through improvisation. This kind of 
recovery applies mostly to failures in industrial engineered systems, where undo 
and cancel cannot easily be implemented. 
3.4.2  Error recovery frameworks and models 
In this section we will discuss the most influential theoretical frameworks that describe 
the process of error recovery. There are several frameworks proposed since the 1980s , 
(e.g. [Cowan, 1986]) — the ones discussed here are some of the more recent ones that are 
seen  as  a  step  further  from  the  first  attempts  that  were  made  three  decades  ago.  In 
addition,  the  three  frameworks  discussed  in  this  section  take  slightly  different 
perspectives which are of interest to this thesis. 
 
In the following pages, some frameworks will be presented; a discussion regarding their 
benefits and limitations will then follow in a separate section, which will be based on a Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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comparison of their features and applicability on the particular matter of laboratory error 
handling. 
 
Error handling model 
One of the earliest models proposed was by Zapf and Reason [1994]. This model (Figure 
3.2) views error recovery as a two-step process: error diagnosis and error recovery. Each 
of these stages is broken down to two further steps. 
 
Figure 3.2: A generic error recovery model [adapted from Zapf and Reason, 1994]. 
Here, error detection is seen as part of error diagnosis, which is then followed by error 
explanation.  Following  error  diagnosis,  error  recovery  is  performed  in  two  steps: 
planning and execution. The two authors do not include the achievement of error control 
and  correction  in  their  model,  as  they  view  that  as  the  outcome  of  the  actual  error 
recovery process (regardless of whether it has been successful or not), taking a rather 
general perspective on the entire process. 
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The INCORECT framework 
INCORECT (Investigating Cognitive and Recovery Tasks) has been proposed for the 
analysis of cognitive reliability in interaction in complex systems [Kontogiannis, 1997]. 
The framework takes into account a set of taxonomies of cognitive error modes, error 
causes, problem solving failures, recovery mechanisms and contextual factors.  
 
INCORECT  has  been  proposed  in  order  to  identify  cognitive  errors  at  the  stages  of 
interpretation,  decision  making  and  planning  during  the  resolution  of  an  encountered 
problem. The framework can thus be used in a risk assessment context, attempting to 
identify potential pitfalls such as an unsafe intervention that may result from a wrong 
situation diagnosis.  
 
Apart from the investigation of cognitive errors, INCORECT also examines the  activities 
that focus on the control of the error’s consequences. As we will see later on, this second 
aspect  of  this  framework  relates  greatly  to  this  thesis.  Figure  3.3  illustrates  two 
dimensions of the error recovery management: Error handling (during a crisis), and the 
consideration of adequate interventions to increase preparedness for more efficient error 
handling in the future. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 3.3: The INCORECT framework [adapted from Kontogiannis, 1997] 
 
The human redundancy framework 
This  framework  [Clarke,  2005]  is  concerned  with  the  role  of  human  redundancy  in 
engineered systems in high-hazard industries. More specifically, the human redundancy 
framework  considers  “redundant  arrangements”  such  as  operator/supervisor  within  a 
socio-technical system where the following features are important: 
•  Someone checks someone else’s work 
•  A  check  is  carried  out  at  the  time  a  function  is  fulfilled  or  soon  after  it  is 
fulfilled 
•  The checker is directed, either verbally or through a written procedure, to check 
a particular human interaction 
•  The check takes place during normal operation. 
 
According to the author, human redundancy is activated when error recovery commences 
(Figure 3.4). From an error recovery perspective, human redundancy exists “where there 
Error 
detection 
Error 
explanation 
Error 
correction 
In outcome 
stage 
Locate error 
in diagnosis 
Re-assess 
situation 
In execution 
stage 
Locate error 
in planning 
Develop 
recovery plan 
In planning 
stage 
Execute 
recovery plan 
Error recovery management 
Facilitate error handling  Prevent or minimize error 
consequences 
System design 
that delays error 
propagation 
Safety barriers or 
limiting functions Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
 53 
is  support  for  concurrent  human  recovery  by  another  of  an  error  associated  with  a 
required operator function”. 
 
Figure 3.4: The ‘human redundancy’ framework [adapted from Clarke, 2005]. 
Each of the stages of error recovery within this framework are affected by cognitive 
diversity and the local and organizational factors that shape the context within which 
these activities take place:  
•  Cognitive diversity is the availability of different cognitive behaviors to fulfill a 
required function, where differences originate either within operators or within 
their  environment.  Cognitive  diversity  may  exist  with  respect  to  two  or  more 
individuals within the same group, between a group and another individual and 
between two people that perform checking tasks. 
•  Local and organizational factors refer to any element of an organization that 
may  affect  error  recovery;  For  example,  issues  such  as  stress,  over-trust,  and 
deficiencies in resource. 
3.4.3  Comparison and criticism 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each of these 
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frameworks,  whilst  taking  into  account  some  of  the  initial  observations  regarding 
laboratory related incidents that have been discussed in the first two chapters. 
 
The error handling model [Zapf and Reason, 1994] can be seen as the most generic one of 
the three. Although it can be argued that it covers all aspects of the recovery process, its 
relatively  high-level  view  does  not  allow  for  a  detailed  consideration  of  all  of  the 
activities that may take place during error handling. In contrast, the other two frameworks 
take more in-depth perspectives: 
 
The  INCORECT  framework  [Kontogiannis,  1997]  takes  account  of  various  error 
detection types (similar to the ones proposed by Sellen, 1994), but also includes a more 
elaborate breakdown of error explanation and error recovery—in addition, this model 
extends to include error/disaster management activities following the incident (which will 
be the focus of the next section). One limitation of INCORECT is that it does not take 
account of communication activities; communication breakdowns are an important aspect 
of error handling failure and are part of the thesis focus.  
 
However, communication events are part of the human redundancy framework. Error 
indication—a sort of incident reporting—is essential in such a model, especially if the 
context  is  a  complex  organizational  setting,  where  the  involvement  of  several 
departments,  or  even  organizations  may  be  possible.  Communication  during  error 
handling can be crucial, especially in the case of a communication breakdown which 
could have serious consequences on a recovery process. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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The human redundancy framework [Clarke, 2005] considers error recovery as a human 
activity, whereby detection by others and reporting of errors to persons who can take 
action are the underlying concepts. This framework also considers cognitive diversity and 
organizational  factors  as  determinants  of  the  outcome  of  an  error  recovery  process. 
However,  this  model  is  somewhat  limited  in  the  variety  of  possible  types  of  error 
detection, and error explanation, which are explained in more detail in INCORECT. 
 
A common issue in these models is that they do not consider problem detection as part of 
the  error  recovery  process.  Arguably,  a  recovery  process  may  commence  once  the 
presence of an error has been acknowledged; however, in many cases an error might not 
be obvious enough for people to confirm its presence; and although the importance of 
problem  detection  has  been  recognized,  current  recovery  models  do  not  incorporate 
problem detection. Finally, these models do not include the investigation activities that 
may take place at any time (either to find out if there is an error or not, or to identify the 
causes of the error).  
 
With this in mind, it was found necessary to proceed with a new model that considers 
problem  detection  and  further  investigation  as  parts  of  the  error  recovery  process 
formally.  The  following  section  will  present  this  new  model  which  builds  upon 
INCORECT and the human redundancy framework, also taking into account problem 
detection. 
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3.5  The error recovery framework 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the stages that make up the error recovery framework. This 
framework indicates the sequence of events from problem detection to error correction; it 
includes a larger set of steps to be followed, providing more coverage in terms of types of 
error handling activities that are possible.    
 
Figure 3.5: The error recovery framework 
These stages can be summarized as follows: 
 
1.  Problem  detection:  The  initial  concerns  that  events  may  be  taking  an 
unexpected and undesirable direction that potentially requires action. 
2.  Problem indication: The reporting of concerns to someone who can act upon 
this potential problem. 
3.   Error detection: The realization that something is actually wrong, without 
necessarily knowing the nature of the error or what has caused it (Action-
based, outcome-based, through limiting functions). 
4.  Error indication: The reporting of error detection to someone who can act 
upon the error. 
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5.  Error explanation: The localization of an error and the identification of its 
causes. 
6.  Error  control: The  controlling of the incident  by stopping the error  from 
causing more harm. At this point, the error has not necessarily been removed 
from the system. 
7.  Error correction: The causes of the error are being removed and system can 
operate normally again. 
8.  Further  investigation:  This  can  take  several  forms  (e.g.  observation  of 
system  behaviour,  enquiry  to  colleagues,  examination  of  system  features, 
technical analysis, etc.). 
 
Problem  detection,  problem  indication  and  error  indication  may  not  always  occur; 
however these activities would take place in situations where there are multiple people 
involved (in terms of indication) and where system feedback is limited, making error 
detection more difficult. The error recovery framework also takes into account Sellen’s 
[1994]  taxonomy  of  error  detection  mechanisms.  Although  cognitive  diversity  is 
obviously  very  likely  to  determine  the  outcome  of  each  of  these  stages,  it  is  not 
considered in this framework. This is because it is very difficult to map the cognitive 
model  that  each  involved  person  would  have  during  error  recovery  without  the 
appropriate amount of data. 
 
The error recovery framework will be used throughout this thesis in order to describe 
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it will be used will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter (Chapter 4: Research 
methodology).  However,  before  proceeding  to  the  next  chapter,  the  next  section  will 
discuss how national and corporate regulation and policy determine how organizational 
failures are managed, and how organizational learning towards better error handling may 
be guided by formal public inquiries in the UK. 
 
3.6  Chapter summary 
This chapter presented and discussed existing work in the areas of problem detection, 
error detection and error recovery, which form the theoretical basis that this thesis draws 
upon.  Following  the  presentation  of  various  models  and  frameworks,  this  chapter 
proceeded with their criticism which concluded with a new error recovery framework—
an adaptation of existing frameworks which also takes into account problem detection as 
part of error recovery. 
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Chapter 4:  Research methodology 
 
 
 
The previous chapter presented an overview of existing literature in error detection and 
error handling, and concluded with a proposed error recovery framework which will be 
used to analyze and explain the activities that make up the processes and activities of 
laboratory error handling. This framework will be the basis of the research methodology 
that this thesis undertakes. The methodology is summarized in Section 4.1. 
 
Section 4.2 presents an overview of available techniques that were considered for this 
analysis, while Section 4.3 contains a discussion based on criticism of these techniques. 
In order to achieve the objectives of this thesis, a new technique has been developed, by 
adapting STEP [Henrick and Benner, 1983] and integrating it with the  error recovery 
framework that was proposed in the previous chapter. 
 
Finally, Section 4.4 will discuss how this suggested analytical approach will be applied to 
multiple case studies, and Section 4.5 will discuss the sources of data that these analyses 
have been based on.  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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4.1  Overview of research methodology  
The research methodology that this thesis follows is presented in Figure 4.1, which also 
illustrates the relationship between methodology, research objectives and overall thesis 
aims. 
 
Figure 4.1: Overview of research methodology, aims and objectives. 
The research methodology is therefore summarized as follows: 
•  Step 1: Development of technique. A technique is developed and discussed in this 
chapter.  This  technique  is  a  result  of  the  integration  of  the  error  recovery 
framework that was discussed in the previous chapter (see Section 3.5) with an 
existing accident analysis technique.  
•  Step 2: Analysis of case studies. The UK incidents summarized in Table 1.1, 
along with one USA incident will be analyzed with the technique that has been 
proposed. This incident was included as a first attempt to demonstrate the generic 
nature of the approach and was conducted as a result of cooperation with a major 
North American hospital department. 
•  Step 3: Further analysis of the four case studies findings. The findings of the four 
case  studies  will  be  further  analyzed  in  order  to  identify  key  problem  areas 
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(common problems in these case studies) and draw high-level conclusions about 
laboratory screening error handling. This will result in an enriched model of the 
error recovery framework which will describe the different types of error handling 
activities that may take place within a laboratory screening context. 
4.2  Accident analysis 
The aim of accident analysis is to identify the underlying causal factors that shaped the 
events of the misfortunate outcome. Such analyses can in turn be used by technology 
designers, system engineers, management and regulatory authorities to consider how to 
eliminate these underlying factors so that similar occurrences are avoided in the future. 
With this perspective, investigations into laboratory failures can be used by the laboratory 
and hospital management, and by device manufacturers for the continuous improvement 
of their respective products [Jenny and Jackson-Tarentino, 2000]. 
 
An  abundance  of  techniques  and  notations  have  been  developed  by  authorities  and 
researchers, considering various levels and aspects of different kinds of incidents and 
accidents in safety-critical industries
7. Causal analysis can be used to explain why the 
failure took place, and reconstruction techniques can explain what happened during the 
failure.  Other  approaches,  such  as  Management  Oversight  and  Risk  Tree  (MORT) 
[Johnson,  1973]  and  Systems  Theory  Accident  Modelling  and  Process  (STAMP) 
[Leveson  et  al.,  2003]  examine  the  involvement  of  organizational,  human  and 
technological elements in the occurrence of an incident or accident.  
                                                 
7This  chapter  does  not  present  a  review  of  all  accident  techniques,  as  such  is  already  available.  The 
“Handbook of incident and accident reporting” [Johnson, 2002] has been used to guide the discussion that 
takes place here. However, event-based techniques will be considered in more detail. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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However, despite the fact that accident analysis techniques would identify and analyze 
causes and events that resulted in poor error handling, there is no systematic approach 
taking a focus on the organizational response following error detection. It is argued here 
that having a focus on error handling in accident analysis would help us to understand 
how the error could have been detected faster and recovered, in addition to the why and 
what happened that established accident analysis notations can help identify.  
 
Error recovery is a process evolving through different stages over time [Zapf and Reason, 
1994;  Jambon,  1997].  For  this  reason,  it  was  more  appropriate  to  consider  event 
reconstruction approaches for the development of a recovery-focused analytical tool. The 
following section will present and discuss some event-based techniques which have been 
considered for this analysis. 
4.2.1  Event-based techniques 
.  
Event-based techniques are used to model multiple events which are linked over time. 
Most event-based techniques are supported by  a graphical notation which depicts the 
evolution of events in a left-to-right, linear manner. The first event in a chain is often 
referred  to  as  the  “initiating  event”—there  is  however  no  principle  that  dictates  the 
selection of the initiating event [Leveson, 2001]; this decision is largely subjective—the 
investigator may  go back several  years before the occurrence of the more immediate 
events that led to an accident/incident. 
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Event-based techniques  are useful in understanding the mechanism through  which an 
accident/incident was created; however a common criticism of such techniques is the 
limited  insight  they  provide  in  analyzing  the  underlying  causes  and  their  conditions 
[Johnson, 2003]. For the reason, event-based models are used to guide further analyses of 
the particular events that were identified as determinants in the sequence of the adverse 
events. 
 
This section will present and discuss the following: 
•  Events and Causal Factors Analysis (ECFA), [Buys and Clark, 1995] 
•  Multi-linear Events Sequencing (MES), [Rimson and Benner, 1975] 
•  Sequentially Timed and Events Plotting (STEP), [Henrick and Benner, 1983] 
 
There are several event-based techniques available. The particular techniques have been 
selected because they are well established, longstanding and well documented.  
 
Events and Causal Factors Analysis 
Events  and  Causal  Factors  Analysis  (ECFA)  is  used  to  identify  errors,  changes, 
oversights, and omissions, as well as also the relevant conditions affecting each event in 
the accident sequence. The approach breaks down the sequence into a logical flow of 
events from the beginning of accident development. The end point may be defined either 
as  the  loss  event  itself or  as  the  end  of  the  amelioration  and  rehabilitation  phase.  In 
addition,  this  flow  of  events  may  not  necessarily  lie  in  a  single  event  chain  but  can 
involve several confluent and branching chains. 
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the conventions that are used when applying ECFA. 
 
Figure 4.2:  ECFA notation [adapted from Buys and Clark, 1995]. 
ECFA is designed as a stand alone technique but is usually applied with other techniques 
found  in  the  Management  Oversight  and  Risk  Tree  (MORT)  programme  [Buys  and 
Clark, 1995]. ECFA serves three main purposes in investigations:  
•  assists the verification of causal chains and event sequences  
•  provides a structure for integrating investigation findings 
•  assists communication both during and on completion of the investigation. 
 
Multi-linear Events Sequencing  
Multi-linear  Events  Sequencing  (MES)  is  a  method  that  is  made  up  of  concepts, 
principles, rules and procedures which can be used for any kind of investigation. The 
technique  was  developed  by  Rimson  and  Benner—at  the  time  investigators  with  the 
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National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) [1975]. One of the motivations behind the 
development  of  MES  as  an  event-based  technique  was  the  wish  to  avoid  the  use  of 
checklists, as this may allow for factors which are not included in a checklist to be missed 
[Ferry, 1998]. 
 
MES uses a matrix-based structure which consists of data documentation, organization 
and analysis tools and rules in order to drive the investigation tasks. Matrix entries follow 
pre-defined  grammar  and  syntax  rules  of  construction  for  event  blocks  on  matrices 
including person, number, tense, voice and deictic position—the MES data language—
and reasoning rules to develop tested descriptions and explanations of what happened. 
These  descriptions  are  then  analyzed  systematically  with  orderly  sequential  problem 
defining.  MES  provides  some  generalized  behavioral  models,  guiding  principles  and 
assessment  or  ranking  tools  to  convey  knowledge  from  prior  experiences  to  help 
investigators [Benner, 2003].  
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates an example MES chart.  
 
Figure 4.3: An example MES diagram [adapted from Ferry, 1998]. 
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Every event is a single action by a single actor. The actor is something that brings about 
events, while actions are acts performed by the actor. A time line is displayed at the 
bottom  of  the  chart  to show  the  timing  sequence  of  the  events  while  conditions  that 
influence  the  events  are  inserted  in  the  time  flow  in  logical  order  to  show  the  flow 
relationship. 
Sequentially timed and events plotting  
Sequentially timed and events plotting (STEP) [Henrick and Benner, 1983] can be seen 
as  synthesis  of  ECFA  and  MES  [Johnson,  2003].  The  starting  point  of  STEP  is  the 
compilation of STEP cards—cards that provide an initial means of recording information 
about key events that occur during the course of an incident (for example, see Figure 4.4 
below).  
Event card id: 
Actor:   
Action:   
Event location:   
Time/date event 
began: 
 
Event duration:   
Data source:   
Description:   
Figure 4.4: Example STEP event card identifier [adapted from Henrick and Benner, 1983]. 
One of the criticisms of ECFA and MES is that it can lead to very complex charts, which 
are difficult to maintain without tool support. The use of STEP cards aims at minimizing 
the notational excesses of the other analytical techniques. The multi-linear time-based 
event representation is conducted in a similar manner as MES, although somewhat more 
simplified (with condition events now omitted). Figure 4.5 illustrates an example STEP 
diagram. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 4.5: Example STEP diagram. 
4.2.2  Focusing accident analysis on error recovery 
Event-based techniques can be used to understand the mechanisms that, through time, 
resulted in an accident or incident [Henrick and Benner, 1983]. The time-based, graphical 
illustration of events can help the analyst reconstruct what happened, and further examine 
why these events occurred. The techniques discussed in this section (ECFA, MES and 
STEP)  are  long-recognized,  established,  event-based  analytical  techniques.  However, 
these techniques do not distinguish between the events that led to an error, and the events 
that  followed  aiming  at preventing  or  controlling  the  impact  of  the  error  once  it  has 
occurred.   
 
Error recovery is itself  a process that evolves through time [Zapf and  Reason, 1994; 
Kontogiannis, 1997]. Therefore, an event-based technique could be adapted to focus on 
error handling, and the development of an entirely new technique was not found to be 
necessary. In order to focus on error handling activities, one has to filter out these events 
and isolate them from other events. This can be done by the use of the error recovery 
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framework (or any other error recovery framework) which was proposed in Chapter 3. 
Essentially, the error recovery framework may be used in combination with any event-
based technique. However, for the purposes of this analysis, STEP was found to be more 
practical, due to its simplified notation, and the use of STEP cards.  
 
The following section will present the result of the integration of STEP with the error 
recovery framework; a method which has been developed for the purposes of this thesis, 
and will be used throughout the analysis of the four case studies. 
4.3  Error recovery focused STEP  
As discussed previously, one of the primary criticisms of ECFA and MES is that their 
notational complexity limits the ability to effectively manage extended diagrams without 
the support of software tools. The decision to use the error recovery framework within an 
event-based technique therefore required a simpler technique that could then be enriched 
with various recovery event-type definitions. The ability to separately document events 
and  information  about  them  with  STEP  cards  allows  for  an  event-centric  elaboration 
without overloading the graphical event chain.  
 
The integration of STEP with the error  recovery  framework  (Section  3.5) resulted in 
Error recovery focused STEP
8 (ER-STEP). Analysis of error recovery activities with this 
technique is performed in the following stages: 
1)  STEP event cards are produced as in the STEP method. 
                                                 
8 The technique and its application resulted in the following paper: Chozos, N (2008). Focusing accident 
analysis on error handling activities: Three case studies in the NHS. Reliability and Engineering, Special 
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2)  Error  recovery  events are  identified  according  to  the  definitions  provided  in 
Section 3.5: the error recovery framework. In the action cell of the STEP cards, 
the recovery stage name may be entered. For error detection events, the action-
based, outcome-based, through limiting functions definitions can also be used for 
more  detail.  Events  that  are  not  recovery  related  may  be  labelled  as  “no 
classification”. 
3)  ER-STEP diagrams are drawn up in a similar way as STEP diagrams. The error 
recovery stage name should also be entered in the event boxes. It is suggested that 
different colours are used for each of the stage, as this can help to visually observe 
the process and easily draw conclusions (e.g. the frequent occurrence of a specific 
type  of  event)  but  these  could  be  omitted.  Figure  4.6  illustrates  a  suggested 
coloration of the error recovery framework stages, which will be used in the rest 
of this document.  
 
Figure 4.6: The ER-STEP notation (colors used to denote recovery stages). 
The “initiating event” is the first instance of detection (problem detection or error 
detection). The investigator may chose to have separate ER-STEP diagrams for 
each  sequence  of  events  that  is  initiated  by  a  detection  event,  but  that  is  not 
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necessary  as  several  detection  events  may  take  place  within  the  same  error 
recovery process. This decision may therefore be made arbitrarily.  
4)  ER-STEP diagrams are rearranged with a single, linear, error recovery view. 
During a recovery, it is very likely that there are repetitions of a specific kind of 
recovery action, or that the process enters a loop for a certain time period. In a 
time-based sequence, all events are depicted with a left-to-right view regardless of 
any  iterations  that  may  occur;  if  these  events  are  rearranged  with  an  error-
recovery perspective, the investigator can see these iterations as a way of ‘going a 
step back’, which indicates that the specific recovery stages may be problematic. 
 
The following section will present a simple example of an imaginary scenario which has 
been analyzed with ER-STEP.  
4.3.1  An example of ER-STEP analysis 
Let’s consider the following scenario (for brevity, recovery event identification will be 
done in the scenario text): 
Car breakdown incident 
“On  the  morning  of  December  12
th,  John  was  driving  his  car  to  work  as  usual.  At 
approximately  8.34am,  he  heard  a  strange  noise  from  the  car  engine  [Event  1: 
Problem detection]. He then heard this noise again when parking his car outside his 
work  place  (8.45am)  [Event  2:  Problem  detection].  At  that  point,  John  was  a  bit 
worried, although the car did not appear to have any particular problems as he was 
driving it. He opened the bonnet to check the engine [Event 3: Further investigation] 
but didn’t see any problems [Failure of further investigation]. After finishing work, 
John  got  in  his  car  and  started  driving  back  home  (5.00pm)  [Event  4:  No 
classification  2].  That  noise  did  not  occur  again  that  day,  or  the  following  day. 
However, on December 14
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classification], he heard that noise again [Event 6: Problem detection], and before 
managing to pull over to the next hard shoulder [Event 7: No classification], there 
was smoke coming out his engine [Event 8: Error detection]. The noise had stopped, 
but he was unable to start the engine afterwards [Event 9: Error detection]. He called 
the breakdown assistance [Event 10: Error indication], which arrived shortly after 
(5.45pm) [Event 11: No classification]. The mechanic checked the engine [Event 12: 
Further investigation] to find out that the head gasket was damaged [Event 13: Error 
explanation], allowing for a cooling failure; however, the temperature indicator had not 
shown  an  increase  in  temperature  [Event  14:  error  explanation];  the  temperature 
indicator was damaged as well. John then had the car towed to the garage (6.00pm) 
[Event  15:  no  classification]  which  was  fixed  the  next  day  [Event  16:  error 
correction]. John realized he should have had the car checked out at the first instance 
he heard that noise”. 
ER-STEP analysis 
STEP cards 
(For this scenario, the second step—identification of recovery activities—has already 
been conducted so the error recovery stage tag has already been entered in the action 
box). Figure 4.7 illustrates two STEP cards as an example.  
 
Figure 4.7: Example STEP cards. 
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Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 illustrate two ER-STEP diagrams that describe some of the 
events that took place during the car breakdown incident. 
 
Figure 4.8: Example ER-STEP diagram (1). 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Example ER-STEP diagram (2). 
 
Recovery-focused view 
Having drawn up the ER-STEP diagrams, the  analyst  can now isolate error recovery 
activities  even  further,  and  observe  the  recovery  sequence  by  accumulating  and 
rearranging the recovery events according to the error recovery framework sequence of 
events (Figure 4.10). Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 4.10: Error recovery-focused view. 
 
This view becomes particularly useful when multiple recovery processes have taken place 
during an incident and when ER-STEP diagrams start becoming large and complex. With 
this view, discussion per error recovery stage is possible, while some conclusions can be 
drawn visually; for instance, in the car breakdown example, we can see that problem 
detection  occurred  three  times  but  they  all  were  done  in  the  same  way  when  the 
‘operator’ heard a noise coming from the engine. However, this view can be most useful 
for the comparison of multiple case studies, as they can be viewed in parallel. 
4.3.2  Validation of technique 
One of the key challenges in successfully applying this technique is getting the recovery 
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and precise so that the analyst does not confuse events when labelling each one of them 
with the appropriate recovery stage name.  
 
The definitions that were provided in Section 3.5 were refined during the application of 
the technique with case studies. However, it was important that other analysts used the 
technique, and that the results of their application were taken into consideration towards 
the finalization of the ER-STEP method. To this purpose, an exercise was put together, 
which was then distributed to four participants. This happened in two stages: First, two 
accident investigators used the technique and identified some key issues that needed to be 
addressed.  Having  considered  their  comments  and  updated  the  technique  and  the 
instructions for its application, a second version of the exercise was developed and given 
to two healthcare professionals. 
 
It should be acknowledged that the number of participants is limited, and therefore the 
evaluation of the technique may not be sufficient. However, this exercise has been—at 
least—useful for making some improvement to the technique. In addition, it could be 
argued that its extensive application with four complex case studies and the quality of the 
subsequent  conclusions  and  recommendations  may  stand  as  validation  activities  and 
results. The limited validation is also justified by the difficulty of finding individuals who 
are experienced in accident investigation and in healthcare – the technique cannot simply 
be tested on large numbers of undergraduates expecting the same results; although these 
tests might be conducted in the future – the initial evaluations were used in a formative 
way to inform the subsequent application of the approach in the rest of the thesis. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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The final exercise can be found in Appendix B. A discussion regarding the evaluation of 
the technique takes place in Chapter 8:.  
4.4  Analysis of multiple case studies 
As mentioned previously, the four incidents that are summarized in Table 1.1 have all 
been analyzed with ER-STEP. Using the same technique for the analysis of multiple case 
studies offers a constructive way to compare and integrate the findings of the individual 
case studies. In turn, this can help identify key issues that are common to these incidents, 
and draw high-level conclusions about error handling in screening services in general. 
These key findings will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
4.5  Data collection 
The analysis of the three NHS case studies was based upon reports that were produced by 
the subsequent inquiry committees. All reports have sections which discuss the events 
that took place with dates and where available the time of the event. Press reports about 
these incidents were examined, but they did not form part of the analysis.  
 
Apart from the three UK incidents, there is one more case study which describes an 
incident that took place in Florida, USA. Information about this incident
9 was collected 
with interviews conducted during a 2-month stay in the University of Florida
10. 
                                                 
9 Some information regarding this incident can also be found at: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/23.64.html 
10 The 2-month stay was possible through the ‘Ken Browning Scholarship in Computing and Medicine, 
2005’. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
 76 
4.6  Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the research methodology that has been applied in this thesis. An 
accident analysis tool has been developed, which is used to explore the organizational 
response to different kinds of error detection. From the abundance of available accident 
analysis  techniques,  it  was  found  that  none  isolate  error  handling  activities  and 
investigating  their  relationship.  Such  a  focus  is  necessary  in  order  to  analyze  error 
recovery processes and have a consistent way for drawing conclusions about the factors 
that limited their effectiveness. 
 
Such a technique has been developed in this thesis, and is the central point of the research 
methodology that is undertaken here. This  chapter therefore presented this technique, 
which is an adaptation of STEP; with a focus on error recovery, the adapted method is 
called  ER-STEP.  An  example  was  then  used  to  illustrate  how  the  technique  may  be 
applied. Some discussion took place regarding the approach to the technique’s validation 
and evaluation, which will be concluded in the final chapter of this thesis. Finally, the 
way with which data collection was carried out was also discussed at the last section of 
this chapter. 
 
The  next  chapter  will  present  the  analysis  of  four  adverse  incidents  that  involved 
screening errors with ER-STEP.  
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Chapter 5:  Case studies 
 
 
 
This chapter will present the detailed analysis of each of the four case studies with the 
ER-STEP method which was presented in detail in the previous chapter. Each of the four 
sections of this chapter corresponds to one of the four incidents, and will consist of an 
incident summary, the detailed ER-STEP analysis and a summary of each analysis. Note 
that  the  discussion  regarding  the  factors  that  affected  error  recovery  in  these  four 
incidents  is  limited  here  as  more  discussion  will  take  place  in  the  next  chapter.  The 
purpose of this chapter is only to present the detailed analysis of each of these incidents. 
 
The STEP event cards can be found in Appendix A. Although any necessary information 
should  be  visible  in  the  ER-STEP  graphs  throughout  this  chapter  with  elaborate 
explanations of each event in the narrative, STEP cards may  at any time be used  as 
reference, especially when considering the ‘error recovery-focused view’, which does not 
illustrate the actor, time and location of the event. 
5.1  Case study 1: Down’s screening errors, Sheffield 
This incident was the first one identified and has motivated and guided much of this 
study.  The  inquiry  report  [Ferres  et  al.,  2001]  is  very  detailed  and  contains  a  well 
documented timeline of activities and conversations that took place throughout the five 
months  that  the  incident  lasted.  Also,  this  incident  has  the  greatest  involvement  of Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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software  and  has  unveiled  some  important  issues  in  comparison  to  the  other  three 
incidents.  
5.1.1  Incident summary  
The first case study describes an incident that took place in Sheffield during the first five 
months of 2000. The Immunology Department of Northern General Hospital was using a 
software application (developed in-house 12 years prior to the failure), which, on January 
1
st, 2000 was affected by the millennium bug. The error was not recovered until May 
23
rd. Until that time, 158 women had been screened incorrectly  for the likelihood of 
giving birth to children with Down’s syndrome. Out of the 158 women, two eventually 
gave birth to children with Down’s, and two proceeded to a late abortion (Table 5.1 
presents an overview of the incident).  
 
Incident   Errors in Down’s screening for pregnant women   
Incident timeframe  January 1 – May 23, 2000 
Primary cause  Millennium bug affected software algorithm used in Down’s 
screening 
Data source  Formal inquiry report [Ferres et al., 2001] 
Table 5.1: Overview of incident 1. 
The incident was severely prolonged by a poor organizational response which is also the 
focus of the analysis. The inquiry committee that was subsequently formed to investigate 
the errors placed much of the focus of the investigation on “…determining at what stage 
following 1
st January there were indications that there was a serious problem with the 
Downs Screening program and how such concerns were addressed”. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
 79 
5.1.2  Background 
Down’s screening in Sheffield 
The normal process of Downs Screening is a complex multidisciplinary process involving 
obstetricians, radiologists and the diagnostic laboratory. The initial steps are taken at the 
time of a woman’s first visit to the antenatal clinic when, following counseling, consent 
for several screening procedures is obtained. Usually this is at 12-13 weeks of gestation. 
Around  this  time  the  woman  also  undergoes  ultrasound  scanning  which  has  the  dual 
purpose of identifying foetal anomalies and providing a estimate of foetal age based on 
measurements of foetal size. 
 
Several blood tests are taken at 15-17 weeks which are sent to the laboratory for analysis.  
 
Complex calculations are then used to estimate the risk of the foetus being affected by 
Downs syndrome. These start with the age-related risk (the a priori risk) which is derived 
from known incidence of pregnancies affected by Downs syndrome based on maternal 
age. This risk is modified using a likelihood ratio of the presence of an affected foetus 
derived  from  the  concentrations  of  the  markers  to  provide  the  final  risk  value.  The 
calculation  relies  critically  on  accurate  estimation  of  the  projected  maternal  age  at 
delivery which, in turn, is based on the ultrasound measurements of foetal age and the 
date of birth of the mother. It is these calculations that the software system in question 
was used to perform. 
 Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
 80 
The final risk value is reported to the obstetrician who will offer to women deemed at 
high-risk a definitive diagnostic procedure based on cyto-genetic analysis of amniotic 
fluid  obtained  at  amniocentesis.  The  risk  cut-offs  used  in  most  centers  for  the  latter 
decision lies within the range from 1 in 200 to 1 in 300. This value is selected due to the 
need to balance the risks of miscarriage due to amniocentesis (approximately 1 in 200 
procedures) with the benefits of identifying affected pregnancies.  
 
It is important to stress that the majority of women identified as high-risk are in fact 
carrying a normal child, and not all Downs syndrome pregnancies are identified as high-
risk. The evaluation of high-risk implies the woman has a higher likelihood than others to 
giving birth to a child with Down’s and should be subject to further evaluation. 
 
Management of Quality of Performance in Downs Screening 
Like other NHS screening services, a Downs Screening Service has to maintain a quality 
system which works across the complete process. Checks are needed at every stage and 
this requires a positive multidisciplinary approach: 
 
1.  The initial discussion with the pregnant woman 
2.  The taking of the blood sample 
3.  Collection of robust demographic data 
4.  Assessment of foetal age 
5.  Maintenance of reliable transport arrangements for the sample 
6.  Provision of accurate laboratory analytical procedures 
7.  Use of reliable calculation algorithms and software Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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8.  The  delivery  and  clear  presentation  of  the  results  by  the  relevant  healthcare 
professional (midwife, nurse or doctor) 
 
These checks are supported by several internal and external QA processes [Ferres et al., 
2001]. 
5.1.3  Overview of error handling activities 
During  a  period  of  five  months,  there  were  three  different  error  recovery  processes 
initiated by nurses in different locations; two from other hospitals, and one from another 
department within Sheffield Northern General. The first two attempts involved nurses 
that became increasingly concerned over a lack of high-risk reports coming back from the 
laboratory—they were however not certain that there was an error; this is considered as 
problem detection due to the uncertainty that comes with the concerns being raised. The 
first nurse noticed this discrepancy just two weeks after the bug came in effect, while the 
second made her first report two months later. From January to May, the two nurses made 
several reports to the  Immunology Department, but they did not manage to convince 
laboratory staff that there was a problem with Down’s screening. Reporting was primarily 
done  over  the  phone,  with  different  people  picking  up  the  phone  on  almost  every 
occasion.   
 
In  May,  five  months  after  the  bug  manifested,  the  problem  was  realized  almost 
accidentally  by  an  investigation  into—what  seemed  at  the  time—another  error.  More 
specifically, nurses from Antenatal care thought the dates of birth of two mothers had 
been  wrongly  entered  in  the  system  and  requested  that  they  be  changed.  When  a Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
 82 
laboratory technician attempted to change the dates of birth, the risk calculation did not 
change; this raised some suspicion. Even when laboratory staff realized there was an 
error  in  Down’s  screening,  they  were  not  aware  of  the  magnitude  of  the  failure.  In 
addition,  communication  breakdowns  and  absences  of  key  personnel  at  that  stage 
prolonged the incident even further (3-4 days). Eventually, when people decided to look 
into the software system, the bug was detected and fixed within 37 minutes. 
 
Despite the resolution of the technical problem, a further investigation was necessary in 
order to identify and contact each affected pregnant woman. Until that investigation was 
finished, recovery could not be considered complete. Eventually, it was determined that 
158 high-risk pregnancies had been labeled as low-risk before May 23
rd. The women 
were contacted for reexamination, where two proceeded with a late abortion, and two 
other gave birth to a child with Down’s syndrome. 
5.1.4  ER-STEP analysis 
This section will describe three different recovery processes, initiated by the 
1.  Maternity and Gynecology liaison sister, hospital B 
2.  Midwife coordinator, hospital C 
3.  Antenatal staff, Sheffield Northern General hospital 
In addition, the activities that followed recovery and correction of the software errors 
regarding the evaluation of the impact of the failure will also be discussed. 
Maternity and Gynecology liaison sister, hospital B 
The first attempt to report concerns was made only two weeks after the bug began to 
manifest itself after the millennium. A Maternity and Gynecology liaison sister in another Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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hospital (Hospital B) was concerned there were not enough positive results, and made at 
least three attempts to indicate the error to the immunology department in January.  
 
As the Downs Screening service had been offered for approximately 12 years, the nurse 
quickly  became  concerned  by  noticing  a  discrepancy  in  the  frequency  of  high  risk 
pregnancies diagnosed [Event 1.4: problem detection] . She reported her concerns to the 
lab over the phone in mid January [Event 1.5: problem indication], but her reports were 
not seen as significant at the time (Figure 5.1 below illustrates the ER-STEP diagram that 
describes  all  the  activities  concerning  the  Maternity  and  Gynaecology  liaison  sister’s 
efforts). 
 
Figure 5.1: Error Recovery Efforts 1, Sheffield. 
Shortly after she had reported her concerns regarding a lack of high-risk pregnancies, the 
same nurse was confronted with an incident that increased her concerns. An older woman 
was found to be in the low risk area, even though she should be in the high-risk area by 
default, because of her age
11 (all women over 35 are considered to be in high-risk) [Event 
                                                 
11 This event is labeled as error detection rather than problem detection because an incident involving one 
specific diagnosis is a clearer indication of the error rather than general concerns of a lack of high risk 
pregnancies. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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1.6: error detection]. The nurse reported the incident directly to the lab [Event 1.8: 
error indication], and this time her concerns had as a result a brief inquiry [Event 1.9: 
further investigation]. 
 
Ms S, the acting Medical Laboratory Scientific Officer (MLSO) at the time, informed a 
colleague of the incident and the nurse’s concerns. ‘Ms S’ colleague’ had performed the 
Y2K tests for the application [Event 1.3: No classification] that supported the Down’s 
screening algorithm in the previous couple of weeks. During their phone conversation, 
Ms S’s colleague reassured Ms S that everything was fine and that Y2K testing had been 
carried out correctly, and this ended the investigation [Event 1.10: Failure of Further 
investigation]. As a consequence, Ms S did not consider the incident as serious, and 
decided not to log it in the ‘high book’, a book that is placed next to the phone for 
recording any reported abnormal results [Event 1.11: Failure of Further investigation] 
(It was suggested in the report that there was an overall high confidence in the Y2K 
compliance activities carried out in the lab). 
 
Towards  the  end  of  January,  the  nurse  was  becoming  frustrated  as  her  reports  were 
ineffective, and she decided to monitor results personally thereafter [Event 1.12: further 
investigation]. She made her last attempt to notify the lab in the end of January [Event 
1.13:  problem  indication],  however  she  didn’t  make  any  progress.  All  reports  were 
made over the phone. No more reference was made to the Maternity and Gynecology 
Sister since then in the inquiry report.   
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Midwife Coordinator, Hospital C 
Approximately  a  month  after  the  incident  involving  the  Maternity  and  Gynaecology 
Liaison sister, the Midwife Coordinator of another hospital (Hospital C) also had growing 
concerns over a lack of high risk pregnancies [Event 1.23: problem detection]. From 
late April through to early May she reported her concerns to the lab twice over the phone 
[Event 1.24: problem indication], [Event 1.26: problem indication]. Her efforts had 
similar results with the Maternity and Gynecology Sister’s, as there were no immediate 
actions to confirm or cancel out her concerns [Event 1.24: failure of error recovery]. In 
fact, at her second attempt, she spoke to Ms S [Event 1.26: problem indication] who 
had also been personally in contact with the Maternity and Gynaecology Liaison sister in 
January (Events 1.7 and 1.8); no association of the two separate reports was made by Ms 
S according to the inquiry report. In this occasion, Ms S suggested she would notify Mr 
M regarding this matter [Event 1.27], but there is no evidence in the report that she 
actually did [Event 1.28], as she never responded to the Midwife’s phone-call [Event 
1.29].  
 
Figure 5.2: Error recovery efforts 2, Sheffield.  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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The Midwife Coordinator made another attempt to communicate her concerns to the lab 
over the phone [Event 1.30: problem indication], and this time spoke to the Head of 
Department,  Dr  B.  He  told  her  he  would  get  back  to  her  soon  [Event  1.31:  No 
classification]. In the meantime, the Midwife Coordinator consulted with the Head of 
Midwifery of Hospital C [Event 1.32: further investigation], and decided to put her 
concerns in writing [Event 1.34: problem indication]. This decision was important and, 
as we shall see later on, it commenced a series of actions that led to the identification of 
the  error;  however,  it  followed  a  number  of  failed  attempts  to  report  the  problem 
informally.  
 
Later on during the same day (May 17
th), Dr B discussed the matter with Ms P [Event 
1.35:  further  investigation]  another  MLSO  (apart  from  Ms  S),  who  informed  Dr  B 
[Event 1.36: further investigation] that an audit which had been requested in April 
(Figure 5.3 illustrates the events that took place in April regarding the audit) and by the 
lab  IT  technician  had  not  been  carried  out  [Event  1.37:  No  classification].    Dr  B 
instructed Mr M to have the audit report on his desk the following day [Event 1.38: 
further investigation].  
 
Figure 5.3: Error recovery efforts 3, Sheffield. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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On May 18
th Dr B saw the note on his desk [Event 1.50: No classification] but didn’t 
realize the piece of paper was actually the result of the audit [Event 1.51: Failure of 
Further investigation]. It was suggested that at the time Dr B was very busy, while his 
wife was about to go into labor. The next day, Friday May 19
th, the Midwife Coordinator 
made a phone call to the lab again reporting her concerns, and also to inform Mr K that 
she would be sending a letter to the lab about her concerns over the lack of high risk 
pregnancies [Event 1.56: further investigation]. On that day Dr B’s wife went into labor 
[Event  1.53:  No  classification].  During  his  absence,  no  further  activities  regarding 
Downs Screening took place until after the weekend.  
 
Figure 5.4: Error recovery efforts 4, Sheffield. 
 
The Midwife Coordinator’s reports did not have a direct impact in the detection of an 
error within the lab. However, during the third week of May, there was another report to 
the Immunology department which was seen at the time as a separate event. This report, Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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in conjunction with the efforts of the Midwife coordinator resulted in the realization of 
the problem with Down’s screening.  
 
Antenatal Staff, Sheffield Northern General 
On May 17
th, the same day that the Midwife Coordinator spoke to Dr B over the phone 
[Event 1.42: error indication], staff from Antenatal care made a phone call requesting 
amendments to two reports. The dates of birth in the reports were wrong; one by a couple 
of months and one by a couple of years [Event 1.41: error detection]. Note that error 
detection here refers to the detection of another error [error 2].  
 
Ms  S  became  concerned  there  was  a  problem  with  Downs  Screening  as  when  she 
changed the dates of birth accordingly, the risk calculation remained the same [Event 
1.44: error detection]. Ms S reported this matter to Mr  L,  who was  responsible for 
maintaining PathLan [Event 1.45: error indication]. Mr L then attempted to inform Mr 
W in Hartlepool [Event 1.46: error indication] who, along with Dr A, had created the 
Downs Screening software application back in 1988. Mr W was not available and so Mr 
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Figure 5.5: Error Recovery Efforts 5, Sheffield. 
The following day, Friday 19
th, Mr L was away, and no further actions were taken until 
Monday 22
nd. On that Friday Mr K received the letter from the Midwife Coordinator 
[Event 1.57: further investigation]. On the 22
nd, Dr B’s wife went into labour, so he 
was absent on paternity leave.  
 
On May 23
rd, Mr K asked Mr M to provide him with the audit results [Event 1.60: 
further  investigation].  After  examining  the  audit  results  [Event  1.61:  further 
investigation], Mr K found that high risk calculations were overall much lower than 
anticipated,  and  not  just  with  regards  to  Hospital  B’s  pregnant  women,  but  to  all 
recipients of their test reports [Event 1.62: error detection]. Mr K immediately asked his 
assistant Mr L to contact Mr W [Event 1.64: error indication] while he had already 
started checking analytical values himself [Event 1.63: further investigation].  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 5.6: Error Recovery Efforts 6, Sheffield. 
Contact with Mr W was established the next day [Event 1.65: error indication]. Mr W 
then logged on to PathLan in the morning and checked the date values [Event 1.66: 
further  investigation]. Within  37  minutes,  the bug  had  been  identified  [Event  1.67: 
error explanation] and corrected [Event 1.68: error correction]. Mr K did not find out 
about  the  Maternity  and  Gynecology  Sister’s  reports  until  after  the  error  had  been 
corrected. 
 
At  that  stage  it  was  important  to  find  out  how  many  errors  had  been  made.  On  the 
morning of May 24
th, Mr K informed Dr B that he would find all high-risk cases that had 
been wrongly reported. He trawled through the system to identify the potential size of the 
problem over the next 12 hours or so [Event 1.70: further investigation]. He found 
approximately 150 high-risk pregnancies which had been reported as low-risk [Event 
1.71: error explanation]—Mr K subsequently emailed these findings to Dr B [Event 
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5.1.5  Further analysis 
As mentioned in Section 4.3, the final stage of the ER-STEP analysis is to rearrange the 
sequence  of  events  based  on  the  progression  that  is  suggested  by  the  error  recovery 
framework.  With this view, the analyst can focus even further on the process of error 
recovery.  
 
In this section, the ER-STEP diagrams will therefore be rearranged to the error recovery 
view, while detection events will be classified according to the different detection types 
proposed  by  Sellen  [1994]  (action-based,  outcome-based,  through  limiting  functions). 
These findings will be aggregated and further analyzed in the next chapter. 
 
Maternity and Gynecology Liaison Sister, hospital B 
Figure 5.7 illustrates the same events as in Figure 5.1 with the error recovery view.   Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 5.7: Error recovery focused view, Sheffield 1. 
As we can see, detection events occurred where test results are used and not inside the 
lab. Reporting of either concerns or of an incident with a patient had to be reported to the 
lab  over  the  phone  several  times.  In  the  first  instance,  problem  indication  did  not 
convince laboratory staff that there was actually a problem. Following several reports by 
the same person, there were some investigation activities—although these came close to 
the  identification  of  the  software  bug,  the  person  who  had  carried  out  Y2K  testing 
dismissed these reports, so the incident was not investigated further and was not logged. 
 
Table 5.2 summarizes the different kinds of activities under each stage that have taken 
place during the efforts initiated by the Maternity and Gynaecology sister during January 
2000. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Event  Analysis 
Problem detection  Outcome-based, outside the lab 
Growing concern due to a discrepancy between the expected number of 
positives and the actually received (event 1.4).  
Error detection  Outcome-based, outside the lab 
Outcome (screening result) different than what she expected (event 1.6). 
Problem indication  Over the phone (events 1.3, 1.5 and 1.7) 
Error indication  Over the phone (event 1.8) 
Further 
investigation 
Outside the lab 
Monitoring of results to find out if there is an error (event 1.12) 
Inside the lab 
Enquiry to colleague to find out if there is an error (event 1.9) 
Investigation to determine the extent of the failure (event 1.70) 
Failure of error 
recovery 
Incident not logged (Event 1.11) 
Reassurances that ‘everything is OK’ (events 1.10, 1.14) 
Table 5.2: Analysis of recovery events, Sheffield 1. 
 
Midwife Coordinator, Hospital C 
Figure 5.8 illustrates the error recovery focused view of the activities following the 
Midwife coordinator’s efforts presented in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.4. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 5.8: Error recovery focused view, Sheffield 2, 4 and 6.  
It is obvious from the above figure that the reports made by the Midwife coordinator 
resulted  in  a  significant  amount  of  investigation  activities.  There  were  at  least  five 
distinct events where staff was investigating the system in order to determine if there is 
an error, after people in the laboratory started becoming suspicious. However, this was 
largely motivated by the Midwife coordinator’s decision to write a formal letter, while 
her  phone-call  to  the  laboratory  to  announce  she  had  in  fact  sent  that  letter  perhaps 
accelerated investigation activities in the laboratory. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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However, these events were not enough to lead laboratory staff to identify the actual 
cause of the errors (although it makes sense to assume that investigation activities that 
were undertaken at the time would have resulted in error explanation anyway). This was 
done when staff from antenatal found errors which seemed at the time as unrelated—this 
will be discussed in the following section.  
 
Table 5.3 summarizes the different kinds of activities under each stage that have taken 
place during the efforts initiated by the Midwife coordinator in Hospital C during March-
May 2000. 
Event  Analysis 
Problem detection  Outcome based, outside the lab 
Growing concern due to a lack of positives reported (event 1.23) 
Error detection  Through further investigation, inside the lab 
Investigation following problem detection has resulted in the identification 
of an error (event 1.62) 
Problem indication  Over the phone (events 1.24, 1.26 and 1.30) 
Written (event 1.34) 
Error indication  None 
Further 
investigation 
Outside the lab 
Enquiry to colleague regarding what action to take (events 1.32)  
Inside the lab 
Enquiry to colleague regarding what action to take (events 1.35) 
Enquiry to colleague regarding actions that have been performed in the 
past (events 1.36,1.54 and 1.57)  
Investigation to find out if there is an error (events 1.38, 1.39, 1.55, 1.61 
and 1.63) 
Failure of error 
recovery 
Failure to consider previous event as important (events 1.25, 1.28 and 
1.51) 
Table 5.3: Analysis of recovery events, Sheffield 2, 4 and 6. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Note that error detection through investigation is a detection mechanism which is not 
considered  in  Sellen’s  taxonomy.  This  kind  of  detection  occurred  following  problem 
detection, problem indication and consequently, further investigation. 
Antenatal Staff, Northern General 
Figure 5.9 presents the error recovery focused view of events that are described in Figure 
5.5 and Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.9: Error recovery focused view, Sheffield 5 and 6. 
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During a rather turbulent time for the Department (recent change of Head of Department, 
low staffing levels), with the reports from the Midwife coordinator under investigation, 
the two nurses in antenatal care found two reports with the DOBs of two women being 
wrong. When they phoned the laboratory to have the dates changed, it was realized that 
the risk calculation remained the same, which made it obvious that there was something 
wrong with the Down’s screening software. It is important to stress that the person who 
tried to change the date was Ms S, who had been involved in all previous reports; she was 
aware of the reports by the Gynaecology and Maternity Liaison sister and the Midwife 
coordinator. 
 
Mr W, the person responsible for the maintenance of the software was finally contacted 
that time—according to the report, it took him 37 minutes to identify and correct the bug. 
 
Table 5.4 summarizes the different kinds of activities under each recovery stage that have 
taken place during the efforts initiated by Antenatal care staff towards the end of the 
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Event  Analysis 
Problem detection  None 
Error detection  Outcome based, outside the lab 
Antenatal staff found two reports where the dates of birth (DoBs) were 
wrong. This was an error during data entry, and could have happened 
regardless of the software bug. For this reason it has been labeled as 
error 2. (Event 1.41). 
Outcome based, inside the lab 
In an attempt to correct error 2, Ms S found the risk calculation remained 
the same. This led to the realization that there was something wrong with 
the risk calculation software (event 1.44) 
Problem indication  None 
Error indication  Over the phone (events 1.45, 1.46, 1.48) and voice-mail (event 1.65) 
Further 
investigation 
Investigation of system to find out what the errors is (event 1.66) 
Error explanation  Identification of software bug (event 1.67) 
Error correction  Removal of bug (event 1.68) 
Table 5.4: Analysis of error recovery activities, Sheffield 5.5 and 5.6. 
5.1.6  Overview of findings 
Table 5.5 summarizes and categorizes all types of error recovery activities that took place 
during this incident. 
Event  Analysis 
Problem detection  Outcome based, outside the lab 
Growing concern due to a lack of positives (events 1.4, 1.23) 
Error detection  Outcome based, outside the lab 
Older woman should be in high-risk by default (Event 1.6). 
Outcome based, inside the lab 
When trying to change a DOB, risk calculation remains the same (event 
1.41) 
Through investigation, inside the lab 
Previous reports investigated result into identification of error (event 1.62) 
Problem indication  Over the phone (events 1.3, 1.5, 1.7, 1.24, 1.26, 134) Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Event  Analysis 
Written (event 1.34) 
Error indication  Over the phone (events 1.45, 1.46, 1.48) and voice-mail (event 1.65) 
Further 
investigation 
Outside the lab 
Monitoring of results to find out if there is an error (event 1.12) 
Enquiry to colleague regarding what action to take (events 1.32)  
 
Inside the lab 
Enquiry to colleague to find out if there is an error (event 1.9) 
Enquiry to colleague regarding what action to take (events 1.35) 
Enquiry to colleague regarding actions that have been performed in the 
past (events 1.36,1.54 and 1.57)  
 
Audit to find out if there is an error (events 1.38, 1.39, 1.55, 1.61 and 
1.63) 
Investigation of system to find out what the errors is (event 1.66) 
Investigation to determine the extent of the failure (event 1.70) 
Error explanation  Identification of software bug 
Error correction  Removal of bug 
Failure of error 
recovery 
Incident not logged (Event 1.11) 
Reassurances that ‘everything is OK’ (events 1.10, 1.14) 
Failure to consider previous event as important (events 1.25, 1.28 and 
1.51) 
Table 5.5: Summary of error recovery activities in the Sheffield incident. 
5.2  Case study 2: Breast cancer screening errors, London 
This  second  incident  is  particularly  different  from  the  first  one.  The  error  was  not 
originating  in  software  or  in  the  analysis  altogether,  but  in  the  notation  laboratory 
technicians used to denote positives. The notation was “confusing”, leading to multiple 
positives missed. In addition, there was no protocol in place to ensure that women were 
receiving  the  correct  results.  In  comparison  to  the  first  incident,  there  are  more 
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In addition, this incident was severely prolonged by the subsequent investigations that 
were carried our. 
 
However,  the  impact  of  the  temporal  dimension  on  the  clinical  outcome  is  not  as 
immediate as in the first case study which considered diagnoses on pregnancies. The 
impact in terms of numbers of patients was therefore smaller, although fatal in some 
cases. 
5.2.1  Incident summary  
In mid October 2000, it was discovered almost accidentally that a woman had been sent 
the wrong results (she was informed she was fine, although she should have been called 
for further testing) by her previous breast screening service following her mammogram in 
January  1999.  Following  this  incident,  two  inquiries  were  carried  out.  During  this 
investigation,  over  174,000  screening  episodes  were  reviewed,  concluding  that  123 
women had not received the right result. The error was eventually associated with a delay 
in diagnosis of breast cancer in 11 women, while the longest delay was 21 months. One 
woman’s condition deteriorated and she died. 
Incident   Errors in Breast Cancer Screening service   
Incident timeframe  1993 – December 2001 
Primary cause  Absence of protocol to ensure women receive the correct results 
Data source  Formal inquiry report [CHI, 2002] 
Table 5.6: Overview of incident 2. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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One of the conclusions drawn by the inquiry committee was that: “…there had been 
warning  signs  of  the  potential  for  service  failure  which  had  not  been  reported  and, 
therefore, not acted on by West of London Breast Screening Service…” 
5.2.2  Background 
The inquiry report for this incident presents only the events that followed the detection of 
the  error,  and  mostly  the  activities  surrounding  the  decisions  and  conduct  of  three 
inquiries that followed (one internal, one independent, and a formal NHS inquiry—the 
latter being the source of this analysis). Errors were made over a period of eight years; 
they were not attributed to software or hardware faults, but to a lack of protocol to ensure 
that the right results were given to the right patient.  
 
There were two Breast Cancer Screening services involved: the West of London Breast 
Screening Service (WLBSS), where the errors occurred, and Breast Screening Service X 
(BSS X), where one of the errors was detected. Abbreviations here are the same as in the 
formal inquiry report. 
5.2.3  ER-STEP analysis 
In January 1999, a woman was sent the wrong mammogram tests by the WLBSS [Event 
2.1: No classification], where she was cleared from any risks associated with Breast 
Cancer. She should have been called back for further testing. In October 2000, she moved 
to another area [Event 2.2: No classification] and had her files sent over to her new 
Breast Cancer Screening Service, BSS X [Event 2.3: No classification]. A review of her Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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case found the error [Event 2.4: error detection], and the BSS X contacted the WLBSS 
over the phone regarding the matter [Event 2.5: error indication].  
 
On October 31
st, the BSS X sent written confirmation to the WLBSS [Event 2.6: error 
indication], that there was an error with the specific patient’s diagnosis, and copied the 
letter to their own Quality Assurance Centre (Quality Assurance Centre X). The matter 
was  discussed  among  senior  management  within  WLBSS  [Event  2.7:  further 
investigation], however it was not regarded as significant [Event 2.8: Failure of error 
recovery], as there had been no complications for the woman’s health. 
 
On the following day, BSS X informed the London Quality Assurance Reference Centre 
[Event 2.9: error indication] over the phone, while they also forwarded the letter sent to 
the WLBSS the previous day [Event 2.10: error indication]. The letter was received 10 
days later (November 10) by the London Quality Assurance Reference Centre [Event 
2.11: further investigation]. Until then, no further actions to investigate the error and 
other possible complications were carried out. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 5.10: Error recovery efforts 1, London. 
On the week starting November 13
th, the London Quality Assurance Centre made several 
attempts to discuss the matter with senior management of the WLBSS [Event 2.12: error 
indication].  They  insisted  the  error  be  reported  to  the  General  Manager  of  the 
Hammersmith Hospitals Trust. On November 17
th, the incident was finally reported as a 
‘critical incident’ to the Trust’s General Manager [Event 2.13: error indication], who 
immediately  contacted  the  Trust’s  Chief  Operating  Officer  [Event  2.14:  error 
indication]. 5 days later, the matter was brought to the attention of the NHS England 
Coordinator of Breast Screening [Event 2.15: error indication]. 
 
The following day (Nov 23), the London Quality Assurance Reference Center informed 
the officer with lead responsibility for Cancer Services at the NHS London Regional 
Office [Event 2.16: error indication]. On November 24, the London Quality Assurance 
Reference Centre wrote a letter to the NHS Region Director of Public Health regarding 
the incident [Event 2.17: error indication], and decided to call a meeting [Event 2.18: Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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further  investigation],  with  participants  being  representatives  from  the  WLBSS,  the 
wider trust, the health authority commissioning consortium, and the Quality Assurance 
Reference Center, while the trust’s Chief Operating Officer was chairing the meeting 
which was scheduled for December 4
th.  
 
Figure 5.11: Error recovery efforts 2, London. 
 
At  the  meeting,  the  trust  established  an  internal  inquiry  panel  [Event  2.19:  further 
investigation].  The  panel,  made  up  by  the  general  manager  of  the  directorate  and  a 
consultant radiologist who did not work at the WLBSS, reviewed a number of documents 
and conducted interviews [Event 2.20: further investigation]. It was understood that the 
WLBSS needed to develop a robust right results protocol to ensure women received the 
correct result [Event 2.21: error explanation], while they suggested an external audit 
company  should  review  the  mammogram  files  of  all  women  who  had  attended  for 
screening  since  1993,  nearly  104,000  women  (over  174,000  episodes)  [Event  2.22: 
further investigation]. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 5.12: Error recovery efforts 3, London. 
 
The  findings  of  the  inquiry  panel  were  reported  to  the  Trust  Chief  Executive  on 
December 22
nd [Event 2.24: further investigation]. The Trust Board also discussed the 
matter in a closed session, on February 12
th 2001 [Event 2.23: further investigation]. It 
was decided an external audit should be carried out, as suggested by the inquiry panel. 
The company—PricewaterhouseCoopers—was instructed to go over all the files since 
1993, in order to identify any difference between the information contained in WLBSS 
files and the corresponding computer records. The principal objective was to identify 
cases in which women screened by WLBSS may have received the wrong result and 
incorrectly  refereed  for  a  routine  recall  in  3  years  time  instead  of  being  recalled  for 
immediate clinical or technical assessment.  
 
This  audit  lasted  approximately  3  months  [Event  2.25:  further  investigation];  the 
findings were forwarded to the inquiry panel, which compiled a report in July [Event 
2.26: Error explanation]. During the audit by PricewaterhouseCoopers, the Trust Chief 
Executive requested the assistance of the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) 
[Event 2.27: error indication], who agreed to conduct their own investigation on April 
10
th [Event 2.28: further investigation].  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 5.13: Error recovery activities 4, London.  
On June 11
th, WoLBSS suspended its breast cancer screening service [Event 2.29: error 
control], and CHI began their investigation [Event 2.30: further investigation] which 
was completed in April 2002. It was not until December 10
th that WoLSBSS began a 
phased reintroduction of services [Event 2.31: error correction].  
5.2.4  Further analysis 
Figure 5.14 presents the error recovery focused view of the error handling activities that 
took place during the Breast Cancer screening errors, London. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 5.14: Error recovery focused view, London. 
 
Error  recovery  efforts  for  this  incident  were  triggered  by  a  single  instance  of  error 
detection. This was however done by a Breast Screening Service and not by a nurse in 
points of care. The reason for the extended recovery timeframe is the fact that errors were 
taking place for over eight years. A total of three inquiries had to be carried out in order 
to determine the number of erroneous reports. These inquiries are considered as part of 
the entire recovery process as the errors were continuing to affect patients as time was 
passing. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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There also many error indication events, where the Breast Screening service that detected 
the error had to notify several agencies and authorities in order to establish a formal 
inquiry. 
 
Table 5.7 summarizes and categorizes all error recovery events that took place during this 
incident. 
Event  Analysis 
Problem detection  None 
Error detection  Outcome based, outside the lab 
Revaluation  of  a  patient’s  screening  result  by  new  breast  screening 
service (Event 2.4) 
Problem indication  None 
Error indication  Over the phone (events 2.5, 2.9 and 2.12) 
Formal letters (2.6 and 2.10) 
Incident reporting to NHS authorities (events 2.14, 2.15 and 2.16) 
Further 
investigation 
Outside the lab 
None 
Inside the lab 
Meeting to decide what action to take (event 2.18) 
Investigation to determine what the error is (events 2.19, 2.20, 2.28 and 
2.30) 
Audit to determine the extent of the error (event 2.22 and 2.25) 
Error explanation  Identification of cause (event 2.21) 
Error control  Suspend breast screening (event 2.29) 
Error correction  Implement  recommendations  (event  2.31),  phased  introduction  of 
services (event 2.32) 
Failure of error 
recovery 
Previous event not considered as important (event 2.8) 
Table 5.7: Summary of error recovery activities in the London incident. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
 109 
   
5.2.5  A case of whistle-blowing? 
Only a few days after the CHI report was published in April 2002, two former employees 
of the Hammersmith Hospitals NHS Trust gave an interview to BBC news, stating that 
there were further failures in the Radiology Department of the Trust
12. In the interview, 
the one former employee argued that she—as well as other colleagues—had made several 
attempts to report problems in the radiology unit, which had to do with technology and 
management failures, but were not affective.  
 
One of them suggested that “Many scans were rendered unusable because reports were 
generated with missing characters and lines and even patients' names transposed”. The 
same person went on to argue that: “Many compromised reports were simply abandoned 
because it was impossible to identify who the patient was, while even reports which were 
identifiable were abandoned because staff were under time pressure”.  
 
These events took place during 1993-1995, when the nurse having written a letter to the 
management reporting these issues was suspended from her duties (allegedly within two 
hours).  In  1995,  A  Picture  Archiving  and  Communication  System  (PACS)
13  was 
introduced,  which  significantly  changed  the  way  with  which  things  were  done  at  the 
Radiology unit. However, other mishaps had taken place since 1999 according to the 
                                                 
12 More information can be found at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/archive/1938095.stm 
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second  whistle-blower.  In  fact,  that  person  suggested  that  staff involved  believed  the 
inquiry carried out was incomplete, and even acted as a ‘cover-up’ of the problems that 
existed in the radiology unit and the breast cancer screening service.  
 
The press article that discusses these matters is neither an official document, nor does it 
contain enough information for an analysis. However, it is worth mentioning as such 
occurrences illustrate the potential friction that may arise when staff in lower levels of the 
organization have concerns about the practices of their department or unit; the following 
quote from the involved nurse may highlight the challenge of whistle-blowing:  “I could 
never  say  to  another  person  who  might  be  in  the  NHS  now,  possibly  watching  this, 
thinking perhaps I should blow the whistle, I couldn't tell them go ahead and do it”.  
5.3  Case study 3: Breast cancer screening errors, Manchester 
This incident was attributed to ‘human error’ of a single radiologist. In comparison to the 
two previous case studies, the direct cause was therefore also different. However, like the 
previous cases, error recovery was poor and contributed to having a prolonged incident 
timeframe. 
5.3.1  Incident summary  
Over  a  two-year  period,  a  consultant  radiologist  misinterpreted  a  total  of  176 
mammograms.  28  of  these  had  previously  been  cleared  by  the  radiologist,  but  were 
eventually  identified  as  having  breast  cancer,  out  of  which  17  were  given  reduced 
chances of survival. Although the  radiologist involved was initially considered solely 
responsible,  the  investigations  that  followed  concluded  that  severe  organizational  and Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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structural  problems  allowed  for  the  errors  to  occur.  The  radiologist  was,  at  the  time 
working at two NHS Trusts: The Trafford Hospitals Trust and The Bury Primary Care 
Trust.   
Incident   Errors in Breast Cancer Screening service   
Incident timeframe  April 2003 – January 2006 
Primary cause  ‘Human error’ 
Data source  Two Formal inquiry reports [Baker, 2006] and [Expert Advisory 
Panel, 2006] 
Table 5.8: Overview of incident 3. 
Two inquiries were carried out ([Expert Advisory Panel, 2006] and [Baker, 2006]). The 
two inquiries discussed  here had different purposes: The  Baker  report  considered the 
practices of the radiologist held responsible (Dr H), while the Expert Advisory Panel’s 
report focused on the communications, meetings and reviews that were carried out upon 
the discovery of the errors. 
The inquiry reports suggested that the errors would have been identified sooner had audit 
arrangements been in place as recommended in previous reviews, while the problems 
“…may  well  have  been  masked  in  previous  settings  by  the  strength  of  their  imaging 
department and of the breast multi-disciplinary team”. In addition, it was concluded that 
“…warning  signs  were  missed  or  ignored  and  inadequate  attention  was  paid  to  the 
nature of references”. 
5.3.2  ER-STEP analysis 
Concerns  about  Dr  H’s  practice  were  raised  from  the  first  couple  of  weeks  in  his 
appointment. More specifically, other Mammography radiologists were concerned that Dr Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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H’s reports were too short, while he didn’t take into account previous radiology reports 
[Event 3.1: problem detection]. Concerns were higher with respect to cancer patients 
under  surveillance.  However,  no  errors  had  been  identified  until  then.  Radiologists 
formally reported their concerns about Dr H’s practices in November 2003 [Event 3.2: 
problem indication]. The subsequent investigation [Event 3.3: further investigation] 
did not find any significant problems with Dr H’s work [Event 3.4: failure of error 
recovery]. 
 
During November 2003, some errors in Dr H’s reports were noticed by other radiologists 
[Event 3.5: error detection]—we have no information regarding the nature of the errors. 
Trust management became aware of this [Event 3.6: error indication], but the errors 
were seen as isolated events, and not systematic [Event 3.7: failure of error recovery]. 
 
During November, clinical staff at Trafford were also becoming concerned that Dr H’s 
work was not reliable [Event 3.8: problem detection]. As a result, they were checking 
all critical tests with another radiologist [Event 3.9: further investigation]. However, 
they were not checking all results, but only the ones with diagnosed cancer (therefore 
only consider the risk of false positives). Since then, the inquiry reports do not mention 
any further activities with regards to Dr H’s work until April 2005. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 5.15: Error recovery efforts 1, Greater Manchester. 
 
In April 2005, mammography radiographers at Trafford Hospitals Trust found a higher 
number of errors than expected in a single Breast Care Multi-Disciplinary Team (MDT) 
patient  list  [Event  3.10:  error  detection].  This,  along  with  their  general  concerns 
regarding Dr H’s work was reported to the THT management [Event 3.11: problem 
indication],  [Event  3.12:  error  indication].  On  April  18
th,  the  Trust  management 
decided  to  suspend  Dr  H  [Event  3.13:  error  control].  The  following  day,  THT 
management  reported  Dr  H’s  errors  as  a  ‘serious  adverse  event’  to  the  Greater 
Manchester Strategic Health Authority (GMSHA) [Event 3.14: error indication], who 
subsequently informed the Department of Health [Event 3.15: error indication]. An 
independent review was called, and the Nightingale centre was instructed to conduct it 
[Event 3.16: further investigation]. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 5.16: Error recovery efforts 2, Greater Manchester. 
 
On April 26
th, the Nightingale centre commenced a mammography review (consisting of 
478 reports) [Event 3.17: further investigation]. On the same day, an Expert Advisory 
Panel was established, in order to advise the Trusts on the management of the clinical 
incident  [Event  3.18:  further  investigation].  The  mammography  review  by  the 
Nightingale centre was concluded on May 6
th, finding a significant number of differing 
reports [Event 3.19: error explanation]. At that stage, the Bury Primary Care Trust 
(where Dr H was also working on a part-time basis) was advised to exclude Dr H [Event 
3.20:  error  indication].  The  National  Patient  Safety  Agency  was  informed  of  the 
incident on April 17
th [Event 3.21: error indication].  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 5.17: Error recovery efforts 3, Greater Manchester. 
During  August,  the  London  Breast  Screening  Quality  Assurance  Team  performed  a 
review of the general radiology images and films [Event 3.22: further investigation], 
while  the  review  of  clinical  notes,  cytology  reports  and  histopathology  reports  lasted 
three months (up to December 2005) [Event 3.23: further investigation], and the review 
of the ultrasound patients’ notes and images lasted four months (ending in January 2006) 
[Event 3.24: further investigation]. Finally, the review of the 28 patients with delayed 
diagnosis was performed over December 2005 [Event 3.25: further investigation]. 
5.3.3  Further analysis 
Figure 5.18 illustrated three distinct sequences of events that were motivated by detection 
in different locations. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 5.18: Error recovery focused view, Greater Manchester efforts 1. 
 
In the first case, colleagues of Dr H’s were concerned about the brevity and the brusque 
style of his reports. They officially reported their concerns to the Trust management who 
decided to look into Dr H’s past. They found nothing notable apart from a good resume 
with good references, and assumed that there were no problems with his practice. In the 
second  incident,  radiologists  in  one  of  the  hospitals  of  the  Trust  found  errors  in  his 
reports—this was reported also to the Trust management, but they thought these were 
isolated events. 
 
However in the third case, it was clinical staff that were concerned and not radiologists. 
They  did  not  report  their  concerns—they  double  checked  Dr  H’s  reports  with  other 
radiologists. This is common practice in radiology and should have been carried out any 
way, according to the inquiry report. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 5.19: Error recovery focused view, Greater Manchester 2. 
 
The incident was directed towards resolution when colleagues of Dr H’s found a number 
of errors in one of his patient lists. Unlike the previous instances of detection, this time 
reporting of this event had immediate impact. Trust management suspended Dr H.  
 
Investigation activities, like in the previous Breast screening incident, involved multiple 
inquires—both  internal  and  independent.  In  a  similar  manner  to  the  Hammersmith 
incident, many indication events involved the notification of agencies and authorities in 
order to establish the inquiries that were necessary. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Event  Analysis 
Problem detection  Outcome based, inside the lab 
Concerns  over  the  brevity  and  overall  quality  of  Dr  H’s  reports  by 
colleagues (event 3.1) 
Outcome based, outside the lab 
Clinical staff become concerned over the reliability of Dr H’s work (event 
3.8) 
Error detection  Outcome based, outside the lab 
None 
Outcome based, inside the lab 
Radiologists notice errors in Dr H’s reports (event 3.5) 
Mammography radiologists find a high number of errors in a single patient 
list of Dr H’s (3.10) 
Problem indication  Formal reporting of concerns to the Trust management (events 3.2 and 
3.12) [presumably in management meetings] 
Error indication  Formal reporting of errors to the Trust management (events 3.6 and 3.11) 
Reporting of incident to the an external authority as a ‘serious incident’ 
(regional Health Authority  and Department of Health) (events 3.14 and 
3.15) 
Inform  other  Trust  that  the  liable  person  works  in  regarding  his 
performance (event 3.20) 
Further 
investigation 
Inside the lab 
To investigate if there is an error (events 3.3 and 3.9) 
To determine the extent of the error (events 3.16, 3.17, 3.22, 3.23, 3.26 
and 3.27) 
Error explanation  Identification of reports that contain errors (event 3.18) 
Compilation of report containing findings (event 3.25) 
Error control  Suspend person responsible (event 3.13) 
Error correction  n/a (there is no information available regarding subsequent activities to 
correct the problem) 
Failure of error 
recovery 
Investigation does not find any problems (event 3.4) 
Do not consider errors as systematic, but only as isolated events (event 
3.7) 
Table 5.9: Analysis of error recovery activities, Manchester 1, 2 and 3. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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5.4  Case study 4: STI screening errors, Florida 
This  last  incident  presents  some  similarities  with  the  Sheffield  incident  due  to  the 
involvement of software. However, the bug was not part of the risk calculation but in the 
reporting scheme; the system which flagged positives and copied them to the test report 
to be distributed back to where the test was initially requested.  In that sense, it  also 
presents some similarities with the second incident, the errors that occurred in the London 
Breast  Cancer  Screening  service  where  a  confusing  notation  for  denoting  positives 
resulted in missing several positives. 
 
This incident occurred in the USA, where the delivery system is somewhat different from 
the UK NHS. In the USA there are more analytic laboratories per clinic or surgery, as the 
Primary/Secondary  care  distinction  does  not  exist.  This  had  some  impact  on  the 
resolution of the incident as it was detected within the same hospital and the error had not 
propagated across various locations. 
 
There is no formal inquiry report for this case study; the analysis was based on an entry in 
the  Risk  Digest  [Wears,  2004]  and  further  data  collected  through  interviews  with 
involved personnel.  
5.4.1  Incident summary 
Due  to  a  software  bug  compounded  with  interface  deficiencies  in  the  Microbiology 
Department  of  a  hospital  in  Florida,  275  positive  results  for  Sexually  Transmitted 
Diseases (STDs) were missed over a period of four months in 2003. Consequently, 125 of 
these cases had not been treated presumptively with antibiotics. Prior to the incident there Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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was a change in equipment for analyzing DNA probes in the Biochemistry Department. 
Also,  there  was  a  change  in  the  reporting  format  after  a  clinician’s  request  which 
contributed to missing critical test results. During the change of equipment, the ED nurse 
who was the designated recipient of all tests was away on vacation. 
 
A few years later, a similar error occurred, and the nurse responsible for collecting test 
results for the Emergency Department, recalled the previous incident and was alarmed 
very quickly. She contacted the lab shortly after the error (within a week) which found 
and  dealt  with  without  any  patient  complications.  This  second  incident  describes  an 
effective error recovery and not a long- term diagnostic failure as the first one. However, 
the experience of the first incident contributed greatly to the resolution of the second. For 
this reason the ER-STEP analysis will cover both incidents. 
Incident   Errors in STI Screening   
Incident timeframe  February 2003 – June 2003 
Primary cause  Software bug 
Data source  Interviews with involved personnel 
Table 5.10: Overview of incident 4. 
5.4.2  Background 
This  incident  involved  errors  in  Sexually  Transmitted  Infections  (STI)  screening  that 
occurred in a Biochemistry Department, affecting patients in the Emergency Department 
(ED) of the same hospital in Florida. Although this took place in the USA and not the 
UK,  there  are  several  similarities,  as  well  as  significant  differences  that  are  worth 
discussing in comparison to the NHS delivery model.  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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The software bug was in the system used for reporting results, and not in the actual 
diagnostic calculations. On a daily basis, the ED would request several different tests to 
be performed from the Biochemistry laboratory. Once these tests were performed, the 
reporting system in the Biochemistry Department would only select the positives and not 
the negatives—these positives are printed and sent to the ED; this was a new system. 
While the software bug in the reporting system resulted in missing positives, the fact that 
negative results were not printed as well did not allow for the error being detected. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, data regarding this incident was gathered with interviews 
with the ED nurse responsible for requesting and collecting reports from the ED, the 
Head  of  the  Emergency  Department  and  the  supervisor  of  the  Biochemistry 
Department
14.  
5.4.3  ER-STEP analysis 
Towards the end of January 2003, there was a change in equipment for analyzing DNA 
probes in the Biochemistry Department. The system for ensuring that results were not 
missed was based on a custom report written locally. This report covered all bacteriology 
cultures, not just those for STDs, and looked at a binary field for a positive or negative 
value  for  Gonorrhea/Chlamydia  (GC)  reporting  only  the  positives.    Under  the  new 
system, that  field was empty, and so no  GC cases positive were listed by the  report 
[Event 4.1].   
                                                 
14 This was possible through the ‘Ken Browning Traveling Scholarship in Computing and Medicine’ of the 
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Because the other cultures were still being reported normally, the report looked normal 
(ie, it was not entirely empty). Some time after her return [Event 4.2: no classification], 
the nurse became concerned that there were no positives getting reported [Event 4.3: 
problem detection]. She discussed the matter with her supervisor [Event 4.4: further 
investigation], who advised her to report this to the Biochemistry Department [Event 
4.5: further investigation]; she shortly after visited the lab and informed staff [Event 
4.6: problem indication].  
 
Figure 5.20: Error recovery activities 1, Florida. 
Technicians looked at tests dating back to the time of the installation of new equipment 
[Event 4.7: further investigation], and found positives had been diagnosed, but were not 
printed in the report sent to the ED [Event 4.8: Error explanation]. They then checked 
the reporting system [Event 4.9: further investigation] and identified the bug [Event 
4.10:  Error  explanation].  The  custom  program  was  amended  [Event  4.11:  error 
correction, Event 4.12 error correction]. All involved patients were identified [Event 
4.13: further investigation] and patients were contacted [Event 4.14 error correction]. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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In cases of STI screening errors, the patients had to be asked to inform their recent sexual 
partners to be screened as well. 
 
Figure 5.21: Error recovery activities 2, Florida. 
Two years later, the same ED nurse noticed after 2 weeks that no positives were coming 
back [Event 4.15: problem detection]. According to her experience, there were 2 or 3 
positives  every  week.  As  she  recalled  the  previous  incident  [Event  4.16:  No 
classification],  she  immediately  visited  the  laboratory  [Event  4.17:  problem 
indication], and after checking the system [Event 4.18: further investigation] it was 
discovered that a ‘flag’ used to check whether a test result is positive had been mistakenly 
deactivated [Event 4.19: error explanation].    
 
Figure 5.22: Error recovery activities 3, Florida. 
The flag was reset [Event 4.20: error correction] and the system continued to be used 
without any further problems. All involved patients were identified [Event 4.21: further 
investigation] and patients were contacted [Event 4.22 error correction]. The incident 
did not last long enough to have any adverse impact on patients’ health. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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5.4.4  Further analysis 
Figure 5.23 illustrates the error recovery focused view of the ER-STEP analysis presented 
in Figure 5.20. As we can see, there was only one instance of problem detection which 
was however enough for an effective recovery process to be carried out. This is perhaps 
due to the fact that problem detection occurred in the same hospital as the laboratory. 
There are also some significant differences in the model of diagnostic services delivery 
between the UK and US (as discussed in section 2.2) which perhaps play in role in the 
US  incident  response  requiring  less  effort  from  the  person  who  detected  the 
problem/error. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 5.23: Error recovery focused view 1 and 2, Florida. 
In a similar manner to the previous incidents, the timeframe of the Florida incident is 
extended by the investigation required to identify and contact all involved patients for re-
screening. This problem is of particular significance when considering infectious diseases 
as more people may be affected over time. 
 
Figure  5.24  illustrates  the  error  recovery  focused  view  of  the  second  incident  that 
occurred in the same hospital, involving the same ED nurse as the previous occurrence.  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 5.24: Error recovery focused view 2, Florida. 
In this case, the experience of the previous incident helped in making a quicker and more 
efficient  recovery.  This  incident  only  lasted  two  weeks  and  there  were  no  affected 
patients from the error. 
Event  Analysis 
Problem detection  Outcome based, inside the lab 
none 
Outcome based, outside the lab 
ED charge nurse becomes concerned over the lack of positives reported 
from the lab (events 4.3 and 4.15) 
Error detection  Outcome based, outside the lab 
None 
Outcome based, inside the lab 
none 
Problem indication  Nurse reports concerns to the lab (face-to-face communication) (Events 
4.6 and 4.17) 
Error indication  None 
Further 
investigation 
Outside the lab 
To decide what action to take (events 4.4 and 4.5) 
Inside the lab  
To investigate if there is an error (events 4.7 and 4.18) 
To determine the extent of the error (events 4.13 and 4.21) 
Error explanation  Identification of erroneous reports(events 4.8)  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Event  Analysis 
Identification of technical problem (events 4.10 and 4.19) 
Error control  None 
Error correction  Fix technical problem (events 4.11, 4.12 and 4.20) 
Call involve patients and their partners back for screening (events 4.14 
and 4.22) 
Table 5.11: Analysis of error recovery activities, Florida. 
5.5  Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the ER-STEP analysis of four screening incidents which were 
severely prolonged by a late detection and poor incident response. The analysis with ER-
STEP diagrams, the restructured view and a categorization and summary of all types of 
activities  that  took  place  according  to  the  error  recovery  framework  stages  has  been 
useful in understanding what happened in these incidents in terms of error handling. 
 
The purpose of the next chapter is to further analyze these incidents, by integrating and 
comparing them, in order to draw high level conclusions about the factors that inhibit 
effective detection and recovery in screening programmes.  
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Chapter 6:  Overview of findings 
 
 
 
Having analyzed the four incidents with the same technique, we can now systematically 
compare and integrate the individual analyses’ findings and draw high level conclusions 
about  key  problem  areas  that  may  impede  an  effective  error  recovery  in  screening 
services (with perhaps implications for other laboratory services as well). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to attain a high-level perspective on screening 
error handling. The tables produced at the end of each of the four case studies will be 
used to aggregate and categorize the different kinds of activities that can be seen to fall 
under  a  specific  stage  of  the  error  recovery  framework—this  will  help  in  gaining  an 
understanding about individual stages. However, it is also important to understand the 
relationship between the different stages, and the different activities. For instance, what 
are the different possible activities that may follow outcome based problem detection 
taking place outside the lab? What are the different kinds of further investigation, and 
what events may trigger these activities? This chapter will conclude with the ‘screening 
error recovery model’—this is based on the error recovery framework which has been 
enriched by the findings of the analysis of the four incidents. 
 
 Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
 129 
6.1  Error recovery stages 
6.1.1  Problem detection 
Table 6.1 presents the different kinds of problem detection that occurred in the four case 
studies. As we can see, problem detection is most likely to occur outside the lab (i.e. 
where the test results are used). In two cases, problem detection outside the lab took the 
form  of  growing  concerns  regarding  a  change  in  the  frequency  of  positives/high-risk 
patients. Also, in all cases of problem detection outside the lab, it was nurses (in one case 
presumably physicians as well) who started becoming concerned. In addition, the people 
who experienced problem detection also acted on upon their own initiative to report these 
concerns  to  the  lab.  This  illustrates  the  importance  of  the  nurses  responsible  for 
requesting  and  following  up  on  test  results,  as  they  are  the  ones  most  likely  to  start 
becoming concerned. 
  Incident 1: Sheffield  Incident 2: 
London  
Incident 3: 
Manchester 
Incident 4: Florida 
Outcome-based 
problem 
detection 
outside the lab 
[Events 1.4 and 
1.23] 
Concern over low 
number of high- 
risk pregnancies 
—  [Event 3.8] 
Clinical staff 
have concerns 
over the 
reliability of Dr 
H’s work 
[Events 4.3 and 
4.15] 
Concern over low 
number of positives 
Outcome-based 
problem 
detection inside 
the lab 
—  —  [Event 3.1] 
Radiologists 
have concerns 
over the brevity 
of Dr H’s 
reports 
— 
Table 6.1: Problem detection events 
Problem detection inside the lab occurred only in the Manchester incident. Colleagues of 
the  person  responsible  were  increasingly  becoming  concerned  as  the  reports  he  was Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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compiling were too short and brusque, while they had realized he was not following all 
appropriate procedures.  
Findings regarding problem detection can therefore be summarized as follows: 
•  Problem detection outside the lab (outcome-based): This kind of detection was 
performed primarily by the nurse responsible for requesting and collecting test 
results  (events  1.4,  1.23,  4.13  and  4.23);  the  nurse  will  become  increasingly 
concerned as his/her expectations of the frequency of positives/negatives reported 
back  from  the  lab  drops.  Problem  detection  may  take  weeks  to  lead  to  some 
further action.  
•  Problem  detection  inside  the  lab  (outcome-based,  could  be  action-based): 
This kind of detection only occurred once in the four incidents (event 3.1). This 
took place when colleagues of Dr H had concerns that his reports were short. No 
error had occurred though, so this event is labeled as problem detection. Problem 
detection arising from the evaluation of test results, as occurred outside the lab, 
did not take place. Therefore, problem detection inside the lab may rarely occur 
by expert clinicians who realize a procedure is not carried out as prescribed, either 
by examining a report, or by observing the conduct of the person responsible.  
6.1.2  Error detection 
Unlike  problem  detection, error  detection  does not  build  up  over  time or  come  with 
uncertainty; this is because there is evidence that an error has occurred. Several different 
kinds  of  error  detection  occurred  in  the  four  case  studies;  most  of  them  involved  a 
specific patient rather than a trend in the frequency of positives/negatives.  
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Apart  from  the  action-based,  outcome-based,  through  limiting  functions  and  location 
based classification, there was another kind of error detection that was found in the case 
studies:  detection  through  further  investigation.  Such  an  occurrence  highlights  the 
systemic nature of error recovery where problem detection in one organization may lead 
to  error  detection  in  another.  Table  6.2  below  presents  these  various  events  of  error 
detection that occurred in the four case studies. 
Detection type and 
location 
Incident 1: Sheffield  Incident 2: London   Incident 3: 
Manchester 
Incident 4: 
Florida 
Outcome-based 
error detection 
outside the lab 
[Event 1.6] 
Incident with one 
patient 
 
[Event 2.4] 
Revaluation of a 
patient’s screening 
result by new 
breast screening 
service found error 
—  — 
Outcome- based 
detection inside 
the lab 
[Event 1.41] 
When trying to 
change DOB, risk 
calculation 
remained the same 
 
— 
[events 3.5 and 
3.10] 
Identification of 
errors in Dr H’s 
reports 
— 
Action- based 
detection in the lab 
—  —  —  — 
Error detection 
through further 
investigation inside 
the lab 
[Event 1.62] 
Accumulation and 
investigation of 
audit data results in 
noticing a lack of 
high- risk results 
—  —  — 
Error detection 
through further 
investigation 
outside the lab 
—  —  —  — 
Table 6.2: error detection events. 
Findings regarding error detection can be summarized as follows: 
•  Outcome-based error detection outside the lab: Primarily incidents involving 
specific  patients (events  1.6  and  2.4).  This  type  of  error  detection  will  occur Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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when there are obvious errors with the test results, either because they do not 
make sense at all, or because clinicians have already established a set of potential 
diagnoses  which  is  obviously  contradicted  in  the  test  results.  In  addition,  we 
should  take  into  account  accidental  detection,  as  it  occurred  in  the  London 
Hammersmith  incident.  A  cancer  patient  which  had  been  sent  the  wrong 
mammogram been cleared of the diseases. When she moved to another Breast 
Screening Service, she was diagnosed again, unveiling the error of the previous 
diagnosis.  
•  Outcome-based error detection inside the lab: Audits and many other quality 
assurance  practices  aim  to  detect  such  errors  before  test  results  leave  the  lab 
(events 1.41, 3.5 and 3.10). However, the incidents discussed here have occurred 
because errors were missed by the lab. Outcome based error detection in the lab 
considers all other possible ways through which the outcome of laboratory work 
is evaluated against errors. This kind of detection during an incident is rare, as, it 
has  already  been  suggested  that  laboratories  maintain  little  or  no  information 
about the subsequent patient outcomes of their work, which limits their evaluation 
of testing practices (Bonini et al., 2005). It is therefore very difficult for labs to 
evaluate the validity of test results; something which can take place in points of 
care where clinicians have physical contact with the patients when they integrate 
test results in the diagnostic process. Outcome based error detection inside the lab 
occurred only in the Manchester incident, where radiologists found errors in Dr 
H’s work (events 3.5 and 3.10).  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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•  Action-based error detection in the lab: Action-based detection can only occur 
in  the  lab,  as  it  refers  to  error  detection  during  the  process  of  analyzing  a 
specimen and performing the subsequent calculations to compile the patient’s test 
results. However such detection was not identified in the four case studies. This is 
a  kind  of  detection  that  should  be  supported  and  will  be  discussed  in  the 
recommendations that are put forth in the next chapter. 
•  Error detection through further investigation in the lab: This kind of error 
detection occurred in the Sheffield incident (event 1.62). Following reports from 
points of care, investigation in the lab was carried out to find out if and what is 
actually wrong. Error detection is considered to be the first stage in error recovery 
[Zapf and Reason, 1994]; however, as we have seen here, if problem detection 
occurs, error detection may come several stages later. This kind of detection is 
very  much  a  system  function,  and  involves  further  investigation  and  problem 
indication to take place first.  
•  Error detection through further investigation outside the lab: There were no 
such instances in the four case studies. This makes sense as investigation activities 
in points of care were very limited; they could only monitor the trends of test 
results, consult with colleagues or make an enquiry to the lab; all activities which 
may lead to problem detection, but not error detection. 
6.1.3  Further investigation 
Further  investigation  includes  a  set  of  diverse  activities,  ranging  from  monitoring  of 
results, review of audit results, communications to investigate aspects of the problem, Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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meetings, and internal and/or external inquiries. Furthermore, further investigation may 
take place both in and outside the lab.  
 
In order to proceed to a useful classification of all further investigation activities they 
were  categorised  not  only  according  to  location,  but  also  according  to  purpose.  The 
following purposes could be identified: 
•  To determine if there is an error 
•  To determine what the error is and its causes 
•  To determine the extent of the failure 
Table  6.3  summarizes  and  categorizes  all  the  further  investigation  events  that  were 
identified in the four case studies. 
Investigation 
type and location 
Incident 1: Sheffield  Incident 2: 
London  
Incident 3: 
Manchester 
Incident 4: Florida 
To decide what 
action to take, 
outside the lab 
[Event 1.32] 
Enquiry to colleague 
—  —  [event 4.4] 
Enquiry to 
colleague 
To decide what 
action to take, in 
the lab 
[Events 1.19 and 
1.35] 
Enquiry to colleague 
[Event 2.18] 
Meeting to 
decide further 
action 
—  — 
To find out if 
there is an error, 
outside the lab 
[Event 1.12] 
Monitoring of results 
—  —  — 
To find out if 
there is an error, 
in the lab 
[Events 1.38, 1.39, 
1.55, 1.61 and 1.63] 
Arrangement and 
conducting of audit 
 
 
[Events 2.22 
and 2.25] 
Arrangement 
and conducting 
of audit 
 
 
[Event 3.3] 
Investigate Dr’s 
past and 
background 
 
[Event 3.9] 
Double check 
Dr’s reports 
[events 4.7 and 
4.18] 
 
Investigation of 
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Investigation 
type and location 
Incident 1: Sheffield  Incident 2: 
London  
Incident 3: 
Manchester 
Incident 4: Florida 
Enquiry 
regarding past 
activities, outside 
the lab 
—  —  —  — 
Enquiry 
regarding past 
activities, in the 
lab 
[Event 1.36, 1.54 
and 1.57] 
Discussing whether 
an audit has been 
carried out or not 
—  —  — 
To find out what 
the error is, 
outside the lab 
—  —  —  — 
To find out what 
the error is, in the 
lab 
[Event 1.66] 
Investigation of 
system 
[Events 2.19, 
2.20, 2.28 and 
2.30 
Investigation of 
system 
—  — 
To determine the 
extent of the 
error, outside the 
lab 
—  —  —  — 
To determine the 
extent of the 
error, in the lab 
[event 1.70] 
 
Examination  of  all 
test  results  since 
Jan 1st 
[Events 2.22 
and 2.25] 
 
Audit 
[Events 3.16, 
3.17, 3.22, 3.23, 
3.26 and 3.27] 
Audit 
[events 4.13 and 
4.21] 
 
Checking of all 
test results 
Table 6.3: Further investigation events. 
Findings regarding further investigation are therefore as follows: 
•  Further investigation outside the lab, to decide what action to take: This is 
most  likely  to  occur  following  problem  detection.  The  nurse  who  performed 
problem detection may seek advice as to what action to take. In the Sheffield 
incident,  this  took  place  after  some  attempts  of  problem  indication  had  failed 
(event 1.32), while in the Florida incident this occurred straight after problem Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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detection (event 4.4). In addition, the colleague that gives the advice may be a 
supervisor or a physician.  
•  Further investigation inside the lab, to decide what action to take: This kind 
of investigation will take place when people in the lab have acknowledged the 
possibility that something might be wrong. This may be informal (e.g., asking a 
colleague for advise) (events 1.19 and 1.35) or formal (Department, hospital or 
event Trust level meeting) (event 2.18). 
•  Further investigation outside the lab, to find out if there is an error: In the 
four case studies, there was only one such occurrence: In Sheffield, a nurse that 
had performed problem detection was monitoring her own results (event 1.12). As 
there are very little means for staff outside the lab to investigate, this kind of 
further investigation is fairly limited as to what it may achieve. 
•  Further investigation to find out if there is an error, inside the lab: This kind 
of investigation is the one most likely to have a major impact on the success of an 
error recovery process, as it may directly lead to error explanation. When it is in 
the form of an audit, it may take a significant amount of time, but this can also 
lead  to—at  least—an  initial  estimate  of  the  number  of  patients  misdiagnosed. 
Audits  were  requested  and  carried  out  in  the  Sheffield  and  London  incidents 
(events 1.38, 1.39, 1.55, 1.61 and 1.63, and 2.2, 2.5). An investigation into the 
system,  whether  software  or  organizational  process,  will  also  fall  under  this 
category of further investigation.  
•  Further investigation to find out what the error is, inside the lab: There may 
be an overlap between this kind of investigation and investigation to find out if Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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there is an error as an investigation to establish the presence of an error will be 
based  on  an  informed  hypothesis  of  the  operator  or  other  involved  actor. 
However, in case where further investigation to find out if there is an error was in 
the form of an audit of test results, more investigation in the form of examination 
of the system (software/hardware, previous test results) will be required in order 
to establish what the error is. 
•  Enquiry regarding past activities, inside the lab: It was found that in many 
cases, audits regularly requested had not been carried out. This emerged when in 
the inquiry report the person who had requested the audit asked weeks, or months 
later if that audit had been carried out or not. Although that audit may not form 
part  of  the  error  recovery  if  it  was  a  routine  activity,  the  enquiry  regarding 
whether it has been carried out or not may well do, if it has been triggered by 
recovery related activities (e.g., by problem indication) (events 1.36, 1.54 and 
1.57). 
•  To determine the extent of the error, inside the lab: This may take place either 
after or during the final stages towards the correction of the causal factors that led 
to the errors in the first place. In a screening incident, this is a very important part 
of error recovery as errors in screening will continue to have an impact as time 
passes on the people misdiagnosed. In the STI incident that took place in Florida, 
there were serious social implications as infected patients who were told they are 
free  from  disease  could  have  possibly  infected  others  which  could  remain 
unknown.  Diagnostic  services  must  therefore  be  prepared  to  contact  involved Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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patients  as  soon  as  possible.  Such  kind  of  investigation  may  also  involve 
independent auditors, which would severely prolong the incident timeframe.  
6.1.4  Problem indication  
Problem and error indication are very crucial—it was found that indication events were 
ones most likely to fail to achieve a progression to a later error recovery stage. Problem 
and error indication are most likely to be initiated outside the lab, following problem and 
error indication. It was observed that various means of communication were employed; 
these are used to classify the indication events that took place. 
 
Table 6.4 summarizes and categorizes the different kinds of problem and error indication 
events that took place in the four incidents, taking into account the various means of 
communication that were used. 
Problem 
Indication 
Incident 1: 
Sheffield  
Incident 2: 
London 
Incident 3: 
Manchester 
Incident 4: Florida 
Face-to- 
face  
—  —  —  Events 4.6 and 4.17] 
ED charge nurse 
visits Microbiology 
lab and informs them 
of the absence of 
positives 
Over the 
phone 
 
[Event 1.3, 1.5, 1.7, 
1.24, 1.26 and 
1.34] 
Nurse that 
performed problem 
detection phones 
the lab 
—  —  — 
Written  [Event 1.34] 
Nurse sends formal 
letter (fax)  
—  —  — Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Problem 
Indication 
Incident 1: 
Sheffield  
Incident 2: 
London 
Incident 3: 
Manchester 
Incident 4: Florida 
Formal/ 
incident 
reporting 
—  —  [event 3.2 and 
3.12] 
To Trust 
management in 
management 
meetings 
— 
Table 6.4: Problem indication events. 
The following conclusions have been reached regarding problem indication events and 
means of communication used: 
•  Problem  Indication  over  the  phone:  As  problem  detection  most  commonly 
occurred in primary care institutions, it is understandable that the use of the phone 
for the purposes of problem indication was the most frequently used means of 
communication (6 occurrences in the Sheffield case). However, it was found to be 
greatly ineffective. Reasons for the failure of problem indication were two: the 
lack of evidence during the claim, and the breakdown of communication; two 
factors which are also intertwined and will be discussed later on in this thesis. 
•  Written  problem  indication  occurred  only  once  in  the  four  incidents  (event 
1.34). A letter was directed from the hospital which detected the problem to the 
lab. It should be noted that no incident reports were written, even though incident 
reporting schemes where present in at least the three NHS incidents. 
6.1.5  Error indication 
Table 6.5 summarizes and categorizes all types of error indication events that took place 
in the four incidents in a similar manner with problem indication events discussed in the 
previous section. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Indication  Incident 1: 
Sheffield  
Incident 2: 
London 
Incident 3: 
Manchester 
Incident 4: 
Florida 
Face-to- 
face  
—  —  —  — 
Over the 
phone 
 
[event 1.45, 1.46 
and 1.48] 
[events 2.5, 2.9 
and 2.12] 
[event 3.20] 
Trust management 
inform other hospital 
of Dr’s errors 
— 
Voice 
message 
[event 1.65] 
Leaves voicemail 
after person is not 
available on phone  
—  —  — 
Written  —  [event 2.6 and 
2.10] 
—  — 
Formal/ 
incident 
reporting 
—  [events 2.14, 
2.15 and 2.16] 
Reporting to 
regional or 
national 
authorities 
[events 3.6 and 3.11]  
To Trust 
management 
 
[events 3.14 and 
3.15] 
Regional and national 
health authorities. 
 
Table 6.5: error indication events. 
The following conclusions can be drawn about error indication: 
•  Face-to-face error indication did not occur in the four incidents. This kind of 
detection is limited due to the physical separation between points of care and 
laboratories in the NHS. As error detection is most likely to occur where test 
results are used, face-to-face error indication is going to take place in the cases 
where errors are detected within the same hospital. 
•  Error indication over the phone: Like problem indication, error indication was 
mostly  done  over  the  phone,  as  the  errors  were  detected  outside  the  physical Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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premises of the lab and host hospital (event 1.45, 1.46, 1.48, 2.5, 2.9, 2.12 and 
3.20).  
•  Written error indication: Letters were written to the lab and to national agencies 
when the error was deemed to be of great importance. However this was done as a 
last resort  and only when it when initial reports to the potentially responsible 
organization were not addressed (event 2.6 and 2.10).  
•  Formal/incident reporting: Incident reporting schemes that were in place within 
hospitals and diagnostic services were in fact not used. This involved cases where 
the management of a health organization decided to formally inform an authority 
of significant errors of other organizations. Informed agencies included regional 
Quality  Assurance  Centers,  the  National  Patient  Safety  Agency  and  the 
Department  of  Health.  Formal  reporting  to  national  agencies  occurred  in  the 
London and Manchester incidents. 
 
Digital communication, such as email were not mentioned in the four case studies. There 
was  one  instance  of  voicemail,  which  was  disregarded  by  the  recipient;  however  the 
caller called again the next day, and the recipient was reached. 
 
Communication breakdowns will be discussed in a separate section in this chapter; this is 
because  there  are  some  common  issues  with  other  stages,  and  primarily  further 
investigation. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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6.1.6  Error explanation  
Error explanation is ultimately a result of a successful investigation into what the error is, 
and what the extent of the failure is. In most cases, reaching error explanation meant that 
error control and recovery are feasible at that stage. 
6.1.7  Error control and recovery 
Error control took the form of suspension of the person responsible in the Manchester 
incident  (event  3.13)  and  suspension  of  breast  screening  until  the  investigation  was 
completed in the London incident (event 2.29). Error control will establish certainty that 
no further errors will take place. Like error explanation, there is little to add to this error 
recovery stage, as the problematic areas are the ones earlier on in the recovery process. 
6.1.8  Failure of error recovery 
These are events where the progression from one error recovery stage to the next has 
been halted. These are primarily communication breakdowns (see Table 6.6 below).  
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Failure of error 
recovery 
Sheffield   London  Manchester  Florida 
Various 
activities 
[event 1.11] 
Incident not 
logged 
 
[event 1.10] 
Reassurances 
that ‘everything is 
OK’ 
 
[events 1.25, 
1.28 and .1.51] 
Previous events 
not considered as 
important 
[event 2.8] 
Previous 
events not 
considered as 
important 
[event 3.4] 
Investigation 
does not find any 
problems 
 
[event 3.7] 
Do not consider 
errors as 
systematic, but 
only as isolated 
events  
— 
Table 6.6: Failure of error recovery events. 
Failure of error recovery suggests the failure of the previous type of event. Primarily, 
these  will  either  be  problem/error  indication  or  further  investigation.  Failure  of  error 
recovery will either result to the reiteration of previous activities, or to bringing the entire 
recovery process to a halt. 
 
It  is  notable  that  all  of  these  failure  of  error  recovery  events  have  taken  place  after 
problem/error  indication  has  occurred.  In  other  words,  the  actual  failure  to  progress 
towards error explanation and control/recovery involved people who were expected to 
take mitigative action. So, they either dismissed a report by the people who performed 
detection, or they conducted a poor investigation. 
 
Ignored indication events can be seen as communication breakdowns, as the people who 
are  in  communication  fail  to  achieve  shared  understanding  [Dix  et  al.,  2004].  The Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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reasons for this are part of the discussion of further analysis of communication events of 
problem/error indication and further investigation (section 6.3).  
 
The next section will present an overview of the findings that have been discussed so far 
in this chapter. This is a particularly important part of this thesis, as it presents a model 
that considered all of the identified sets of activities that fall under each of the stages of 
error  recovery,  and  their  relationship  towards  the  achievement  (or  failure  of)  error 
recovery.  
6.2  The screening error recovery 
model
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the screening error recovery model. This model is based on the 
error  recovery  framework,  which  has  been  enriched  by  the  findings  of  the  analyses 
conducted in the past two chapters.  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Figure 6.1: The Screening error recovery model. 
The lighter shade of gray indicates the set of activities that are possible outside the lab 
(i.e. where test results are used), while the darker shade of grey illustrates the set of 
activities that may take place within the lab. 
The process can be seen in two parts:  
•  Part 1: Until error is acknowledged in the laboratory. Part 1 includes the initial 
activities that will start where test results are requested and used. Most likely to be 
motivated by problem detection, the nurse responsible for request and collection 
of test results will either report his/her concerns to the lab, monitor his/her own 
results, or report his/her concerns directly to the lab.  
•  Part  2:  Identification  and  correction  of  errors.  Having  acknowledged  the 
presence of an error, laboratory technicians will investigate to determine what the 
nature of the error is and what has caused it. This may take time as an audit might 
have  to  be  called  for.    Communication  of  the  incident  will  either  be  internal Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
 146 
(within the Department, hospital or Trust) or it may involve NHS authorities such 
as regional quality assurance centers, the National Patient Safety Agency and the 
Department  of  Health.  The  recovery  process  may  be  prolonged  even  if  an 
independent auditor is required to examine large volumes of test results in order to 
determine the extent of the failure (i.e. the number of patients that have been 
misdiagnosed).  In  the  case  studies  analyzed  here,  the  acknowledgement  of  an 
error within the lab was not always clearly noted, but occurred along with error 
explanation following an investigation into claims coming from outside the lab. 
 
An advantage of this model is that it illustrates at what stage different sub-types of error 
recovery stages may occur (e.g., further investigation to find out if there is an error etc). It 
can also be used to identify and relate activities that will take place in the different parts 
of the healthcare system. Eventually, the purpose of this model is to improve individual 
error recovery activities and consider the subsequent communication link between points 
of care and the laboratory. However, it is still abstract at this stage and should be enriched 
with  particular  information  that  pertain  to  a  specific  screening  process,  fitted  within 
practices and regulation of a real diagnostic network. This model could be seen as a 
starting point for considering the design of error recovery strategies customized according 
to a particular setting. 
 
The following section will discuss the key conclusions that arise from this analysis. Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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6.3  Key problem areas 
It is important to stress that the failure of error recovery is not the only reason why the 
timeframe of an incident may be prolonged. Failure of failure recovery will interrupt the 
process, but other problems may slow it down. The recovery processes we have seen 
were mostly initiated by problem detection, and not error detection. Problem detection 
however may take a significant amount of time to occur. In addition, the lack of evidence 
that comes along with problem detection is very likely to compromise the effectiveness of 
problem indication. Limited detection, along with the fairly loosely defined process for 
reporting concerns over the phone and, on the other end, dealing with complaints lead to 
extended failures to detect and recover from errors (communication breakdowns).  
 
These  two  main  factors  (limited  detection  and  communication  breakdowns)  will  be 
briefly discussed here, and will be fully analyzed in the next chapter, which will also 
consider  implications  for  design,  and  recommendations  for  the  improvement  of 
laboratory error handling. 
 
Limited detection 
Limited detection can be seen to be due to a lack of appropriate feedback [Norman, 
1983]  from  the  system.  The  lack  of  appropriate  feedback  did  not  allow  for  error 
detection,  and  especially  for  action-based  detection,  which  is  an  immediate  way  of 
identifying errors. Detection had to therefore take the form of problem detection, and was 
based on the experience of the nurse responsible for requesting and receiving test results. 
However,  problem  detection  and  the  lack  of  appropriate  feedback  are  not  only Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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responsible  for  a  late  detection,  but  also  a  determinant  factor  of  the  failure  of 
problem/error indication and further investigation.  
 
The lack of evidence often resulted to communication breakdowns, especially in inter-
organizational settings, which prolonged the incident adversely.  
 
Communication breakdowns  
Problem  and  error  indication  are  the  reporting  of  concerns  of  detected  errors  to  the 
laboratory and other key parties, expecting them to act upon these reports. This should 
not be confused with communication during further investigation, where the person who 
initiates the communication is not reporting an error, but is trying to find out what caused 
it. However, common problems may affect both.  
 
Communication failures are an important contributor to adverse events in medicine. In a 
review of 14,000 in-hospital deaths, communication errors were found to be the lead 
cause [Wilson et al., 1995], while about 50% of adverse events detected in a study of 
primary care physicians were related to communication difficulties [Bhasale et al., 1998].  
 
Breakdowns during conversation are relatively frequent occurrences; however we tend to 
be able to repair them when we communicate [Winograd and Flores, 1986]. Breakdowns 
occur due to divergence in topic focus, due to ambiguity in a speaker’s expression, or 
merely because someone misheard a word. Most breakdowns are detected quickly, but in Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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many cases people might think they have achieved a shared understanding, while in fact, 
they have not (Dix et al., 2004).   
 
Many of these breakdowns occurred because reporting was informal. In the Sheffield 
incident, several reports over the phone were ignored, but a single letter stimulated some 
activity  to  investigate  if there  was  actually  a  problem  [see  event  1.34,  p.  89].    This 
highlights the danger associated with informal reporting; however, if formal reporting is 
introduced without appropriate consideration, there is a danger that it creates barriers to 
reporting; people may be more reluctant than mentioning something to a colleague. 
 
There  is  much  work  currently  done  in  understanding  communication  breakdowns  in 
healthcare. For instance, communication breakdowns in the operating room [e.g. Lingard 
et al., 2004 or Greenberg et al, 2007], or during patient hand-offs [e.g. Solet et al., 2005 
and  Patterson  et  al,  2004].  Such  work  could  be  considered  to  further  analyze  these 
instances of communication breakdown that were found in this study.   
 
The  purpose  of  the  next  chapter  is  to  address  the  issues  of  limited  feedback  and 
communication breakdowns further, and to generate a set of useful recommendations that 
could be used to improve these two aspects of error handling. These recommendations 
are  also  based  within  the  error  recovery  framework  and  the  screening  error  recovery 
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6.4  Chapter summary and discussion 
This chapter presented the final stage of analysis of this thesis. The findings of the four 
individual  incident  analyses  were  aggregated,  compared  and  integrated  in  order  to 
understand how errors in screening programmes are detected and handled. This analysis 
resulted to the screening error recovery model, which summarizes the various activities 
that fall under each of the recovery stages, as well as their relationship. This model can be 
used to devise error recovery strategies for screening programmes. 
 
The chapter concluded with the identification of two general problem areas: the lack of 
appropriate feedback and communication breakdowns. These two problem areas affected 
various stages of error recovery in different ways. Having abstracted to a relatively high-
level, we can now relate these two problem areas to the various stages, and consider how 
to deal with the particular problems. The next chapter will discuss these two issues in 
more  detail,  and  suggest  a  number  of  recommendations  that  may  be  applicable  to 
screening services and diagnostic services in general for a more effective detection and 
recovery of errors.   Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Chapter 7:  Recommendations 
 
 
 
The recommendations that will be discussed in this chapter address the challenges that 
have been discussed in the previous chapter. In order to produce recommendations on the 
improvement of screening error handling, the screening error recovery model is used in 
combination  with  systems  design  principles.  In  particular,  they  draw  upon  theory 
presented  in  Chapter  3:  Theoretical  context,  theory  in  Human  Computer  Interaction 
(HCI), but also focus on the Quality Assurance practices and related artefacts that were 
discussed in Chapter 2: Field and focus and during the analysis of the case studies (such 
as auditing and incident reporting). These recommendations consider the improvement of 
individual stages of the screening error recovery model, but also take into account their 
impact on the subsequent stages, e.g. how a particular improvement in problem detection 
may facilitate better problem indication. 
 
There are two important limitations of the recommendations put forward in this chapter: 
first of all, they are high-level, as they have been abstracted from the laboratory context 
of the individual incidents that have been analyzed; this was necessary in order to reach a 
level of generalization that would cover the diverse set of screening services available. 
Therefore, their application will require further analysis and instantiation so that they can 
be focused on the particular processes, job roles, technology and regulation. 
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A second limitation is that these recommendations lack validation. Some of these have 
formed  part  of  publications  produced  during  this  work  [Chozos,  2008;  Wears  et  al., 
2008], but this does not stand as sufficient validation for their application in an actual 
medical context at this stage. It is also likely that some of the suggested practices are also 
currently existing in NHS diagnostic services; this is because the recommendations are 
based on the findings of the analysis of the four incidents but a thorough review of actual 
systems has not been conducted. 
 
Nonetheless, these recommendations are important as they expand on the findings of the 
analysis of the four incidents and could suggest general principles for good practice and 
directions for further research. The discussion on the relationship between the different 
stages should be considered as the most significant contribution of this chapter. 
 
Table 7.1 illustrates the four different kinds of recommendations that are put forward in 
this chapter, and their area of relevance.  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
 153 
 
  Checking patterns  Interface design  Software app  Communication 
Problem detection  —  —  Section 7.1.3  — 
Error detection  Section 7.1.1  Section 7.1.2  —  — 
Action-based  Section 7.1.1  — 
—  — 
Outcome-based  Section 7.1.1  Section 7.1.2 
—  — 
Limiting functions  —  Section 7.1.2 
—  — 
Problem indication  —  —  Section 7.1.3  Section 7.2 
Error indication  —  —  Section 7.1.3  Section 7.2 
Further 
investigation 
—  —  Section 7.1.3  Section 7.2 
Table 7.1: Recommendations and relevance to error recovery stages. 
7.1  Detection 
Recommendations for improving detection will consider:  
•  Checking patterns 
•  User interface issues 
•  Software applications 
7.1.1  Checking patterns 
Action-based detection (discussed in Section 3.3) would occur during the analysis of a 
specimen  or  while  entering  data  in  a  computer  system.  This  primarily  focuses  on 
instances of human error, and not systematic errors that have been the focus of this thesis. 
Furthermore, action-based detection is very much dependent on the nature of the task 
which varies in relation to the diagnostic service—specific  guidelines applicable here 
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Human redundancy (discussed in Section 3.4.2) [Clarke, 2005] is applicable here as it can 
help to improve detection of errors in the lab during or shortly after the analysis; the 
concept is based on the presence of a colleague observing the person who is performing a 
specimen analysis. Human redundancy suggests the following: 
1.  One  person  checks  the  outcome  of  their  colleague’s  work.  In  a  laboratory 
setting, a test result is evaluated by another colleague. 
2.  A  check  is  carried  out  at  the  time  a  function  is  performed.  A  supervisor 
observes the laboratory technician while he or she carries out the test. 
 
There are two types of human redundancy that could be considered: 
•  Active human redundancy can be identified in human systems through some 
analogy with redundancy in hardware systems. Active human redundancy occurs 
when the individual performing a redundant function is involved in the task at 
hand; for instance, when two laboratory technicians take part in the analysis of 
one specimen.  
•  Duplication, Overlap and Substitution. Duplication exists when two different 
people perform the same function or if a reserve unit is present. Overlap exists 
when two people share  some functional  areas.  For instance, when two people 
perform the same kind of laboratory testing, duplication takes place; however, 
when two people carry out different testing but they share the same equipment of 
parts of laboratory facilities refers to overlap. Substitution occurs when people 
rotate jobs.  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Outcome based detection will take place once a test has been completed and the test 
results are checked for errors. As we have seen in the Manchester incident, detection of 
the  radiologist’s  errors  was  done  by  colleagues  of  his  who  examined  reports  he  had 
compiled. Double-checking is considered to be a standard practice in diagnostic services 
[Johnson and Patnick, 2000], although it was not mentioned in the other case studies.  
 
There is little room for making recommendations here; this is primarily because outcome-
based detection is most likely to occur outside the lab, since this is where test results are 
used—and  thus  evaluated.  However,  a  number  of  options  are  applicable  within  a 
laboratory  setting  regarding  detection  through  limiting  functions—detection  by 
constraints imposed on a diagnostic process. Some of these are discussed in the following 
section. 
 
7.1.2  User interface issues 
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) plays a very important role in error handling due to 
the increasing reliance on software-automated testing. The user interface can influence 
both detection and further investigation, with an immediate impact on any problem/error 
indication communication that may take place. 
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In the Sheffield and the Florida incident, user interface deficiencies resulted in a failure to 
detect software faults. Two conclusions can be drawn from these two incidents: 
 
•  Critical calculations should be visible. In Sheffield, the screening calculation 
had  been  removed  from  the  user  interface  following  users’  request  to  reduce 
clutter. The result that was then indicated was a mere “high-risk” or “low-risk”. 
Had the calculation been visible, and users would be able to perform outcome-
based detection. This illustrates a trade-off that exists within usability. The key is 
that issues such as simplicity and readability had not adequately been considered 
in terms of the impact on safety – it is therefore necessary to take into account 
usability in hazard analysis and risk assessment. 
•  Screening tests should be reported separately. In Florida, the reporting system 
would only print out the positive patients, and negatives would be disregarded.  
This  was  done  in  a  custom  report  which  was  also  included  other  tests.  The 
software fault resulted in the positives not being reported, but the printout report 
appeared normal as there were other test results present. The conclusion to be 
drawn  from  this  is  that  critical  tests  should  be  reported  separately,  and  there 
should be no filter applied. All test results should be included, but presented in an 
organized manner, with more information regarding the particular test that has 
been carried out. 
The  next  section  will  consider  how  software  applications  could  be  used  to  improve 
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7.1.3  Application-level issues 
As we have seen in the case studies, problem  detection occurred over time due to a 
discrepancy  in  the  frequency  of  positives/negatives,  based  on  the  expectations  of  the 
nurse  responsible  (and  primarily  in  the  Sheffield  and  Florida  incidents).  Nurses  were 
however unable to investigate themselves, while problem indication was ineffective—
investigation activities to determine if there is an error were only possible within the lab. 
 
It has been suggested that allowing for comparisons is a practical  way of evaluating 
outcomes [Reason 1997; Rizzo et al., 1996]. Staff at the points of care where test results 
are used should be able to monitor and investigate trends of test results at their location. 
A potential approach to this is by automatically logging all test results reported from the 
lab, and calculating a mean of the entire set of test results through a software application. 
A graphical distribution of test values or results across time can help to notice potential 
discrepancies and support further investigation by helping to identify a timeframe within 
which the behaviour of test results is different than the one expected. The results of such 
a comparison, with a date and a number in the drop or rise of reported positives/negatives 
can stand as evidence for laboratory technicians to carry out further investigation. 
 
Such  an  application  would  be  particularly  useful  as  it  correlates  historical  data  and 
represents it graphically. The nurses’ expectations and any potential deviations would 
both be captured and documented.  
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The  next  section  will  discuss  how  communication  during  error  handling  could  be 
improved. This relates to problem/error indication and further investigation. 
7.2  Improving Communication 
Improvement  of  communication  during  problem/error  indication  and  during  further 
investigation  can  be  improved  in  various  ways
15.  This  section  will  present  various 
interventions that have been suggested in related literature.  
 
Non- technical interventions 
•  Alter  communication  behaviours:  Such  interventions  focus  on  encouraging 
communication behaviours as a professional skill rather than as a personal style, 
and they are a matter of education and training. 
•  Alter  communication  policies:  Mandatory  policies  should  formalise  certain 
aspects  of  communication,  while  there  can  be  constraints  on  professional 
behaviour  involving  poor  communication.  This  can  be  related  to  policies 
regarding incident reporting, and in the laboratory setting, reports made to the lab 
regarding possible errors detected in points of care. 
 
 
 
Technical interventions  
                                                 
15 Material from this section resulted in the following paper: 
  
Chozos N, Wears RL and Perry S (2008). The role of communication in laboratory error handling. 
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With the merging of information and communication technologies, a number of different 
technical interventions have been suggested 
•  Channels: One of the simplest interventions is to introduce new communication 
channels, such as pagers, mobile phones, Internet, email and other new options for 
interaction. Such interventions may be very helpful, especially in teams which are 
geographically dispersed.  
The following sections apply these recommendations to a diagnostic setting. 
7.2.1  Problem/error indication 
Non-technical interventions: Alter communication policies 
A dedicated phone line 
In many cases were the same nurse made several phone calls to a laboratory, different 
people  picked  up  the  phone.  They  were  thus  possibly  not  aware  of  previous  reports, 
especially since log books for documenting abnormal test results were not used, or were 
not present at all. A dedicated phone line, and perhaps designated staff responsible for 
dealing with these phone calls, could greatly improve error handling for the following 
reasons: 
•  Formalization of incident reporting over the phone 
•  Presence of designated staff to deal with incident reporting 
•  Ability to log messages for further investigation purposes 
This  recommendation  was  also  considered  in  a  recent  Scotland-wide  study  as  a 
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only about one third of reports resulted in some action taken, while the rest were largely 
ignored.  
Double checking of critical values 
Double  checking  of  critical  values  can  be  seen  as  an  intervention  to  support 
communication over the phone. This was recommended by a recent study which found 
that errors were significantly reduced [Barenfanger et al., 2004]. This requires that the 
person  taking  the  result  must  read  the  result  back  to  the  lab  as  a  check  on  correct 
communication  and  interpretation.  Reduction  of  errors  and  better  communication  of 
important data can be achieved by asking all recipients (nurses, doctors, admin) to read 
back the message.  This is a simple yet effective measure for laboratories to improve 
safety by minimizing the number of critical values missed. This however deals primarily 
with  errors  such  as  wrong  patient  name  or  other  patient  information,  and 
miscommunication of a test result if it is done over the phone.  
 
In this study, critical laboratory results were monitored. After receiving the message, the 
recipients of a telephoned message were asked to repeat the message. The recipients were 
asked to repeat the name of the patient, the test, and the result; the technologists noted 
this on the form. In addition, they noted the time necessary for the entire phone call and 
the extra time necessary to ask for the message to be repeated and for it to be repeated.   
 
Out of a total 822 telephone contacts made for critical results, 29 errors were made (error 
rate, 3.5%). The major categories of errors were incorrect name of the patient, incorrect 
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message. The time required to deliver the message initially averaged 57.6 seconds per 
call. The time required to ask for the information to be repeated and for the recipient to 
repeat the message was a mean of 12.8 seconds per call. Times vary depending on the 
laboratory testing process. A call about a critical result from the microbiology laboratory 
inherently  involves  a  more  complex  narrative  than  one  would  have  in  the  chemistry 
laboratory. 
 
There is an abundance of work that could be also considered here. For instance, Leonard 
et al. [2004] examine the role of communication in the effectiveness of teamwork, while 
Haig et al. [2006] consider a shared mental model for improving communication between 
clinicians.  Such  work  could  be  integrated  with  the  findings  of  this study  in  order  to 
generate more detailed recommendations. 
7.3  Risk calculation algorithmic issues 
Error trapping is a common practice in software development, which involves detecting 
an error and producing an error message, taking some action on the erroneous result and 
either proceeding with execution or aborting the execution. This can either occur for run-
time errors whose results are that are outside the defined range, or for infinity errors (e.g. 
division by zero).   
 
The first type occurred in the Sheffield incident, while the second in the Florida incident 
(the other two incidents did not involve software). However, code error handling is not 
within  the  scope  of  this  thesis,  as  it  could  be  argued  that  this  is  still  within  error Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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prevention. This thesis focuses on the handling of laboratory errors, which assumes that 
software cannot always be reliable.  
7.4  Job design and training 
Training can be a key factor towards effective error handling [Chmiel and Wall, 1994]. 
There are implications for training for nurses and for laboratory staff. As a starting point, 
training  should  consider raising  the  awareness  of  problems  that  may  lie  in  screening 
services [Chant et al., 2002]. Discussion of incidents and accidents in relation to medical 
processes and involved equipment can facilitate the understanding of cause-and-effect; 
the role of staff in the detection and recovery of such problems should also be party of 
that training.  
 
A  key  aspect  of  training  with  regards  to  error  handling  would  be  to  focus  on  the 
communication  problems  that  have  been  found  in  this  analysis.  The  expressions  and 
terms used to transmit concerns over the phone to the laboratory technician can have a 
critical affect on a recovery process. This is an area that would require further research 
and is not considered in any depth here. 
 
Overall, if any of the error handling recommendations suggested in this chapter were to 
be implemented, training should also cover their implementation. For instance, reporting 
over the phone should be part of medical staff’s implicit training. This suggests that job 
design should primarily address error handling, with supportive training for a particular 
job specification.  
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Job  design  should  encompass  the  appropriate  portion  of  the  responsibility  for  error 
recovery.  One  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  this  analysis  is  what  the  capabilities  of 
involved parties are in terms of detection and recovery. For instance, nurses that request, 
receive and use test results are limited to problem and error detection, with little ability to 
investigate the system. Therefore, their job specification should involve the monitoring of 
test results and the reporting of any concerns to their supervisor and/or the laboratory 
technician. In a similar way, the job specification of the laboratory technician should 
encompass following up reports and so on.  
 
On the other hand, it is important not to over-formalize some of these processes. Creating 
additional  tasks  can  impose  a  work  overload,  leading  staff  to  find  workarounds. 
Therefore, the level to which some of these recommendations should be introduced as 
part of everyday work and policy requires further research. 
7.5  Chapter summary and discussion 
This chapter outlined a number of high-level recommendations that may be applicable to 
healthcare  screening  services.  They  have  partly  been  derived  from  the  findings  of 
accident analysis, while some additional recommendations are based on literature in error 
detection and HCI. These recommendations considered checking mechanisms, interface 
design, improvement of communication and training, while the relevance of each of these 
to the various stages of error recovery was also discussed.  
 Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
 164 
The recommendations discussed here can be seen as preliminary, as they are not focused 
on a particular system and maintain a high level of abstraction; also, they lack validation. 
Further research would be required to instantiate and validate such recommendations.   Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Chapter 8:  ER-STEP Validation and evaluation 
 
 
 
A useful way for drawing conclusions regarding the applicability of an incident analysis 
approach  is  to  distribute  a  scenario-based  exercise  to  participants  and  compare  their 
analysis and findings for consistency; such an activity was also done for ER-STEP.  The 
exercise and the participant’s findings can be found in Appendix B. The purpose of this 
section is to discuss some of the key issues that arose from the validation exercise. 
8.1  Validation method overview 
It should be mentioned that the aspect of ER-STEP that is subject to validation is the 
level to which analysts may consistently label events according to the  error  recovery 
framework stages. Otherwise, the set of activities that make up the method are identical 
to STEP, which has been widely accepted as a practical and straightforward technique.  
 
In order to evaluate the level to which analysts may label error recovery events with 
consistency, an exercise along with a brief introduction to ER-STEP and an example of 
how it should be applied was given to four participants. The exercise is based on Case 
Study 1: Down’s screening errors, Sheffield, so that the participants’ results could be 
compared to the author’s. This was done in two stages: 
•  Stage 1: Initial evaluation by two experienced accident analysts. At an early stage 
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feasibility  of  such  an  analysis,  and  to  identify  problems  of  technical  nature. 
Therefore,  the  first  draft  of  the  technique,  along  with  guidelines  as  to  how  it 
should be applied was given to two accident analysts and a scenario for them to 
analyze. 
•  Stage 2: Final evaluation by two healthcare professionals. Having revised the 
technique  after  its  evaluation  by  the  two  experts,  and  having  had  further 
experience  by  analyzing  the  four  incidents,  the  exercise  was  given  to  two 
healthcare professionals. It is important that people at the forefront are able to 
apply such a technique without necessarily having experience in accident analysis.  
Stage 1: accident analysis experts 
The initial analysis found there was not a sufficient distinction between communication 
events  during  further  investigation  and  problem/error  indication.  During  further 
investigation, a person will make an enquiry regarding a problem in order to take action 
themselves, or will instruct someone to carry out a specific activity. This is different to 
problem/error indication, where someone reports a problem/error, without having any 
control over the subsequent activities that are to take place. This was clarified in the 
section 3.5, where the error recovery framework is defined. 
 
At the time of this evaluation, the technique was still under development and changed 
significantly  since  their  exercise.  The  actual  exercise  and  the  produced  findings  are 
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Stage 2: Healthcare professionals 
Table 8.1 illustrates the answers that the two healthcare professionals provided in the 
exercise. 
Event  Participant 1  Participant 2 
E1: Problem detection  √  √ 
E2: Problem indication  √  √ 
E3:Problem indication  √  √ 
E4:Further investigation  √  √ 
E5:Failure of further 
investigation 
√  Failure of problem 
indication 
E6: Further investigation  √  √ 
E7: Further investigation  √  √ 
E8:Problem indication  √  √ 
E9: Further investigation  √  √ 
E10: Problem indication  √  √ 
E11: Failure of further 
investigation 
√  Failure of problem 
indication 
Table 8.1: ER-STEP validation exercise findings. 
The two participants only disagreed in two events; however, they were of the same type 
which appeared twice. Disagreement can therefore be placed only on one event (Or at 
least in terms of this methodology this was the only disagreement that was apparent. It is 
possible that they might have classified events the same way but for different reasons).  
 
The disagreement was in the labelling of a ‘failure of further investigation’ event which 
was tagged as failure of ‘problem indication’ by the second participant. Following this, it 
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it may not always be clear where the failure was. As we can see in this case, the report of 
the nurse did not result in an effective investigation. It is therefore not straightforward to 
derive which of the two stages failed. 
 
Comments from the two participants can also be found at the end of each of the two 
forms. Some of them were based on the lack of information regarding the incident, and in 
particular timing, which was a problem for the main analysis of the case studies anyway. 
This  limitation  cannot  be  placed  on  the  technique,  as  it  is  only  a  matter  of  what 
information is available from data gathering.  
 
Both participants commented on the possibility of further breaking down events, although 
the one acknowledged the fact that the analysis would become more “swamped”. Further 
breakdown has occurred as a result of the analysis of the case studies. In addition, the 
purpose of the exercise was to consider whether the basic identification of events would 
be possible; further analysis should be up to the analyst. 
 
An important comment was based on the fact that repetition of problem indication could 
be regarded as part of further investigation in order to confirm if that potential problem 
really exists. This is a rather challenging issue, as it is very difficult to understand the 
intentions the person who is initiating this communication. It could be assumed that this 
is subject to interpretation, especially as this analysis and the exercise are based on data 
gathering that others have performed. This could only be clarified if the interviews with 
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8.2  Validation and evaluation findings 
In order to claim that the technique can be widely applied with ease, further evaluation is 
required. However, it should be stated that this technique was developed for the purposes 
of  the  specific  investigation  into  laboratory  error  handling;  the  development  of  the 
technique itself may have formed a research objective, however its complete validation is 
not an objective within the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, the activities discussed in 
this  section  were  very  useful  in  making  some  considerable  improvements  and 
clarifications  in  the  definitions  of  error  recovery  stages  which  may  be  subject  to 
misinterpretation by the analyst.  
 
Following the analysis of the exercises and the experience of applying the technique, 
some further conclusions can be drawn. 
Benefits: 
•  The technique can be very useful in identifying, representing and communicating 
the activities that took place during error recovery during an incident. 
•  The reconstructed view can assist in identifying key problem areas of an error 
recovery process 
•  The focus on problem detection is particularly useful as it can help to reason 
about the role of “concerns” in error recovery. These can be the only error 
recovery initiating events in the absence of system feedback that can guide the 
investigator to identify errors. 
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•  Still  not  always  straightforward—but  it  has  been  found  that  different  accident 
analysts may still conclude to different findings. 
•  Tool support—it has been very difficult to maintain the indexing and traceability 
between events in text, figures and STEP cards, while the drawing of figures had 
to be done with Microsoft Word, creating the possibility for inconsistencies in the 
use of colours, size of boxes etc. 
8.3  Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the approach that was undertaken towards validation of ER-STEP. 
The findings of the evaluation were also presented, while this section concluded with an 
evaluation of the technique as a result of the validation exercise and the experience 
accumulated with the application of ER-STEP with these four case studies. 
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Chapter 9:  Evaluation and implications 
 
 
 
This final chapter will present a summary and an evaluation of the research undertaken, 
before discussing the implications for practice and research this thesis has. The discussion 
about implications for practice will briefly state the relevance of the various findings that 
have  emerged  for  different  stakeholders,  while  directions  for  further  research  will 
concern patient safety, error detection and recovery, and accident analysis. This chapter 
will conclude with some final remarks. 
9.1  Summary of research 
The research presented here is an investigation into the factors that may impede detection 
and recovery of errors in screening tests. In order to identify and understand these factors 
and how they may inhibit an effective recovery, four incidents (three from the UK and 
one for the USA) were analysed with an analytical method that focuses on error handling 
activities that will take place. This method (ER-STEP) is an adaptation of STEP which 
has been integrated with a theoretical framework that illustrates the stages that make up 
an error recovery process from problem detection (initial concerns that something might 
be wrong) to error correction (chapters 3 and 4). 
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The findings of the four case studies (chapter 5) were integrated and compared to draw 
high-level conclusions about common problems in screening services in general. These 
conclusions  (chapter  6)  concerned  both  error  recovery  stages  individually,  and  their 
relationship (e.g. how a specific kind of detection will result to a specific kind of further 
investigation).  It was found that there are two key problem areas (which are anyway 
interrelated):  
•  Problem detection is most likely to occur than error detection. When there is a 
problem with a screening service, the first instance of detection is going to take 
place where test results are used. In almost all instances in the four case studies, 
this was done by the nurse responsible for requesting and received them. This 
detection  is  based  on  a  discrepancy  between  the  expected  number  of 
positives/negatives (probably per week or month). 
•  Severe  communication  breakdowns  throughout  the  recovery  process: 
Communication breakdowns will primarily occur because the reporting nurse will 
call  the  laboratory  to  report  concerns,  without  convincing  evidence  that  will 
motivate  the  laboratory  technician  to  investigate  further.  However,  these 
communication breakdowns are not only attributed to limited detection, but also 
to problematic—or a lack of—procedures for recording and handling complaints. 
The means of communication also play a role in the effectiveness of reporting of 
concerns. The informal reporting over the phone did not succeed in convincing 
laboratory technicians to investigate the system in order to find out if there is an 
error or not, whereas in the cases where face-to-face communication was possible, 
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The  sum  of  these  findings  resulted  in  the  “laboratory  error  recovery”  model,  which 
classifies and correlates the various activities that may take place for the purpose of error 
handling outside and inside the laboratory.  
 
These findings are used to generate recommendations for the improvement of detection 
and  recovery  (chapter  7).  Additional  literature  was  used  from  the  areas  of  Human-
Computer Interaction and systems engineering in order to provide some more detailed 
insight  for  technical  and  organizational  interventions  that  aim  at  improving  the 
preparedness  of  healthcare  systems  to  detect  and  recover  lab  errors  more  efficiently. 
However  these  recommendations  serve  as  a  secondary  aim  of  this  thesis  and  would 
require more research in order to be further developed and validated. 
 
Finally, Chapter 8 presents the validation and evaluation of ER-STEP. The exercise and 
the participants’ responses can be found in Appendix B.  
9.2  Evaluation of research 
This section will discuss the contributions that this thesis has perhaps made to patient 
safety, accident analysis and error recovery, as well as the limitations and major problems 
that were faced during this work. 
9.2.1  Contribution to practice 
Screening programmes need to have adequate systems in place in order to “to be able to 
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screening  failures  that  have  been  discussed  throughout  this  thesis  illustrate  what  can 
happen if screening programmes are not prepared to detect and recover from errors when 
they occur. While there are several studies in the area of laboratory error, they mainly 
focus  on  error  types  and  frequencies.  It  has  been  argued  that  we  have  very  limited 
understanding of the impact of laboratory errors and laboratory work in general on patient 
outcomes [Plebani and Carraro, 1997; Bonini et al., 2002]. These issues motivate this 
study. The findings and the approach employed can help to understand how healthcare 
systems could be better prepared to detect and deal with errors when they occur within 
screening services.  
 
This study has identified a set of high-level conclusions—this level of abstraction was 
required in order to understand what the common key problem areas require that attention 
is placed in screening services in general (limited detection and communication barriers) 
and their impact on various stages of a recovery process. However, the application of 
these recommendations to a ‘real world’ environment would require a substantial amount 
of further technical analysis.  
9.2.2  Contribution to accident and incident analysis 
Although error handling is identified as a distinct area in the study of error, it is not 
considered as a separate issue in accident analysis. Up to this time, there is no technique 
available that focuses intrinsically on error detection and recovery. The adaptation of 
STEP to ER-STEP is a proposed approach to analyze the organizational response during 
a  crisis.  The  validation  and  evaluation  of  the  technique  where  already  discussed  in 
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9.2.3  Cognitive science and systems engineering 
The use of the error recovery framework as a means to analyze error handling activities 
has resulted in a better understanding of the relationship between such activities, and the 
variety of actions that may fall under a specific error recovery stage. For instance, we can 
better understand how different kinds of communication may be stimulated following the 
various kinds of detection, or what purposes further investigation has.  
 
In addition, the inclusion of problem detection in the error recovery process has not—to 
this time—been done; problem detection, as a subject matter has been considered as an 
action of its own. In a similar manner, most recovery models and frameworks do not take 
into account the different mechanisms of detection (e.g. action-based, outcome-based, 
through limiting functions). 
 
Finally,  this  study  indicated  an  additional  detection  mechanism  which  had  not  been 
considered  by  Sellen  [1994]:  detection  through  investigation.  This  kind  of  detection 
suggests  that  not  only  the  process  of  recovery,  but  also  error  detection  may  be 
organizational processes; especially in this context, where error detection through further 
investigation was inter-organizational.  
9.2.4  Study limitations 
Given the high-level view that is taken in this thesis, the recommendations require further 
input in order to be practically  useful  within a  specific  context.  In such a  case, it is 
possible some of the recommendations might not be applicable. In addition to this point, 
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recommendations. This has perhaps been achieved to a certain extent by peer review 
publications, and especially the two in the Patient Safety and Ergonomics conference, as 
it has a clear focus on patient safety.  
 
Another limitation is the hindsight bias [Johnson, 2003] with which the analyst views an 
accident. Although the focus on problem detection has been an important part of this 
thesis, it is unknown how many of reports based on concerns, without concrete evidence, 
are actually correct and not “noise”. Nonetheless, this thesis has argued that events of 
“problem indication” should be at least recorded, as they can be of great importance 
during an incident investigation. 
 
The final limitation here was the lack of data for the analysis of the Florida incident. The 
laboratory was unwilling to discuss the incident in detail, while the distance and the time-
difference made follow-up discussions problematic from the UK. For these reasons, the 
analysis of the Florida incident were significantly more superficial in comparison to the 
UK incidents. 
9.3  Implications for research 
Research  in  error  handling  has  been  fairly  limited,  at  least  in  comparison  to  error 
prevention. This section will discuss some potential directions for further research which 
consider error handling in healthcare, the application of ER-STEP in other domains, and 
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9.3.1  Error handling in healthcare 
Understanding the boundaries of plausibility 
A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods should be employed to understand 
the  thresholds  (problem  detection)  that  when  passed  would  drive  a  nurse  to  report  a 
potential  problem  (problem  indication).  This  is  based  on  the  notion  that  false-yet-
plausible test results are only plausible in isolation. The qualitative aspect would focus on 
examining  a  particular  screening  process,  and,  with  a  laboratory  medicine-driven 
analysis, construct scenarios which describe potential instances of false-yet-plausible test 
results.  
 
Focus groups consisting of nurses would then discuss these scenarios in order to explore 
the different levels of plausibility. Ideally, such a study should be run within a network of 
hospitals and GP practices that are all dependent on the same laboratory or radiology 
department, with the scenarios being based on that specific department. The findings of 
such a study could then be used to direct questionnaires that could be deployed on a 
larger scale, again focusing on how nurses would react to different levels of plausibility. 
 
Hazard analysis 
The  focus  of  hazard  analysis  should  aim  to  identify  the  causes  of  false  test  results, 
focusing on their potential plausibility. In order to do this, a multidisciplinary perspective 
on hazard analysis would be required, which would involve clinicians at points of care, 
nurses,  laboratory  technicians,  quality  and  safety  managers,  and  system  and  software 
engineers.  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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9.3.2  Application of ER-STEP in other domains 
The error under investigation here can be seen to be information-based as it impacts 
medical test results; thus, safety implications arise after a considerable amount of time. It 
would be interesting to consider different kinds of errors and technical faults, as well as 
in  other  domains  such  as  aviation  and  energy,  where  the  timeframe  within  which 
recovery will have to occur is much shorter.  
9.3.3  ER-STEP tool 
Following the discussion regarding limitations of the technique, it would be very useful if 
there was tool support for ER-STEP. Tool support could also facilitate the restructuring 
of events to the error recovery focused view.  
9.4  Final remarks 
Error handling in screening programmes can be a complex, multi-departmental and inter-
organizational process; while detection is most likely to occur where test results are used 
(and  originally  requested),  rectification  of  the  technical  problem  can  only  take  place 
within  the  laboratory.  In  addition,  the  incident  response  can  only  be  considered  as 
complete once affected patients are all identified and contacted, as a misdiagnosis will 
continue to affect a patient as time passes. This part of error recovery may involve several 
other organizations, such as national and regulatory authorities, or independent auditors.  
 
Problem detection was the initial recovery related activity in all of the incidents that were 
discussed  here.  Yet  problem  detection  has  neither  been  given  enough  attention  in 
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occurs  without  the  presence  of  an  error,  and  the  turbulence  of  medical  environments 
along with limited time and resources do not allow for the investigation into any concern 
reported to the laboratory. Nonetheless, problem detection is critical as the plausibility of 
test results does not allow for error detection. The consideration of problem detection in 
the analysis of these four incidents has therefore been an important aspect of this thesis. 
 
The technique proposed perhaps requires some further application in order to calibrate 
and better define the boundaries between activities that seem to overlap. In any case, this 
is the first proposition of an error recovery focused technique; the findings of the multiple 
analyses resulted in the screening error recovery model which could be used to design 
error recovery processes in a laboratory setting. 
 
The involvement of physicians has been very important for the purposes of this work. A 
laboratory  supervisor  (Dr  Frank  Finley),  a  GP  surgeon  (Dr  James  Barnes)  and  an 
Emergency Medicine physician (Dr Robert Wears) have provided with very important 
insight, and with some evaluation and validation of the findings that resulted from this 
work.  
 
To conclude, this thesis aimed at increasing our understanding of an important problem 
that medical practice currently faces. The primary contribution of this thesis is therefore 
seen to be the set of conclusions that were derived in Chapter 6, which can be used to 
design error recovery processes in NHS screening services. The author hopes that such 
work will be continued, and, in the long run, will contribute to the improvement of the Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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ability  of  the  NHS  to  detect  laboratory  screening  errors  and  better  handle  them, 
eventually offering safer and of higher quality services to individuals.  Error handling in NHS screening programmes |  
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Appendix A: STEP cards 
 
A.1  Incident 1: Down’s screening errors, Sheffield 
The data source for this incident is the formal Sheffield Inquiry report (Ferres et al., 
2001).  The  ‘data  source’  cell  in  each  of  the  following  STEP  cards  will  refer  to  the 
specific paragraph number (description of events can be found in section 10, pp. 63-74 of 
the Report). In addition, the actors’ names have been disclosed; in the Report they have 
been  given  aliases  which  will  also  be  used  here.  Finally,  there  are  several  occasions 
where some information (in most cases the time/data event began and duration) has not 
been explicitly mentioned in the Report; therefore assumptions had to be made. Where 
necessary, these are highlighted by italic fonts in the STEP cards. 
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Event card id: Event 1.1 
Actor:  Dr T 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
7
th December, 1999 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.2 
Description:  Issues a draft of a 
document describing a 
new incident reporting 
scheme 
 
Event card id: Event 1.2 
Actor:   Dr B 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
1
st January, 2000 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.2 
Description:  Introduces the new 
incident reporting 
scheme 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.3 
Actor:  Mr R  
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
4
th January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.3 
Description:  Undertakes Y2K 
testing on PathLan. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.4 
Actor:  MGL sister 
Action:  Problem detection 
Event 
location: 
Hospital B 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid January 
Event 
duration: 
Approx. 2 weeks 
Data source:  10.3 
Description:  Becomes concerned 
as the number of 
positives she had 
received was lower 
than expected 
 
Event card id: Event 1.5 
Actor:  MGL sister 
Action:  Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital B 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.3 
Description:  Reports concerns to 
immun. Dept. over the 
phone. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.6 
Actor:  MGL sister 
Action:  Error detection 
Event 
location: 
Hospital B 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.3 
Description:  Notices the results for 
an older woman are 
“unrealistically low” 
 
Event card id: Event 1.7 
Actor:  MGL sister 
Action:  Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital B 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.3 
Description:  Reports concerns 
[Event 1.4] to 
immunology 
department over the 
phone. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.8 
Actor:  MGL sister 
Action:  Error indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital B 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.3 
Description:  Reports [Event 1.6] to 
Immun. Dept. over the 
phone. 
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Event card id: Event 1.9 
Actor:  Ms S 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.3 
Description:  Asks Mr R “colleague 
who had undertaken 
Y2K testing [Event 1.3] 
about event 1.8. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.10 
Actor:  Mr R 
Action:  Failure of Further 
investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immun. Dept. 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.3 
Description:  Reassures Ms S that 
there is no Y2K 
problem with PathLan. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.11 
Actor:  Ms S 
Action:  Failure of Further 
investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immun. Dept. 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of January 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.3 
Description:  Does not log incident 
[Events 1.7 and 1.8] 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.12 
Actor:  MGL sister 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Hospital B 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of January 
Event 
duration: 
2 months 
Data source:  10.4 
Description:  Monitors her own 
screen positive results  
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.13 
Actor:  MGL sister 
Action:  Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital B 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.5 
Description:  Reports concerns over 
the phone 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.14 
Actor:  <unknown> someone 
in immunology 
department 
Action:  Failure of Problem 
indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.5 
Description:  Reassures that there is 
no problem with Down’ 
screening. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.15 
Actor:  Mr K  
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 2000 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.6 
Description:  Requests from Dr A for 
a routine audit to be 
carried out for CPA 
visit due April 18
th. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.16 
Actor:  Dr A 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 2000 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.6 
Description:  In response to [Event 
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the data would not be 
available but he would 
be able to respond to 
any queries made 
during CPA visit, 
 
Event card id: Event 1.17 
Actor:  Mr K 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th April 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.7 
Description:  Performs random 
check of the ‘High 
book’. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.18 
Actor:  Mr K 
Action:  Problem detection 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th April 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.9 
Description:  Notices there are too 
many positives 
reported in High book. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.19 
Actor:  Mr K 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 17th 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.10 
Description:  Instructs Mr M to audit 
the screen positive rate 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.20 
Actor:  Mr M 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 17th 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.10 
Description:  Assumes ‘human error’ 
has been made during 
maintenance of the 
High book. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.21 
Actor:  Mr M 
Action:  Failure of further 
investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 17th 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.10 
Description:  Does not consider this 
[Event 1.19] as urgent 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.22 
Actor:  Mr K  
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 19th 
Event 
duration: 
18 days 
Data source:  10.11 
Description:  Goes on leave until 8
th 
of May 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.23 
Actor:  Midwife coordinator 
Action:  Problem detection 
Event 
location: 
Hospital C 
Time/date 
event began: 
13
th April 
Event 
duration: 
2 weeks 
Data source:  10.13 
Description:  Becomes concerned as 
no high-risk test results 
have been received 
 
Event card id: Event 1.24 
Actor:  Midwife coordinator 
Action:  Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital C 
Time/date 
event began: 
2
nd May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.13 
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[Event 1.23] to Mr M 
over the phone. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.25 
Actor:  Mr M 
Action:  Failure of problem 
indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
2
nd May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.13 
Description:  Does not consider 
Event 1.24 serious 
enough to notify Dr B. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.26 
Actor:  Midwife coordinator 
Action:  Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital C 
Time/date 
event began: 
Week commencing 2
nd 
May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.14 
Description:  Reports concerns 
again [Event 1.23], this 
time to Ms S (over the 
phone). 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.27 
Actor:  Ms S 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Same day as Event 
1.26 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.14 
Description:  Replies she will notify 
Mr M regarding [Event 
1.26] 
 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.28 
Actor:  Ms S 
Action:  Failure of Problem 
indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date  Same day as Event 
event began:  1.26 
Event 
duration: 
Until 17
th May 
Data source:  10.15 
Description:  Does not inform Mr M 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.29 
Actor:  Ms S 
Action:  Failure of Problem 
indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Same day as Event 
1.26 
Event 
duration: 
Until 17
th May 
Data source:  10.15 
Description:  Does not respond to 
[Event 1.26] 
 
Event card id: Event 1.30 
Actor:  Midwife coordinator 
Action:  Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital C 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.15 
Description:  Reports to Dr B that 
she hasn’t received a 
high-risk pregnancy 
report for 5 weeks, 
although she would 
expect 5-10 per week. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.31 
Actor:  Dr B 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.15 
Description:  Responds she will get 
back to her (midwife 
coordinator) regarding 
Event 1.30. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.32 
Actor:  Midwife coordinator 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
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Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.15 
Description:  Consults with the Head 
of Midwifery regarding 
what actions to take in 
order to pursue a 
resolution of her 
concerns. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.33 
Actor:  Midwife coordinator 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Hospital C 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.16 
Description:  Writes a letter to the 
immunology 
department addressed 
to Mr K 
 
Event card id: Event 1.34 
Actor:  Midwife coordinator 
Action:  Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Hospital C 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.16 
Description:  Writes a letter to the 
immunology 
department addressed 
to Mr K 
 
Event card id: Event 1.35 
Actor:  Midwife coordinator 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Hospital C 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.17 
Description:  Writes a letter to the 
immunology 
department addressed 
to Mr K 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.36 
Actor:  Dr B 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.17 
Description:  Has a discussion with 
Ms P regarding Event 
1.34. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.37 
Actor:  Ms P 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.17 
Description:  Informs Dr B Mr K had 
asked Mr M to 
undertake an audit 
earlier that month 
(May). 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.38 
Actor:  Mr M  
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Beginning of May 
Event 
duration: 
Until 17
th May 
Data source:  10.17 
Description:  Mr M does not perform 
audit. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.39 
Actor:  Dr B 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.17 
Description:  Requests audit to be 
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and have the results on 
his desk. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.40 
Actor:  Mr M 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
2 days 
Data source:  10.17 
Description:  Performs audit 
 
Event card id: Event 1.41 
Actor:  Antenatal staff 
Action:  Error detection (2) [(2) 
is required as this is a-
what seemed to be-
different error] 
Event 
location: 
Antenatal care 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.20 
Description:  Notice DoB in two 
Down’s screening 
reports are wrong. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.42 
Actor:  Antenatal staff 
Action:  Error indication (2) 
Event 
location: 
Antenatal care 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.20 
Description:  Report event 1.41 to 
Ms S, immunology 
department. 
Event card id: Event 1.43 
Actor:  Ms S 
Action:  No classification (2) 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.21 
Description:  Attempts to change 
DoBs for the two 
reports in event 1.42. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.44 
Actor:  Ms S 
Action:  Error detection 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.21 
Description:  Notices risk calculation 
remains unaltered 
following event 1.43. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.45 
Actor:  MS S 
Action:  Error indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.23 
Description:  Reports event 1.44 to 
Mr L. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.46 
Actor:  Mr L 
Action:  Error indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.23 
Description:  Phones Mr W at 
Hartlepool. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.47 
Actor:  Mr W 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Hartlepool hospital 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.23 
Description:  Mr W is absent 
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Event card id: Event 1.48 
Actor:  Mr L 
Action:  Error indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.23 
Description:  Leaves a voice-mail for 
Mr W. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.49 
Actor:  Mr M 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
18
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.20 
Description:  Places a note on Dr B’s 
desk writing “1.7%” 
following event 1.40. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.50 
Actor:  Dr B 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
7.00pm ,18
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.17 
Description:  Sees note (event 1.41) 
on his desk 
 
 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.51 
Actor:  Dr B 
Action:  Failure of further 
investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
7.00pm ,18
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.17 
Description:  Does not pay attention 
to that note (based on 
assumption that he did 
not understand what 
that note meant). 
 
Event card id: Event 1.52 
Actor:  Mr K 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Friday, 19
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.18 
Description:  Returns to work 
 
Event card id: Event 1.53 
Actor:  Dr B 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Friday, 19
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.18 
Description:  Is absent as his wife 
goes into labour.  
 
Event card id: Event 1.54 
Actor:  Dr B 
Action:  Problem indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
19
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.18 
Description:  Speaks on the phone 
with Mr K to confirm 
that the results are 
locked in his office. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.55 
Actor:  Mr K 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
19
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.18 
Description:  Agrees to look into the 
matter. 
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Event card id: Event 1.56 
Actor:  Midwife coordinator 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Evening, 19
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.19 
Description:  Phones Mr K regarding 
the letter she sent 
(event 1.33) 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.57 
Actor:  Mr K 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
22
nd May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.26 
Description:  Receives letter through 
fax (event 1.33). 
 
Event card id: Event 1.58 
Actor:  Dr B 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
22
nd May 
Event 
duration: 
1 day 
Data source:  10.26 
Description:  Away on paternity 
leave 
 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.59 
Actor:  Dr B 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
11:30am, 23
rd May 
Event 
duration: 
7 hours 
Data source:  10.27 
Description:  Is present at hospital 
(but not in immunology 
department). 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.60 
Actor:  Mr K 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
23
rd May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.28 
Description:  Asks Mr M to provide 
him with the results of 
the audit. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.61 
Actor:  Mr K 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
23
rd May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.28 
Description:  Examines audit results 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.62 
Actor:  Mr K 
Action:  Error detection 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
23
rd May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.28 
Description:  Notices only 2% 
positives had been 
reported since January.  
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.63 
Actor:  Mr K 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
23
rd May 
Event 
duration: 
“some time”  
Data source:  10.28 
Description:  Examines analytical 
values 
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Event card id: Event 1.64 
Actor:  Mr K 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
23
rd May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.28 
Description:  Urges Mr L to contact 
Mr W. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.65 
Actor:  Mr L 
Action:  Error indication 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Morning, 24
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.28 
Description:  Contacts Mr W, 
Hartepool  over the 
phone. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.66 
Actor:  Mr W 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Hartlepool 
Time/date 
event began: 
9:30am, 24
th May 
Event 
duration: 
Approx. 30’ 
Data source:  10.29 
Description:  Examines PathLan 
 
Event card id: Event 1.67 
Actor:  Mr W 
Action:  Error explanation 
Event 
location: 
Hartlepool 
Time/date 
event began: 
24
th May 
Event 
duration: 
A few minutes  
Data source:  10.29 
Description:  Identifies bug 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.68 
Actor:  Mr W 
Action:  Error correction 
Event 
location: 
Hartlepool 
Time/date 
event began: 
24
th May 
Event 
duration: 
A few minutes  
Data source:  10.29 
Description:  Removes bug 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.69 
Actor:  Mr K 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
24
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.30 
Description:  Informs Dr A that he 
will find all high-risk 
cases that have been 
wrongly reported (face-
to-face) 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.70 
Actor:  Mr K 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Morning, 24
th May 
Event 
duration: 
Approx. 12 hours (until 
11.30pm). 
Data source:  10.34 
Description:  Trawls through system 
to identify “the potential 
size of the problem”. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.71 
Actor:  Mr K 
Action:  Error explanation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
24
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.34 
Description:  Finds approx. 150 
high-risk pregnancies 
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reported as low-risk. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.72 
Actor:  Mr K 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
11.30pm, 24
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.34 
Description:  Emails findings [event 
1.71] to Dr B. 
 
Event card id: Event 1.73 
Actor:  Dr B 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
11.30pm, 25
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.35 
Description:  Sees email [event 1.72] 
 
 
Event card id: Event 1.74 
Actor:  Mr J 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Immunology 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
11.30pm, 24
th May 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  10.34 
Description:  Informs Chief 
Executive 
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A.2    Incident 2: Breast Cancer Screening errors, London 
 
The  data  source  for  this  incident  is  the  formal  Commission  for  Health 
Improvement report (CHI, 2002). The corresponding paragraph number will be 
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Event card id: Event 2.1 
Actor:  Patient 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
January 1999 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.1 
Description:  Receives letter from 
WoLBSS indicating 
that her mammogram 
was normal. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.2 
Actor:  Patient 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
2000 (before October) 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.1 
Description:  Moves to area X 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.3 
Actor:  BSS X 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
Breast  Screening 
Service X 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid-October 2000 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.1 
Description:  Receives patient’s file 
forwarded by WoLBSS 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.4 
Actor:  BSS X 
Action:  Error detection 
Event 
location: 
BSS X 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid-October 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.1 
Description:  Realize patient has 
been screened 
incorrectly by WoLBSS 
by comparing their 
mammogram with the 
previous. 
 
Event card id: Event 2.5 
Actor:  BSS X 
Action:  Error indication 
Event 
location: 
BSS X 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid-October 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.1 
Description:  Contact senior 
manager at WoLBSS 
by phone regarding 
event 2.4. 
 
Event card id: Event 2.6 
Actor:  BSS X 
Action:  Error indication 
Event 
location: 
BSS X 
Time/date 
event began: 
31
st October 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.2 
Description:  Send written 
confirmation of the 
incident to WoLBSS. 
 
Event card id: Event 2.7 
Actor:  Senior management 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
WoLBSS 
Time/date 
event began: 
1
st November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.2 
Description:  The matter of event 2.4 
is discussed in 
management meeting. 
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Event card id: Event 2.8 
Actor:  Senior management 
Action:  Failure of Further 
investigation 
 
Event 
location: 
WoLBSS 
Time/date 
event began: 
1
st November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.2 
Description:  The matter of event 2.4 
is not considered as 
important. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.9 
Actor:  Quality assurance 
reference centre 
relating to BSS X 
Action:  Error indication 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
1
st or 2
nd of November  
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.3 
Description:  Informs the London 
quality reference centre 
about event 2.4 
(“verbally”—it is 
assumed this was done 
over the phone). 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.10 
Actor:  Quality assurance 
reference centre 
relating to BSS X 
Action:  Error indication 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
Same day as event 2.9 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.3 
Description:  Forward the letter that 
was sent to WoLBSS 
[event 2.4] to the 
London quality 
reference centre. 
Event card id: Event 2.11 
Actor:  London quality 
reference centre 
Action:  No classification 
Event 
location: 
London 
Time/date 
event began: 
10
th November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.3 
Description:  Receive letter [event 
2.10] 
 
Event card id: Event 2.12 
Actor:  London quality 
reference centre 
Action:  Error indication 
Event 
location: 
London 
Time/date 
event began: 
13
th November 
Event 
duration: 
5 days 
Data source:  1.4 
Description:  Contacted senior 
management 
(WoLBSS) on “several 
occasions”, insisting 
that the matter [event 
2.4] be reported to the 
general manager of the 
imaging directorate of 
Hammersmith 
Hospitals NHS Trust) 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.13 
Actor:  WoLBSS 
Action:  Error indication 
 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.5 
Description:  Report the incident as 
critical incident to the 
general manager of the 
imaging directorate of 
Hammersmith 
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Event card id: Event 2.14 
Actor:  Trust chief operating 
officer/director of 
services  
Action:  Error indication 
 
Event 
location: 
Hammersmith 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.6 
Description:  Briefs the trust chief 
executive and medical 
director. 
 
Event card id: Event 2.15 
Actor:  London quality 
reference centre 
Action:  Error indication 
 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
22
nd November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.6 
Description:  Informs the national 
coordinator of the NHS 
Breast Screening 
Programme and the 
chair of its 
administrative group. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.16 
Actor:  London quality 
reference centre 
Action:  Error indication 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
23
rd November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.6 
Description:  Informs the officer with 
lead responsibility for 
cancer services at the 
NHS London regional 
office 
 
Event card id: Event 2.17 
Actor:  London quality 
reference centre 
Action:  Error indication 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
24
th November 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.6 
Description:  Confirms the incident in 
writing to the NHS 
London region director 
of public health. 
 
Event card id: Event 2.18 
Actor:  London quality 
reference centre 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
4
th December 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.7 
Description:  Call a meeting to 
discuss the incident.  
 
Event card id: Event 2.19 
Actor:  Meeting panel 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Hammersmith 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
4
th December 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.7 
Description:  An internal inquiry 
panel is established.  
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.20 
Actor:  Inquiry panel 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
WoLBSS 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early December 
Event 
duration: 
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Data source:  1.7 
Description:  Review documents and 
conduct interviews. 
 
Event card id: Event 2.21 
Actor:  Inquiry panel 
Action:  Error explanation 
Event 
location: 
WoLBSS 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early December 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.7 
Description:  Conclude that 
WoLBSS did not have 
a robust right results 
protocol. 
 
Event card id: Event 2.22 
Actor:  Inquiry panel 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
WoLBSS 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early December 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.7 
Description:  Suggest that an 
external audit company 
reviews the 
mammogram files of all 
women who had 
attended for screening 
since 1993 (nearly 
104,000 women and 
over 174,000 episodes) 
 
Event card id: Event 2.23 
Actor:  Inquiry panel 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Hammersmith 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
21
st December 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.8 
Description:  Report their findings to 
a meeting. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.24 
Actor:  Inquiry panel 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Hammersmith 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
22
nd December 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.8 
Description:  Report their findings to 
the trust chief 
executive. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.25 
Actor:  PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
WoLBSS 
Time/date 
event 
began: 
27
th February, 2001 
Event 
duration: 
Approx. 3 months 
Data source:  1.9 
Description:  Go through the files of all 
women screened since 
1993. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.26 
Actor:  Inquiry panel 
Action:  Error Explanation 
Event 
location: 
BSS X 
Time/date 
event began: 
July 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.10 
Description:  Compile a report with 
their findings. 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.27 
Actor:  chief executive 
Action:  Error indication 
Event 
location: 
Hammersmith 
Hospitals Trust’s 
Time/date 
event began: 
9
th March 
Event 
duration: 
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Data source:  1.11 
Description:  Request CHI’s 
assistance 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.28 
Actor:  CHI 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
10
th April 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.11 
Description:  Agree to conduct an 
investigation 
 
Event card id: Event 2.29 
Actor:  WoLBSS 
Action:  Error control 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
11
th June 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.12 
Description:  Suspend breast 
screening 
 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.30 
Actor:  CHI 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
WoLBSS 
Time/date 
event began: 
11
th June 
Event 
duration: 
Approx. 3 months 
Data source:  1.11 
Description:  Conduct investigation 
 
 
Event card id: Event 2.32 
Actor:  WoLBSS 
Action:  Error correction 
Event 
location: 
 
Time/date 
event began: 
10
th December 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  1.12 
Description:  Begin phased 
reintroduction of 
services. 
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 A.3    Incident 3: Breast Cancer Screening errors, Manchester 
 
Following  this  incident,  two  inquiries  were  conducted;  the  one  by  the  Expert 
Advisory Panel [2006], and the other by Professor Mark Baker [2006]. The two 
reports have been used to produce the STEP cards for this incident. The EAP 
report has paragraph number, but not the Baker report. For the later, the page 
number will therefore be entered in the STEP card source cell.  Error handling in NHS screening programmes | 216 
Nick Chozos, University of Glasgow 
Event card id: Event  3.1 
Actor:  Mammography 
radiographers 
Action:  Problem detection 
 
Event location:  Breast service, Trafford 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
8 months 
Data source:  Baker report, p6 
Description:  Become concerned over 
Dr H’s brusque style 
and high speed and 
brevity of reporting, the 
non-use of previous 
screening programme 
films in reporting 
mammograms and 
other practices, 
although no errors had 
been made. 
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.2 
Actor:  Mammography 
radiographers 
Action:  Problem indication 
Event location:  Breast service, Trafford 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  Baker report, p6 
Description:  Formally report their 
concerns [Event 3.1] to 
the Trust management. 
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.3 
Actor:  THT management 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event location:  Breast service, Trafford 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
<,unknown>, 
presumably less than a 
week 
Data source:  Baker report, p6 
Description:  Investigate Dr H’s 
practice. 
 
Event card id: Event  3.4 
Actor:  THT management 
Action:  Failure of Further 
investigation 
Event location:  Breast service, Trafford 
Hospitals Trust 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  Baker report, p6 
Description:  Do not find any errors or 
unacceptable behavior 
apart from the non-use 
of previous screening 
programme films. 
 
Event card id: Event  3.5 
Actor:  Radiologists 
Action:  error detection 
Event location:  Trafford Hospital 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  Baker report, p6 
Description:  Notice errors in Dr H’s 
reports 
 
Event card id: Event  3.6 
Actor:  Radiologists 
Action:  error indication 
Event location:  Trafford Hospital 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  Baker report, p6 
Description:  Inform Trust 
management about 
Event 3.5 
 
Event card id: Event  3.7 
Actor:  Trust management 
Action:  Failure of error 
recovery 
Event location:  Trafford Hospital 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
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Description:  Consider errors as 
isolated events 
 
Event card id: Event  3.8 
Actor:  Clinical staff  
Action:  problem detection 
Event location:  Trafford Hospital 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  Baker report, p6 
Description:  Started becoming 
concerned that Dr H’s 
work was not reliable. 
 
Event card id: Event  3.9 
Actor:  Clinical staff 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event location:  Trafford Hospital 
Time/date 
event began: 
November, 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  Baker report, p6 
Description:  Would double-check Dr 
H’s reports with other 
radiographers before 
communicating bad 
news to patients. 
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.10 
Actor:  Mammography 
radiographers 
Action:  Error detection 
Event location:  THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
April, 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  Baker report, p7 
Description:  Find  a  high  number  of 
errors  in  a  single  MDT 
patient list.  
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.11 
Actor:  Mammography 
radiographers 
Action:  Problem indication 
Event location:  THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
13
th April, 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  Baker report, p7,  
EAP report, 4.1 
Description:  Report their concerns 
again to Trust senior 
management. 
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.12 
Actor:  Mammography 
radiographers 
Action:  Error indication 
Event location:  THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
13
th April, 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  Baker report, p6, EAP 
report 4.1 
Description:  Report event 3.7 to 
Trust senior 
management. 
 
Event card id: Event  3.13 
Actor:  THT management 
Action:  Error control 
Event location:  Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
18
th April, 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  EAP report 4.1 
Description:  Suspend Dr H 
 
Event card id: Event  3.14 
Actor:  THT management 
Action:  Error indication 
Event location:  Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
19
th April 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  EAP report 4.1 
Description:  report the issue as a 
Serious Adverse Event 
to the Greater 
Manchester Strategic 
Health Authority 
(GMSHA) 
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Event card id: Event  3.15 
Actor:  GMSHA 
Action:  Error indication 
Event location:  GMSHA 
Time/date 
event began: 
19
th April 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  EAP report 4.1 
Description:  Inform the Department 
of Health.  
 
Event card id: Event  3.16 
Actor:  Nightingale Centre 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event location:  Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
20 April 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  EAP report 4.1 
Description:  Are instructed to 
conduct an audit of Dr 
H’s work 
 
Event card id: Event  3.17 
Actor:  Nightingale Centre 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event 
location: 
Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
26
th April 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  EAP report 4.1 
Description:  Commencement of the 
review of the 457 
Mammograms. 
 
Event card id: Event  3.18 
Actor:  Expert Advisory Panel  
Action:  Further investigation 
Event location:  Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
26
th April 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  Baker report, p6 
Description:  The panel is established 
 
Event card id: Event  3.19 
Actor:  Nightingale Centre 
Action:  Error explanation 
Event location:  Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
6th May 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  EAP report 4.1 
Description:  Findings of initial 
mammography review 
(457 mammograms) 
highlighted a significant 
number of differing 
reports. 
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.20 
Actor:  THT management 
Action:  Error indication 
Event location:  Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
27th May 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  EAP report 4.1 
Description:  Bury PCT became 
aware of the Serious 
Adverse Event due to a 
general alert regarding 
the excluded Consultant 
Radiologist being 
distributed to PCTs,  
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.21 
Actor:  THT management 
Action:  Error indication 
Event location:   
Time/date 
event began: 
17
th June 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  EAP report 4.1 
Description:  NPSA notified of 
incident 
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.22 
Actor:  Breast Screening 
Quality Assurance 
Team 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event location:  Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
1
st August 2005 
Event  Approx. one month Error handling in NHS screening programmes | 219 
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duration: 
Data source:  EAP report 4.1 
Description:  External review of 
general radiology 
images/films 
 
Event card id: Event  3.23 
Actor:  Breast Screening 
Quality Assurance 
Team 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event location:  Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
1
st September 2005 
Event 
duration: 
Apprx. 3 months 
Data source:  EAP report 4.1 
Description:  External review of 
clinical notes, cytology 
reports and 
histopathology reports 
 
Event card id: Event  3.24 
Actor:  Breast Screening 
Quality Assurance 
Team 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event location:  Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
1
st September 2005 
Event 
duration: 
Apprx. 4 months 
Data source:  EAP report 4.1 
Description:  External review of 
ultrasound patients 
notes/images 
 
Event card id: Event  3.25 
Actor:  Breast Screening 
Quality Assurance 
Team 
Action:  Error explanation 
Event location:  Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
21
st November 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:  EAP report 4.1 
Description:  Findings reported 
 
 
 
 
Event card id: Event  3.26 
Actor:  Breast Screening 
Quality Assurance 
Team 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event location:  Breast screening, THT 
Time/date 
event began: 
1
st December 2005 
Event 
duration: 
One month 
Data source:  EAP report 4.1 
Description:  External review of the 
28 patients with delayed 
diagnosis completed  
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A.4  Incident 4: STI screening errors, Florida 
As already mentioned, data for this analysis has been gathered with interviews. 
Therefore, the source cell will be left blank. 
 
 
Event card id: Event  4.1 
Actor:  Biochemistry department 
Action:  No classification 
Event location:  Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
January 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  New reporting system is 
introduced 
 
Event card id: Event  4.2 
Actor:  Charge nurse 
Action:  No classification 
Event location:  Emergency Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early April 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Returns from maternity 
leave 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event card id: Event  4.3 
Actor:  Charge nurse 
Action:  Problem detection 
Event location:  Emergency Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early April 
Event 
duration: 
2 weeks 
Data source:   
Description:  Notices there are no 
positives reported from 
Biochemistry department 
 
Event card id: Event  4.4 
Actor:  Charge nurse 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event location:  Emergency Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Discusses matter (event 
4.3) with a physician  
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Event card id: Event  4.5 
Actor:  Physician 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event location:  Emergency Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Advises nurse to contact 
the lab 
 
Event card id: Event  4.6 
Actor:  Charge nurse 
Action:  Problem indication 
Event location:  Emergency Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Informs lab that there 
are no positives being 
reported back to ED 
 
Event card id: Event  4.7 
Actor:  Biochemistry department 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event location:  Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Check tests carried out 
since change of 
equipment 
 
Event card id: Event  4.8 
Actor:  Biochemistry department 
Action:  Error explanation 
Event location:  Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Find positive tests in the 
system which have not 
been reported by 
reporting system 
 
Event card id: Event  4.9 
Actor:  Biochemistry department 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event location:  Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Check result reporting 
system 
 
Event card id: Event  4.10 
Actor:  Biochemistry department 
Action:  Error explanation 
Event location:  Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Identify/locate software 
bug 
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Event card id: Event  4.11 
Actor:  Biochemistry department 
Action:  Error correction 
Event location:  Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Remove software bug 
 
Event card id: Event  4.12 
Actor:  Biochemistry department 
Action:  Error correction 
Event location:  Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Change printout settings 
so that all results are 
reported 
 
Event card id: Event  4.13 
Actor:  Biochemistry department 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event location:  Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Search for all involved 
patients’ details 
 
Event card id: Event  4.14 
Actor:  Biochemistry department 
Action:  Error correction 
Event location:  Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
End of April 2003 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Call patients back for 
screening 
 
Event card id: Event  4.15 
Actor:  Charge nurse 
Action:  Problem detection 
Event location:  Emergency department 
Time/date 
event began: 
n/a, sometime in 2005 
Event 
duration: 
2 weeks 
Data source:   
Description:  Notices there are no 
positives being reported 
back from the lab 
 
Event card id: Event  4.16 
Actor:  Charge nurse 
Action:  No classification 
Event location:  Emergency Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early week 3 
Event   
duration: 
Data source:   
Description:  Recalls previous incident 
 
Event card id: Event  4.17 
Actor:  Charge nurse 
Action:  Problem indication Error handling in NHS screening programmes | 223 
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Event location:  Emergency Department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early week 3 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Informs lab no positives 
are being reported back 
to ED (face-to-face) 
 
Event card id: Event  4.18 
Actor:  Biochemistry department 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event location:  Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early week 3 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Do not find any errors or 
unacceptable behavior 
apart from the non-use 
of previous screening 
programme films. 
 
Event card id: Event  4.19 
Actor:  Biochemistry department 
Action:  Error explanation 
Event location:  Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early week 3 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Realize a flat used to 
check whether a test 
result is positive has 
been mistakenly 
deactivated 
 
 
Event card id: Event  4.20 
Actor:  Biochemistry 
department 
Action:  Error correction 
Event location:  Biochemistry 
department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Early week 3 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Reset flag 
 
Event card id: Event  4.21 
Actor:  Biochemistry department 
Action:  Further investigation 
Event location:  Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid week 3, 2005 
Event 
duration: 
 
Data source:   
Description:  Do not find any errors or 
unacceptable behavior 
apart from the non-use 
of previous screening 
programme films. 
 
Event card id: Event  4.22 
Actor:  Biochemistry department 
Action:  Error correction 
Event location:  Biochemistry department 
Time/date 
event began: 
Mid week 3, 2005 
Event   Error handling in NHS screening programmes | 224 
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duration: 
Data source:   
Description:  All involved patients are 
contacted for re-
screening Error handling in NHS screening programmes | 225 
  225 
Appendix B: ER-STEP exercise 
This appendix will present the exercise that was used for the validation of the proposed 
technique, and the solutions provided by the two participants. The discussion regarding 
the results of validation activities can be found in Chapter 8:. 
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Focusing Accident and Incident Analysis on Error Handling:  
Error Recovery focused Sequentially Timed Events Plotting (ER- 
STEP). 
 
Nick Chozos 
PhD Student 
Department of Computing Science 
University of Glasgow 
17, Lilybank Gardens 
mailto:Nick@dcs.gla.ac.uk 
07909793228 
 
 
Accident and incident analysis techniques aim at identifying and understanding the factors that 
resulted to a disaster or a ‘near- miss’. Such analyses are important, not only for the 
understanding of what caused an accident, but also for the understanding of how it could have 
been avoided, prevented, or better handled once the failure started to take place.  
 
In the following pages, you will find a brief description of an incident analysis technique, and an 
exercise for its evaluation. The technique (ER- STEP) focuses on the analysis of error handling 
activities following the detection of a problem/ error/ technical fault. A brief incident scenario 
will be introduced, and participants will be asked to analyse the error handling efforts with the 
proposed analytical technique. 
 
I would like to thank you for taking the time to conduct this exercise. Your findings will be 
compared to others’ who have performed the same analysis, in order to evaluate how consistent 
and applicable the technique can be. If you have any queries please contact me at the email 
address above, or my PhD supervisor (Professor Chris Johnson, mailto:Johnson@dcs.gla.ac.uk). Error handling in NHS screening programmes | 227 
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ER- STEP: Focusing accident analysis on error handling activities 
 
The technique presented here is an integration of an existing technique called Sequentially Timed 
Events  Plotting  (STEP),  and  the  Error  Recovery  Framework,  a  theoretical  framework  that 
described  the  sequence  of  events  that  take  place  during  error  handling,  from  detection  to 
recovery. STEP and the Error Recovery Framework will be introduced, before presenting Error 
Recovery focused- STEP, the integrated technique. An example will also be presented, in order to 
suggest how the technique should be applied during an incident analysis. 
 
1.  Sequentially Timed Events Plotting 
STEP was developed by the USA Department of Energy. STEP is a reconstruction technique 
which presents the sequence of events as they evolved from left to right, denoting the actors’ 
involvement. Figure 1 illustrates how STEP is applied in incident and accident analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of incident analysis with STEP 
 
In order to focus the analysis on error handling activities, STEP has been integrated with the Error 
Recovery Framework, which will be presented in the next section. 
 
2.  The Error Recovery Framework 
The framework presented here is an adaptation of existing frameworks, while taking into account 
error detection theory from psychology and cognitive science. Figure 1 presents the sequence of 
the different stages that an error recovery process will go through. Each stage will be described in 
this section. Error handling in NHS screening programmes | 228 
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Figure 2: The Error Recovery Framework 
 
Problem Detection: Initial concerns that something may be wrong. During problem detection the 
operator is not certain that there is an error or fault in the system. At this initial stage, the operator 
would have a ‘feeling’ based on experience and expertise, rather than any evidence suggesting 
concerns are valid. It is possible the operator might not act upon those concerns, but if they build 
up  through  time,  the  operator  will  either  proceed  with  problem  indication,  or  further 
investigation.  
 
Error Detection: A near miss, incident, or a system indication that something is wrong. Unlike 
problem detection, error detection is a strong and clear indication of a system failure. However, 
error detection does not suggest the causes of the error have been identified. Further investigation 
might still be necessary in order to find the exact nature of the failure, and what caused it. 
 
 
Further Investigation: Actions to find out if there is an error, what the error is, what the extent 
of the failure is. Activities range from seeking advice for further action to investigation into 
system elements that might be problematic, carrying out audits etc. Following problem detection, 
the operator might consult with a colleague, monitor system behaviour, or conduct other activities 
in order to determine if there is an error. Further investigation varies depending on the previous 
error  recovery  stage  that  took  place.  If  it  follows  error  detection,  where  more  evidence  is 
available, further investigation may include a range of different activities, all of which aim at 
finding out more about what caused the error. 
 
Problem Indication: Reporting of concerns (problem detection). Reporting of concerns takes 
place when the operator that has detected a problem informs someone who can act upon these 
Problem 
Detection 
Error 
Detection 
Error 
Indication 
Error 
Explanation 
Error Control and/ or 
Correction 
Further Investigation 
Incident Timeframe 
Problem 
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concerns. It is important to distinguish problem indication from communication that takes place 
during further investigation. During further investigation, the person that detected a problem/ 
error,  will  communicate  in  order  to  find  out  more  about  the  potentially  problematic  system 
element, while during problem indication, the operator will report his/ her concerns to someone 
who can do something about it. 
 
Error Indication:  Reporting  of  error detection.  Error  indication  may  take  place in  different 
forms: Incident report, communication over the phone, email etc.  
 
Error Explanation: The causes of the error are identified. Error explanation usually follows 
further investigation. Once the causes of the failure have been identified and explained, error 
correction can be completed. 
 
Error  Correction:  Actions  are  taken  to  eliminate  the  error  or  fault  that  took  place. 
Modifications or interventions are introduced in order to assure the same error does not take place 
again.    
 
The process of error recovery does not necessarily have to go through all stages. Also, some 
stages might be repeated, while the failure of a stage will either stop error recovery, or take it 
back to a previous stage. 
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3.  Error Recovery- focused –STEP (ER STEP) 
 
Figure 3 presents the application of ER STEP to the same sequence of events illustrated in figure 
2.  The  classification  of  events  has  been  done  according  to  the  different  stages  of  the  Error 
Recovery Framework. 
 
Figure 3: Analysis of error handling efforts with ER- STEP 
 
Note event E3 which is labelled as ‘No Classification’. This is done when an event cannot be 
categorised under any of the stages of the error recovery process. 
 
When the event following further investigation and/ or problem/ error indication results in 
slowing down or stopping the process, the event is labelled as ‘Failure of- label of previous 
stage’.  In the example, a Lab technician that was going to investigate the ED nurse’s reports 
failed to do so. Event E5 is then labelled as ‘Failure of Further Investigation’. 
 
The proposed technique aims at analysing error handling activities that took place during an 
incident. The labelling of events with the appropriate error recovery stage name, and the timely 
sequence can assist analysts to ‘filter’ activities, and to consider where error recovery was 
problematic. 
 
However, in order for the technique to be applicable, it is important to have solid definitions of 
the error recovery stages, so that analyses are consistent and coherent. The purpose of this 
exercise is to evaluate this technique with its application to the same incident scenario by multiple 
participants. In the next section, the incident scenario will be presented.Error handling in NHS screening programmes | 231 
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4.  Incident scenario 
 
This scenario describes part of the events that took place during an incident in the Immunology 
Department of Sheffield Northern General Hospital. A software system used to calculate the 
likelihood of pregnant women giving birth to children with Downs Syndrome was not compliant 
with the millennium bug. As a result, calculations came back as negative, and pregnant women 
were screened as ‘low- risk’, even if they should be in the ‘high- risk’ area. The error resulted in 
the misdiagnosis of 235 women over a period of 5 months (January 1
st to May 23
rd 2000).  From 
early on, several attempts were made by nurses that had concerns to contact the lab and resolve 
the matter. However, due to a number of reasons, error recovery efforts failed.  
 
Following you will find 11 events that describe activities following January 1
st 2000, during the 
response to the first indications of the software error. 
 
4.1  Event Classification 
 
Participants are asked to label the 11 events according to the stages of the Error Recovery 
Process, and then the sequence of events will be drawn in a STEP diagram as illustrated in figure 
3. Events can be labeled as [No Classification, Problem Detection, Error Detection, Further 
Investigation, Problem Indication, Error Indication, Error Explanation, Error Correction, 
Failure of Further Investigation, Failure of Problem Indication, Failure of Error Indication] 
 
Events following January 1
st, 2000. 
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B.1  First participant’s solution 
 
E1: By the first two weeks of January, A Maternity and Gynaecology Liaison Sister at one of the 
hospitals (Hospital A) had become concerned as the number of screen positives she had received 
was lower than expected. _ Problem Detection __________________________ 
 
E2: Following her concerns, she made the Immunology Department aware of this at the end of 
January  with  a  phone  call,  during  which  she  spoke  with  Ms  S,  the  acting  MLSO. 
______________________Problem Indication ____ 
 
E3: At the end of January, the Liaison Sister also queried a result for an older woman which she 
believed to be unrealistically low. She also spoke to Ms S about this matter. 
______________________Problem Indication _____ 
 
E4: Ms S had mentioned it to a colleague, Ms J in Hartlepool Hospital who had undertaken the 
Y2K test on January 4
th.  __ Further Investigation _________________________
 
 
E5: Ms J reassured her that everything was fine. __ Failure of Further Investigation__________ 
 
E6:  Ms  S  did  not  log  this  incident  because  she  did  not  regard  it  as  very  significant. 
____________________ Failure of Further Investigation _ 
 
E7:  The  Liaison  Sister  decided  to  monitor  her  own  screen  positive  results. 
____________________ Further Investigation ______ 
 
E8: She phoned the Immunology Department again in April to express her concerns. She spoke 
to Mr M. ____________Problem Indication ______________ 
 
E9:  Following  her  reports  in  April,  she  was  told  that  it  would  be  looked  into  by  Mr  M.  
____________________Further Investigation ______ 
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E10: During March and April, whenever results seemed unusual, the Liaison Sister would ring up 
and query the results for individual patients when they seemed unusual. ____________________ 
___________________ Problem Indication ________ 
 
E11:  On  all  occasions  she  received  assurances  that  there  was  no  problem. 
___________________Failure of Further Investigation _______ 
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4.2  ER STEP diagram 
 
Now that events have been labeled, the ER STEP diagram can be drawn up. On the left of the 
vertical axis please place the title of each actor and the department/ organization they belong to. 
As events are drawn up from left to right, the corresponding date/ time of the event should be 
written below the horizontal axis, as in the example presented in Figure 3. Since events have been 
labeled in the previous part of the exercise, box diagrams do not need to contain the description of 
the event. It is advised that each box contains the event number and the error recovery stage name 
(e.g. E20: Error Detection) 
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Time 
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Ms S 
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n 
 
E1 
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n 
E3 
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Indicat
n 
 
E4 
Further 
Investigation 
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Further 
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E6 
Failure 
Further 
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E7 
Further 
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n 
 
E8 
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n 
 
E9 
Further 
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n 
 
E10 
Problem 
Indicat
n 
 
E11 
Failure 
Further 
Investg
n 
Early Jan  Late January 
E4 
Further 
Investigation 
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Please feel free to leave any comments in this page 
 
Uncertain as to number of actual events – should they be broken down further?   
Also uncertain as to time plotting - should timing of events be more detailed? 
E.G. Problems are notified twice in separate events to Actor B Ms S, but event numbers do not 
detail this unless event label (E2) is repeated twice. 
Same applies to E4..both Actor B Ms S and Actor C Ms J are engaged in ‘further 
investigation’..separate events? 
Events in March / April overlap…is loss of information on ER-STEP important? 
Unclear whether or not Actor A’s efforts end in failure. 
Insufficient detail to report multiple ‘problem indication’ events from Actor A to unspecified 
persons, presumably in the lab who provided assurances. Error handling in NHS screening programmes | 237 
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B.2  Second participant’s solution 
E1: By the first two weeks of January, A Maternity and Gynaecology Liaison Sister at one of 
the hospitals (Hospital A) had become concerned as the number of screen positives she had 
received was lower than expected. __Problem Detection_________________________ 
 
E2: Following her concerns, she made the Immunology Department aware of this at the end of 
January with a phone call, during which she spoke with Ms S, the acting MLSO.  
_______Problem Indication___________________________ 
 
E3: At the end of January, the Liaison Sister also queried a result for an older woman which she 
believed to be unrealistically low. She also spoke to Ms S about this matter. 
_Problem Indication__________________________ 
 
E4: Ms S had mentioned it to a colleague, Ms J in Hartlepool Hospital who had undertaken the 
Y2K test on January 4
th.  __Further Investigation_________________________
 
 
E5: Ms J reassured her that everything was fine. ___Failure of Further Investigation ___ 
 
E6: Ms S did not log this incident because she did not regard it as very significant. _Failure of 
Problem Indication____________________ 
 
E7:  The  Liaison  Sister  decided  to  monitor  her  own  screen  positive  results.  ____Further 
Investigation_______________________ 
 
E8: She phoned the Immunology Department again in April to express her concerns. She spoke 
to Mr M. ___Problem Indication____(? No definite proof  of error)____________________ 
 
E9:  Following  her  reports  in  April,  she  was  told  that  it  would  be  looked  into  by  Mr  M.  
___Further Investigation________________________ 
 
E10: During March and April, whenever results seemed unusual, the Liaison Sister would ring 
up  and  query  the  results  for  individual  patients  when  they  seemed  unusual.  ___Problem 
Indication________________________ 
 
E11:  On  all  occasions  she  received  assurances  that  there  was  no  problem.  ___Failure  of 
Problem Indication________________________ 
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4.3  ER STEP diagram 
 
Now that events have been labeled, the ER STEP diagram can be drawn up. On the left of the 
vertical axis please place the title of each actor and the department/ organization they belong to. 
As events are drawn up from left to right, the corresponding date/ time of the event should be 
written below the horizontal axis, as in the example presented in Figure 3. Since events have 
been labeled in the previous part of the exercise, box diagrams do not need to contain the 
description of the event. It is advised that each box contains the event number and the error 
recovery stage name (e.g. E20: Error Detection) Error handling in NHS screening programmes | 239 
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Please feel free to leave any comments in this page 
 
 
Found timing of events slightly difficult as not always discrete events, may cover a time period 
so become difficult to order and display  
 
Could argue need to break down into more events but appreciate do not want to become 
swamped with detail. It may be better to have description of event in box. 
 
Are repeated Problem Indications simply that or do they become a part of the Further 
Investigation process as they help to build a picture of the potential problem and start to confirm 
that it really exists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 